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13. What explains observed reluctance to trade? A
comprehensive literature review
Kathryn Zeiler*

1.

INTRODUCTION

Valuation gaps and exchange asymmetries are among the most widely studied phenomena
in the field of behavioral economics. They are also among the most widely applied in the
law literature (Klass and Zeiler 2013). A valuation gap exists when the most a person is
willing to pay for an item (WTP) is less than the least amount that same person is willing
to accept to give up the same item if endowed with it (WTA). Asymmetric exchange
behavior is observed when a person is reluctant to give up an endowed item in exchange
for another item of comparable value.1 Early observations of such reluctance to trade
were noted as evidence against standard utility theory, which assumes that one’s valuation
of an item is independent of whether one is endowed with the item (Thaler 1980; Kelman
1979). Since then, researchers have attempted to develop and test numerous theories
designed to explain observed reluctance to trade. In the meantime, legal scholars have
been busy spinning out hundreds of applications of this finding in every conceivable
area of law—from adverse possession in property law to default rules in contract law to
beneficiary’s rights in trust law to right to discoveries in intellectual property law, and on
and on and on (Klass and Zeiler 2013; Korobkin 2014).
The purpose of this chapter is to present the current state of the social science literature
related to observed reluctance to trade. Georgantzís and Navarro-Martínez (2010, p. 2)
summarize the state of the literature best: “[D]espite the overwhelming volume of evidence
on the WTA–WTP gap accumulated to date, researchers are still far from agreement on
the nature of the disparity and even on its very existence.”2 Numerous theories have been
proposed and few can be ruled out based on the evidence to date. While reluctance to trade
has been observed in many laboratory settings, such behavior does not seem to be robust.
From a scientific perspective, we are compelled to place the most weight on theories that

* Thanks are due to Keith Hylton, Owen Jones, Michael Meurer, Charles Plott, Theodore
Sims, and Joshua Teitelbaum for valuable comments and suggestions.
1
Valuation gaps and exchange asymmetries are often referred to as “endowment effects.”
The name is confusing when it comes to the cause of gaps and asymmetries because it implies
that endowment is the cause. For this reason, some have adopted less theory-suggestive names for
the observed phenomena (e.g., Plott and Zeiler 2005, 2007). I use “valuation gap” and “exchange
asymmetry” throughout depending on the context in which the phenomenon is observed. I use
“reluctance to trade” to refer to the general phenomenon.
2
See also, Biel et al. (2011) (“At present, there is no sign of an approaching consensus . . .”)
and Lunn and Lunn (2014) (“There remains no agreed explanation for the finding that experimental subjects and survey respondents generally set a minimum selling price for an item that is two or
more times higher than the maximum those without the same item will pay to acquire it”).
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are able to organize the largest swaths of reported data. When a theory’s predictions fail to
garner robust support, the theory is either discarded or updated. As existing theories are
revised and tested, new theories arise and are often supported by initial data, bolstered by
replications and checks on robustness, and sometimes fail to stand up to on-going robustness checks. The social science literature on the topic, mostly in the fields of economics
and psychology, is an on-going conversation between theory and empirical verification,
and, at present, several theories stand as possible winners..
Despite the uncertainty that exists about the drivers of observed reluctance to trade and
the continual evolution of the social science knowledge base on the phenomenon,3 legal
scholarship has not kept pace.4 The social science literature on reluctance to trade has
thoroughly saturated legal scholarship. Legal scholars regularly make claims that are not
supported by the existing literature. Oftentimes legal scholars rely on decades-old sources
or other legal scholars’ descriptions of the literature, which are often outdated, incorrect
or incomplete. Given the rapid pace of discovery, a firm understanding of the drivers
of observed reluctance to trade cannot be gained by plucking one study or even a large
handful of studies from the now vast literature. Understanding what we know and what
remains unknown requires a survey and a synthesis of the entire literature. And, because
the literature is continually developing, snapshots at particular points in time quickly
become outdated. Useful importation of knowledge from the social sciences requires a
full understanding of the state of the literature at the moment of importation, including
what we know and what we’re uncertain about.5
Understanding social science literatures is not a matter of simply understanding the
contributions of individual studies. Each study is connected to the larger literature in
some way, and understanding a study’s import requires an analysis of how it advances
what we already know and what new questions it gives rise to. When new findings are published, our understanding of best explanations shifts. We get answers to some questions,
and, often, new questions arise. Experimenters work on separating theories by designing
clever environments that produce divergent predictions from competing theories. Those
efforts teach us not only about the relative predictive value of the theories but also about
the influences of experiment design choices meant to control for alternative explanations
or measure variables of interest (e.g., valuations of goods as owner and non-owner).
The purpose of this chapter is three-fold. First, it presents one viewpoint on the state of
the literature. The bottom line is that reported data lend support to several theories, and
more work is required to better understand the causes of reluctance to trade. A number
of open questions remain. Second, the chapter provides an example of how we might
analyze individual experimental studies to determine how they fit into a literature. This
sort of analysis is necessary to properly update our beliefs about the causes of observed

Just in the last decade, at least 73 studies have been published in journals or posted as working papers: 8 in 2006, 9 in 2007, 3 in 2008, 4 in 2009, 6 in 2010, 11 in 2011, 9 in 2012, 5 in 2013, 13
in 2014 and 5 in 2015.
4
See Klass and Zeiler (2013) for a discussion of the problems with importation of the reluctance to trade literature into legal scholarship and ideas for mitigating them. Zeiler (2010) makes
the more general case.
5
To assist in this endeavor, I regularly update this review. Readers can find the most recent
version at http://sites.bu.edu/kzeiler/research-2/. A link to a glossary of terms also appears there.
3
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phenomena. Third, the chapter offers examples of methods employed to critique individual studies. To this end, studies are not merely summarized but are evaluated along
many dimensions, including the soundness of the experiment design, the connection
between tested theories and the design, and the strength of inferences drawn from results.
Best practices, for example, require the design to incorporate all necessary features of the
tested theory and to control for alternative explanations.
This is not the first review of the reluctance to trade literature. Others have both
summarized it and attempted to draw conclusions from it about what drives observed
reluctance to trade. A few meta-analyses examine how various features of experimental
environments impact subject choices (Horowitz and McConnell 2002; Sayman and
Öncüler 2005; Tuncel and Hammit 2014). These studies reveal wide variation in experiment design and help in the endeavor to develop a set of controls for alternative explanations—many of which relate to the difficulties that arise when we ask individuals to do
something they usually resist: reveal the most they would be willing to pay for something
and the least they would be willing to accept to give something up. Ericson and Fuster
(2014) walk us through what they classify as three waves of research in the field: early
experiments and theory, challenges to the existence and interpretation of valuation gaps,
and expectations-based reference points.6 This chapter differs from their review in two
main ways. First, I include (for better or worse) a larger number of studies. Second, and
more importantly, we reach different conclusions. While Ericson and Fuster claim that
“[l]oss aversion . . . is . . . still the leading paradigm for understanding the endowment
effect” (p. 555), this chapter concludes that the data support other theories just as well
and possibly better. Morewedge and Giblin (2015) step through several posited theories
from the literature and provide a quick snapshot of evidence for and against each. They
conclude that an extension of one theory, which they refer to as “attribute sampling
bias,” can account for a wide set of the reported evidence. While they do not explain
their conclusions (they cover 125 studies in eight journal pages), the review organizes
the literature through a helpful lens. This review, which is substantially longer, provides
a thicker analysis and offers methodological critiques. Finally, some literature reviews,
unfortunately, are misleading and possibly at least partly responsible for the confused
legal scholarship.7

6
They also describe a number of alternative theories and point to evidence in support of and
against each. This chapter discusses expectations-based reference points and all other terms used
but not defined in this section.
7
See e.g., Kahneman et al. (2008). They claim that “[t]here is . . . little or no empirical support
for the empirical assertion of people’s symmetrical valuations of gains and losses and the presumed
economic choices and behavior that results [sic] from them. Instead, tests consistently indicate that
people value the loss of an entitlement more, and usually far more, than a fully commensurate gain
and make choices accordingly” (p. 939). This chapter’s summary of the literature makes it clear that
by the mid-2000s several published studies called into question the assumption that losses are more
painful than gains of the same size. While their review was published in 2008, the most recent study
it cites was published in 1998. Between 1998 and 2008, tens of published studies had reshaped the
landscape.
Korobkin (2014) draws conclusions from a relatively small subset of published studies. His
review covers roughly 40 studies by my count. As a point of reference, this chapter catalogs over
150 published studies, roughly 130 of which were published before his chapter was printed. Caution
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The chapter begins by describing the standard model of preferences, which generally
assumes that valuation is independent of ownership status, and then catalogs early
findings published in the 1980s that seem to suggest that ownership status influences
valuation. This decade of research was characterized by a number of studies designed
to test various potential explanations for observed reluctance to trade, and the results
did not point to any one theory. Despite this, the literature gravitated towards a single
theory—endowment theory, which assumes that preferences are reference-dependent
and that individuals are averse to losses. With endowment theory on the rise, some went
to work to investigate the conditions that might trigger loss aversion and those that
might reduce its effects. Evidence suggested that we might be especially reluctant to
trade goods that trigger moral commitments (e.g., objects with intrinsic value like pine
trees), goods that signal something about our characteristics (e.g., earned goods), goods
that we consider when we’re in particular emotional states, and goods that we intend to
consume rather than ones that we’re in the business of trading in markets or that don’t
belong to us but to firms that employ us. While some pointed to these sorts of findings
as evidence of the context-dependent nature of loss aversion, others leveraged them to
develop competing theories in an attempt to better unify the data. Since the early 1990s, a
number of theories have been developed and tested by both economists and psychologists
including substitution theory, expectation theory, preference uncertainty, mere-ownership
theory, enhancement theory, subject misconceptions, and regret avoidance. The chapter
walks through each proposed theory, cataloging the evidence for and against. While some
theories have garnered more support from the data than others, no single theory yet
deserves the title of leading theory. In addition, the phenomenon itself has proved too
unstable to warrant general claims that valuations depend on ownership (or expectations
over ownership) or that individuals are generally reluctant to trade. Given the current
state of the literature, to make such claims is to misrepresent the full set of results. As this
chapter makes clear, much more work is required to develop a theory or set of theories
worthy of designating the leading theory.

2.

NEOCLASSICAL THEORY ASSUMES WTA EQUALS WTP

Neoclassical microeconomic theory assumes that, ignoring wealth effects,8 one’s valuation
for a good (with many available substitutes)9 is independent of whether one is endowed
should be used when considering conclusions drawn from roughly a third of all relevant studies.
One omitted study (e.g., Plott and Zeiler 2011) was published in the same issue of a journal that
contained an included and highly influential study (e.g., Isoni et al. 2011) that posed a serious challenge to previous work. Korobkin’s readers, unfortunately, are getting not only an incomplete view
but also a biased view of the literature. In addition to the lack of comprehension and the apparent
cherry picking of included studies, Korobkin confuses alternative theories for explanations of loss
aversion. For example, he argues that attachment to endowed goods drives loss aversion, but the
authors of attachment theory offer it as an alternative to loss aversion. See discussion of mereownership theory infra.
8
A wealth effect (or income effect) can occur when purchasing power changes as a result of
a change in wealth (or income). In laboratory experiments, we might worry about wealth effects
caused by endowing owners with a good and giving nothing to non-owners. The non-owners are
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with the good. That is, standard utility theory assumes that the most one is willing to pay
to obtain a good is the same as the minimum amount one is willing to accept to give up
that same good if endowed with it (Willig 1976; Randall and Stoll 1980). This implies
that indifference curves are reversible. An indifference curve, as illustrated in Figure 13.1,
indicates the rate of substitution between two commodities. The individual characterized
by the indifference curve in the figure is equally happy with one mug and $10 as he is
with two mugs and $5. If endowed with one mug and $10, he is indifferent between his
endowment and giving up $5 to obtain another mug. In the reverse, if endowed with two
mugs and $5, he is indifferent between his endowment and giving up a mug in exchange
for $5. Regardless of the starting point, his valuation for the mug (the amount that makes
him indifferent between the money and a mug) is the same—$5.9
That assumption was called into question by various researchers who observed disparities in WTP and WTA in the 1970s. Hammack and Brown (1974) reported one of the first
observations of reluctance to trade. A hypothetical survey of duck hunters revealed a gap

$10
Indifference
curve

$5

1

Figure 13.1

2

mugs

A reversible indifference curve

less wealthy, on average, than owners and so might be willing to pay less to obtain the good relative
to the amount owners are willing to forgo to keep the good. One way to avoid wealth effects is to
ensure that potential buyers and potential sellers begin on the same indifference curve by endowing
potential buyers with an amount of cash that is equivalent to the average value of the good given to
potential sellers. For example, some experimenters endow potential buyers with cash in an amount
equal to the average reported WTA (e.g., Morrison 1997b).
9
See more on the impact of substitutes, infra.
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in valuations of the right to duck hunt on wetlands. On average, those with a hypothetical
right to hunt were willing to accept on average $1,044 to give it up while those without the
right were willing hypothetically to pay an average of only $247 to get it. This, and similar
observations,10 motivated a long line of laboratory investigations to measure valuations in
controlled conditions in an effort to determine the cause of observed gaps.

3.

GAPS IN THE LAB: AN EARLY EXPLORATION OF
VALUATION ELICITATION PROCEDURES

One of the first tested hypotheses was that observed valuation gaps were caused by the
hypothetical nature of the valuation elicitation device used in earlier studies reporting
gaps.11 Knetsch and Sinden (1984) hypothesized that the gap was the result of the
hypothetical nature of such contingent valuation studies. They were among the first to
estimate reluctance to trade in the laboratory under non-hypothetical conditions. They
endowed half their subjects with lottery tickets, which gave the ticket holders a chance to
win a choice between a $70 bookstore gift certificate and $50 in cash. The second group
was given an opportunity to purchase a lottery ticket for $2 and had access to credit if
short on cash. Those endowed with lottery tickets were given a chance to sell their tickets
for $2. Exchanges were performed individually and privately to control for “information
influences and information flows” (p. 510). To control transaction costs, all subjects were
required to stop at a cash desk to discuss options. If the hypothetical nature of previous
experiments caused the observed gap, then removing this feature would remove the gap.
For example, Bishop and Heberlein (1979) elicited valuations for non-hypothetical WTP,
hypothetical WTA and hypothetical WTP for a goose-hunting permit. Hypothetical WTA
exceeded non-hypothetical WTP, which exceeded hypothetical WTP. Despite the implicit assumption of all theories that choices have actual consequences, many others have elicited valuations
under hypothetical conditions. For example, Gerking et al. (1988) reported a WTP–WTA gap in
hypothetical valuations for job safety. Johnson et al. (1993) reported hypothetical gaps in insurance
deductibles, Hartman et al. (1991) for residential electrical services, Korobkin (1998) for contract
terms, Hoorens et al. (1999) for time (i.e., purchase and sale of hypothetical labor), Cook and Wu
(2001) for lottery tickets and Nash and Rosenthal (2014) for position in a line to choose a dorm
room. Chilton et al. (2012), after training subjects to report their true valuations, reported mixed
results for valuations of hypothetical health conditions. Some have studied why average hypothetical WTA tends to be higher than average non-hypothetical WTA. Li et al. (2002) for example
suggest that individuals are uncertain about their preferences and they “do not search for their true
preferences in a hypothetical situation as intensively as in real transactions.” In addition, they posited that risk aversion and preference uncertainty pushes individuals who are uncertain about the
welfare effects of proposed changes to report higher WTA values relative to WTA values reported
by individuals who are more certain about their preferences. It should be noted that Horowitz and
McConnell’s (2002) meta-analysis of gap studies reported no difference in results from studies
using “incentive-compatible” elicitation devices and those that do not, although they (oddly) count
some hypothetical studies as incentive-compatible. In more recent meta-analyses, Sayman and
Öncüler (2005) and Tuncel and Hammitt (2014) reported significantly smaller disparities in studies
that use truly incentive-compatible mechanisms.
11
For example, see Jones-Lee et al. (1985) and Viscusi et al. (1987). For a dated and yet still
relevant intellectual exchange on the pros and cons of employing the contingent valuation method
to elicit valuations for non-market goods, see Cummings et al. (1986).
10
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It did not. A smaller proportion of owners chose to sell their lottery tickets relative to
the proportion of non-owners who chose to buy a ticket, suggesting that owners’ valuations for the tickets were, on average, higher than non-owners’. The authors conducted
additional tests to check the impact of lowering the value of the prizes available and the
cash trade amount to test the influence of familiarity with the task, and to test robustness across different subject pools (e.g., employed people v. students). The results were
robust to these variations. Only one treatment produced no exchange asymmetry. In this
treatment, non-endowed subjects were given cash and very little time passed between the
moment of endowment and choices. The authors proposed two possible explanations for
the lack of reluctance to trade: the expressed desire by subjects to participate in the group
activity and a possible lack of belief that the cash and tickets were in fact owned given
the short period of time between endowment and trade decisions.12 Generally, though,
while valuation gaps decreased relative to those estimated using hypothetical elicitation
devices, statistically significant gaps remained.13 Knetsch and Sinden attributed these gaps
to asymmetric evaluation of realized income and opportunity income.14 They pointed to
several potential sources of this asymmetric valuation, including cognitive biases, regret
avoidance, and reference-dependent loss aversion, a feature of preferences posited by
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) that assumes individuals experience a greater subjective
effect of a loss from some reference point relative to an equivalent gain from that same
point. Loss aversion is one feature of a theory some refer to as “endowment theory”
(Klass and Zeiler 2013), an application of prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979)
to contexts of riskless choice (see Tversky and Kahneman 1991).15
Coursey et al. (1987) explored the possibility that flaws in the methods Knetsch and
Sinden (1984) used to elicit choices might explain their results. They noted that the
use of lottery tickets, and the uncertainty they introduce, might have confounded the
results. In addition, they point to the lack of a demand-revealing, market-like elicitation
mechanism16 and of opportunities for subjects to understand that reporting their true

A large literature has developed to investigate the relevance of the strength of reference states
and what exactly sets reference points. See infra for details.
13
Bishop et al. (1983) also explored the hypothetical nature of contingent valuation studies and
hypothesized that “contingent markets are too artificial to provide a sufficient context for developing accurate values” (p. 620). While the authors did not estimate gaps, substantial differences in
valuations were observed depending on whether outcomes were hypothetical or non-hypothetical
and whether subjects were asked to report WTP or WTA. Hypothetical elicitation devices were
found to result in higher WTA and lower WTP relative to non-hypothetical elicitation devices.
14
It is possible that income (or wealth) effects explain observed reluctance to trade. Specifically,
non-owners might offer to pay less than the amount owners are willing to accept because nonowners, on average, have less wealth than owners, who were endowed with some item at the start of
the experiment. Given the size of observed gaps and the low value of goods used in experiments,
however, this explanation generally has been ruled out, at least as the dominant explanation (see
e.g. Bishop et al. 1983). Other experimenters attempt to control wealth effects by endowing nonowners with cash (e.g., Plott and Zeiler 2005) or by asking subjects, all of whom were endowed with
goods, whether they want to trade the endowment for a different good with similar market value
(e.g. Kahneman et al. 1990).
15
This theory is explained in more detail infra.
16
Demand-revealing mechanisms are designed to encourage the reporting of true valuations
(i.e., the most one would be willing to pay to obtain an item or the least one would accept to give
12
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valuations would serve their best interests. When they elicited valuations in the context of
hypothetically buying and selling the right to avoid holding a bitter tasting liquid in their
mouths for a few seconds,17 they observed a valuation gap. In contrast, when the authors
employed a demand-revealing Vickery (1961) auction mechanism to elicit valuations,
ran four non-binding trials to encourage learning,18 and endowed potential buyers with
$10, the gap disappeared due to a substantial decrease in reported owner valuations. The
authors concluded that reluctance to trade should be expected only when decisions are
made outside markets or when individuals lack experience with the elicitation device.19
Follow-up studies designed to test the effects of elicitation methods report mixed results.
up an item). These amounts are sometimes referred to as “non-strategic valuations.” If subjects
report valuations that deviate from their true valuations because they think they will be better off
doing so, these reported valuations cannot be used to test theories that predict a disparity in the
true valuations of owners and non-owners.
17
The researchers chose to use an unfamiliar good to avoid preconceived notions of value.
18
The clearing price was announced to all subjects after each round. Note that controversy
exists around the influence of repeated trials; see e.g., Morrison (2000). While they might be necessary for learning one’s preferences and how best to engage with an unfamiliar elicitation device,
they might be unnecessary (and not worth the added cost) if reported valuations do not change
across rounds. In addition, even if reported valuations do change across rounds, the changes
might not necessarily reflect learning. Finally, they might bias reported valuations, especially if
preferences are imprecise, clearing prices are announced between rounds, and announced prices
influence reported valuations. Morrison (2000) reported results from experiments that employed
multiple rounds. Subjects were told how much they would have to pay to purchase the goods at a
nearby store. The randomly chosen clearing prices were announced between each round. Morrison
observed no change over five rounds when subjects reported valuations for a chocolate bar, for
which no gap was observed in any round, and an increase in the gap over the first couple of rounds
when subjects reported valuations for mugs over five rounds. A slight decrease in the mug valuation
gap occurred over the final three rounds, but the gap in the final round was larger than the gap in
the first round. Morrison found some evidence that subjects learn their true valuations when they
participate in multiple rounds and that owners need more rounds than non-owners to “locate” their
true valuations. She found no statistically significant evidence that reported valuations depend on
the clearing price announced in the previous round, but this might be due to her small sample size
(n = 10).
19
Gregory and Furby (1987) questioned whether subjects understood the elicitation device
used by Coursey et al., whether the rounds meant to help subjects learn their valuations for the
good actually performed as intended, whether the fact that not all rounds were binding with
certainty moved reported valuations away from actual valuations, whether the presence of extreme
outliers skewed the results, whether the instructions might have signaled to non-owners an upper
bound on their valuations, whether endowing potential buyers but not potential sellers with cash
impacted reported valuations, and whether announcing the clearing price between rounds triggered
a lack of independence of one subject’s reported valuations from others’, especially given subjects’
unfamiliarity with the good. A reanalysis of the data demonstrates a lack of robustness in terms
of the elimination of outliers. While Coursey (1987) convincingly responded, the multi-faceted
critique highlights difficulties that experimenters face when they attempt to elicit true valuations
in the lab.
In a second critique, Knetsch and Sinden (1987) suggested a number of reasons why the elicitation mechanism used by Coursey et al. might not be demand revealing. They also argued that giving
cash to potential buyers, a design feature that attempts to control for wealth effects, might lead to
a house-money effect—the possibility that subjects are more willing to spend cash received as a
windfall during an experiment relative to money from their own pockets. The authors also worry
about other confounding impacts caused by the cash endowment.
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Knez et al. (1985) estimated valuation gaps using bids and asks for lotteries in a repeated
market setting. They found that subjects were willing to deviate from reported valuations
once engaged in the market. While some had suggested that valuation gaps could lead to
market inefficiencies, the authors pointed to their results as evidence that gaps observed
in single-shot, non-market settings do not imply “that . . . individuals are incompetent
or markets are inefficient” (p. 401). Similarly, Brookshire and Coursey (1987) estimated
gaps using three methods: the contingent valuation method,20 a single-shot hypothetical
(but otherwise) demand-revealing auction, and repeated and binding demand-revealing
auctions. In the non-hypothetical treatment, potential buyers were endowed with cash
and potential sellers were endowed with the right to have a particular number of trees
planted in their neighborhood (all subjects lived in the same neighborhood). The demandrevealing auction was explained to the subjects. In contrast with Knez et al. (1985),
Brookshire and Coursey (1987) observed statistically significant gaps in each treatment.
The gap, however, decreased across each of the three treatments (again, as a result of
reduced owner valuations). The authors concluded that, while reference-dependent loss
aversion seems to be present under all conditions, market settings have disciplinary effects
that move reported valuations closer to true valuations.21
Harless (1989) contributed to the gap literature in two ways. First, he refined the valuation elicitation device by explaining to subjects through examples the optimal strategy
of the demand-revealing auction. He hypothesized that subjects likely were unfamiliar
with the auctions used to elicit valuations and that explaining the optimal strategy to the
subjects would help eliminate any noise caused by strategic considerations. Second, rather
than using a between-subject design, in which each subject acts only as a potential seller
or a potential buyer, he employed a within-subject design, measuring the gap by averaging
individual differences between valuations as owner and as non-owner.22 He observed no
gap in valuations for lotteries, which implies that previously observed gaps were due to
subject misconceptions of the elicitation device and the way in which gaps were estimated,
and not loss aversion.
To summarize, by the end of the 1980s evidence reported in the literature supported a
The contingent valuation method entails simply asking subjects to state their valuations
either as hypothetical owners or hypothetical non-owners. Subjects’ reports do not result in
consequences of any sort.
21
Ortona and Scacciati (1992) observed no disparity in valuations when subjects faced real
payoffs after announcing valuations for necessary goods of substantial value (i.e., half day’s net
wages). They concluded that, although endowments can impact valuations in some cases, if the
payoffs are real and the goods are necessary and expensive, rational behaviors might swamp
reference-dependent loss aversion (or any other drivers of valuation gaps).
22
Relative to between-subject designs, within-subject designs often increase the power of
statistical tests, increasing the likelihood of detecting treatment effects if they exist. They also
controlled for any unobservable differences between control and treatment groups that remain after
randomized assignment. The downside to within-subject designs is potential carryover effects—
participation in the control group might impact subjects’ subsequent choices once the treatment is
applied. For example, subjects might feel a need to be consistent across rounds. In this context, a
subject might wonder whether it would seem odd to report different valuations as a potential buyer
and a potential seller. This change in the experiment design might explain, as least in part, Harless’s
null result. Schmidt and Traub (2009) reported evidence supporting the claim that between-subject
and within-subject measures might produce different results.
20
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number of theories including reference-dependent loss aversion, uncertain or imprecise
preferences, the lack of market discipline (which acts to drive inflated WTA down to
values more reflective of actual values), and a lack of familiarity with the valuation
elicitation device. Despite the mixed evidence, the next steps in the literature veer towards
the adoption of endowment theory as the dominant explanation.

4.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF ENDOWMENT THEORY

Knetsch (1989) was the first to report observed exchange asymmetries in the context of
trading one good for another good (as opposed to some amount of money). He motivated
the design change by framing it as a more direct test of the assumption of reversible
indifference curves. Subjects were endowed with coffee mugs, which they kept in their possession while answering a short questionnaire.23 Subjects were then told they could either
keep the mug they owned or exchange the mug for a candy bar. The subjects were told to
signal their desire to trade by holding up a piece of paper with the word “trade” written
on it. To reduce the possibility of transaction costs related to trading, the experimenter
immediately made all desired trades by walking the candy bar to the subject and exchanging it for the mug. Another group participated in the same experiment except that they
were endowed with candy bars and offered mugs in exchange. A third group was simply
offered a choice between the two goods with neither being endowed. The simple design
eliminated income effects and any opportunity for strategic bidding. The design also
nicely separates the theories Knetsch tests. If indifference curves were reversible, we would
expect no difference in the proportions of subjects in each group favoring one good over
the other. If individuals are averse to losses, however, we would expect willingness to trade
to depend on endowment status. The results were consistent with the behavior predicted
by loss aversion. While 56% of those given a choice chose the mug, 89% of mug owners
kept their mugs and only 10% of candy bar owners traded for a mug.24 Two additional
In most experiments, subjects possess the endowed good for a short time before making
choices about whether to keep it or give it up. This reduces the likelihood that the value of the
good changes due to experience with it or some sort of psychological attachment that often comes
with owning a good for some longer period of time. When reluctance to trade results after a short
possession period, some refer to observed reluctance to trade as an “instant endowment effect”
(Tversky and Kahneman 1991). Korobkin (2003) argued that theories based on attachment cannot
explain instant valuation gaps. Others, however, suggest that such instant effects result from “generalized response tendencies in relation to possessions, even when such consumption capital may not
have been built up yet” (Ariely et al. 2005). Reb and Connolly (2007) reported evidence suggesting
that possession alone might drive reluctance to trade. They also review the then-existing literature
on subjective ownership—feelings of ownership that are induced by control over a good even
when it is not owned. Bischoff and Meckl (2008) reported evidence of valuation gaps in rights to
publically provided goods even when no one individual has exclusive property rights over the good.
Coren (2007, Chapter 4) developed a theory of “cognitive investment” to explain instant valuation
gaps but fails to find evidence supporting the theory in data collected using a survey instrument.
24
Harbaugh et al. (2001) replicated this result for cohorts of different ages, ranging from
5-year-olds to college undergraduates. The authors interpreted these results as evidence of loss
aversion. If market experience was at work to correct mistakes in valuation, the argument goes,
we would not see gaps in valuations reported by undergraduate students who have higher levels of
23
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treatments using different designs produced similar results.25 Knetsch interprets his results
as additional evidence of endowment theory, but he does not attempt to square the theory
with published evidence that works against it.
Kahneman et al. (1990) similarly reported the results of several experiments designed
to test alternative theories of gaps but failed to explain why gaps are not observed in
other contexts. They provided a “summary [table] of past tests of evaluation disparities.” Surprisingly, the table did not report confidence intervals for the estimates, and it
excluded null results.26 They did, however, acknowledge potential explanations beyond
endowment theory, including perceived illegitimacy of the transaction,27 standard
bargaining habits (i.e., sellers’ instinct to ask high and buyers’ instinct to bid low), subject
misunderstandings, presumably of the valuation elicitation device, and transaction costs.
They also began to refine endowment theory. The theory assumes that endowments set
individuals’ reference points, which frame perceptions of the giving up of endowments as
losses and the getting of endowments as gains. Loss aversion assumes that individuals are
hurt by losses more than they are helped by gains of the same size, thus endowment theory
predicts a reluctance to trade away endowments. The authors refined the theory to exclude
some types of endowments. They asserted that reluctance to trade should not be expected
for goods that are purchased for resale rather than consumption. In addition, it should not
be expected “if a perfect substitute is readily available at a lower price” (p. 1344).
Kahneman et al. designed an environment to test theories related to transaction costs,
misunderstandings and strategic bargaining behavior. They posited that if gaps are not
observed when subjects trade induced-value tokens,28 we can rule out these theories as
explanations for gaps observed when subjects trade goods (using the same methods as
those used in the induced-value token rounds) for which endowment theory would predict
market experience relative to younger subjects. The authors concluded that “[t]he endowment effect
appears to be a “real” part of preferences, rather than a mistake that diminishes with experience
and learning” (p. 181).
25
Chapman (1998) reported data suggesting that not all trades are perceived as losses. Her
results support the conjecture that the relation between the endowed good and the alternative good
matters. For example, subjects seem not to be reluctant to give up an endowed good for an identical
alternative good, suggesting that the mere giving up of an item does not trigger a perceived loss.
She drew a line between “trade-loss aversion,” the notion that loss aversion is a characteristic of
the exchange, and “attribute-loss aversion,” that loss aversion is a characteristic of a single item or
attribute of that item. This distinction can be thought of as a modification to assumptions about
what exactly constitutes a loss.
26
Table 1 (p. 1327) does not report whether observed gaps were statistically significantly different from zero: e.g., Coursey et al. (1987) concludes that the gap observed in Part III—the only
treatment with non-hypothetical choices and design features intended to train subjects on the valuation elicitation procedure—was not statistically significant; Test 4 of Knetsch and Sinden (1984)
produced no statistically significant gap). The table also failed to include some studies reporting
null results (e.g., Harless 1989). Unfortunately, readers have likely misinterpreted this table as a
signal of robustness of gaps, when, in fact, the evidence was mixed at the time. Kahneman et al. did,
however, mention some previously reported null results later in the text.
27
This theory might explain results in experiments, for example, where the endowed good is a
public good such as neighborhood tree density. See, e.g., Brookshire and Coursey (1987).
28
Induced-value tokens are items that subjects who end up owning them at the end of the
experiment can trade for cash in an amount equal to the value assigned to them by the experimenter
before the start of the experiment.

Joshua C. Teitelbaum and Kathryn Zeiler - 9781849805674
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 03/24/2018 11:07:59AM
via Boston University Pappas Law Library

358

Research handbook on behavioral law and economics

gaps. Kahneman et al. ran several treatments,29 one of the most controlled30 of which
elicited valuations for mugs using the Becker, DeGroot, Marschak (BDM) mechanism
(Becker et al. 1964). Each potential seller is asked to report the least amount she is willing
to accept to give up her endowment, and that reported value is compared to a randomly
generated number. If the reported valuation is higher than the random number, the owner
keeps her endowment. If the reported valuation is less than the random number, she gives
up her item in exchange for an amount of cash equal to the random number. This device
encourages reports of true (i.e., non-strategic) valuations. If a seller decides to report a
valuation that is higher than her true valuation, she risks forgoing an opportunity to trade
her item for an amount higher than her true valuation. If she decides to report a valuation
that is lower than her true valuation, she risks trading her item for an amount that is lower
than her true valuation. The incentives are similar for buyers, who report a valuation and
then buy at a price equal to the random number only if the random number is lower than
the reported valuation.
Each of 59 subjects was randomly assigned to the buyer role or the seller role and
remained in the same role throughout the experiment. Subjects participated in two
hypothetical induced-value token rounds.31 In all rounds subjects were told that it was
in their best interest to answer the questions truthfully and that reported valuations
would have no effect on the price at which the items were traded. Potential buyers did
not receive cash to spend during the experiment,32 and they did not physically possess
the mugs while bidding on them, although they were shown the mugs prior to reporting
valuations. Valuations were elicited using the multiple price list format: each subject was
asked whether he would sell (or buy) at a specific price across a set of prices ranging
from $0 to $9.50 in increments of 50 cents.33 Reluctance to trade was estimated in an
unconventional way by comparing the actual numbers of trades to the predicted number

29
In a pair of treatments, Kahneman et al. investigated whether non-owners are reluctant to
buy or owners are reluctant to sell by asking a third group of subjects to simply choose between the
good and different amounts of cash. They found that choosers’ valuations were more in line with
potential buyers’ valuations than potential sellers’ valuations and concluded that the gap was driven
by reluctance to sell. Franciosi et al. (1996) wondered whether the terms “buying,” “selling,” and
“choosing” suggested particular strategies to the subjects—i.e., “buyers are motivated to buy low
and sellers to sell high” (p. 216)—that might have nudged subjects away from their true valuations.
Franciosi et al. tested the impact of language by stripping out these terms. While the WTA–WTP
gap narrowed, it remained statistically significant.
30
By “most controlled,” I mean the treatment that attempts to eliminate the greatest number
of alternative explanations.
31
Note that the hypothetical nature of the token rounds negates the demand-revealing nature
of the elicitation device. Had gaps been observed in these rounds, this feature might have accounted
for them, but gaps were not observed.
32
Subjects were told to bring cash to the experiment and that credit and change would be
available. The authors reported that some subjects borrowed money from other subjects.
33
Kahneman et al. (1990) are cited as the first to use multiple price lists to elicit commodity
valuations (Anderson et al. 2006). The demand-revealing properties of this method have been
questioned (e.g., Anderson et al. 2006), but Kahneman et al. obtained the same results in a separate
treatment that asked subjects to simply report their valuations. Anderson et al. (2007) reported
evidence supporting the multiple price list method as a valid way to elicit non-strategic (i.e., true)
valuations. Others have employed this mechanism (see infra for examples).
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of trades assuming that the distribution of values in the two groups is the same barring
sample variation.34 That is, the authors concluded that sellers were reluctant to trade
if the ratio of the number of observed trades to the number of expected trades is less
than 1.
The results support the existence of valuation disparities driven by endowments. The
ratios of observed trades to expected trades in the induced-value token rounds were
both roughly 1 (no tests of significance were mentioned). From this result, Kahneman
et al. (1990) concluded that subjects understood the valuation elicitation procedure and
that they understood that strategic bidding was not advantageous. On the other hand,
the ratio of observed to expected number of trades in the mug round was 0.41 (no tests
of significance mentioned). The median selling price was over twice the median buying
price. A number of alternative designs were employed to control for various alternative
explanations, and reluctance to trade proved robust.35
Note that while Knetsch (1989) and Kahneman et al. (1990) both produced results
in support of endowment theory and robust for various design changes to control for
alternative explanations, the body of evidence in the literature at the time Kahneman
et al. was published did not universally support this explanation, and neither Knetsch
nor Kahneman et al. attempted to explain the published null results. Despite this, legal
scholars tend to cite these studies as proof (and not just evidence) of endowment theory
without acknowledging results that call the explanation into question (Klass and Zeiler
2013). When applying any economic theory in law and policy, disclosing the evidence both
for and against the theory is necessary to determine how confident we should be when we
contemplate generating legal rules and policies based on a particular theory. The bottom
line is that, in 1990, the explanation for observed reluctance to trade remained elusive
despite claims to the contrary (Klass and Zeiler 2013).
Despite the literature’s mixed evidence, the findings from Knetsch and Sinden (1984),
Knetsch (1989), and Kahneman et al. (1990), along with more general evidence of status
quo bias, prompted Tversky and Kahneman (1991) to adapt prospect theory (Kahneman
and Tversky 1979) to contexts of riskless choice.36 The theory, which I will refer to as
Franciosi et al. (1996) explored the impact of using a different auction mechanism that
avoids possible incentives related to uncertainty over the clearing price inherent in the mechanism
Kahneman et al. use to elicit valuations in some of their treatments. Franciosi et al. employed a
demand-revealing elicitation device that informed subjects of the clearing price as the market ran.
While fewer trades occurred relative to the predicted number of trades, trading volume increased.
In addition, Franciosi et al. demonstrated that trading volume might decrease even when no significant difference between WTP and WTA exists. Thus, they interpreted Kahneman et al.’s results as
supporting a prediction of under-trading but not a WTP-WTA disparity, per se.
35
Borges and Knetsch (1998) ran simulations to estimate the impact of valuation gaps
on number of trades. They concluded from the collected valuations data and simulations that
competitive markets will not produce efficient outcomes and that final allocations depend on initial
endowments, a direct challenge to the predictions of Coase (1960).
36
Tversky and Kahneman (1991) claim that “[a]lthough isolated findings may be subject to
alternative interpretations, the entire body of evidence provides strong support for the phenomenon of loss aversion” (p. 1041). Such incomplete summaries of empirical results highlight the
importance of developing a first-hand knowledge of empirical literatures before importing theories
designed to explain observed phenomena reported in the literatures (Zeiler 2010). Those who chose
not to rely on Tversky and Kahneman’s literature description would have discovered Knez et al.
34
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“endowment theory,”37 assumes that individual preference relations depend on one’s
reference state (i.e., reference dependent preferences). In riskless choice contexts, “the
reference state usually corresponds to the decision maker’s current position, [but] it can
also be influenced by aspirations, expectations, norms, and social comparisons” (Tversky
and Kahneman 1991, pp. 1046–1047). Endowment theory assumes that a potential seller’s
reference point is set when a good becomes part of that owner’s endowment (Kahneman
et al. 1990, p. 1326).38 In this sense, reference points are assumed to be exogenous. In
addition, the theory assumes that changes from one’s current position affect the decision maker differently. That is, losses lead to more disutility than the utility enjoyed by
gains of the same size. It also assumes diminishing marginal sensitivity, which implies
that marginal value decreases with the distance from the reference point.39 The authors

(1985) and Harless (1989), both of which are absent from Tversky and Kahneman’s (1991) reference list and discussion, and both of which fail to provide support for endowment theory.
37
The revised name is meant to distinguish the explanation from the observed phenomenon
(Plott and Zeiler 2005). Others noted the importance of this earlier on (Mandel 2002, p. 746) (“It is
important to clearly distinguish the behavioral definition of the endowment effect from its possible
explanations”).
38
Sen and Johnson (1997, p. 111) reported data suggesting that “mere possession of only a
coupon for one of the choice options leads to an instantaneous increase in subjects’ preference
for that option.” Strahilevitz and Loewenstein (1998) investigated the impacts of past ownership,
duration of ownership, possession and attractiveness of the item on the setting of reference
points. Others refer to this phenomenon as an increase in the subjective value of a good caused by
psychological attachment. See, e.g., Ariely and Simonson (2003), who suggested that attachment
can occur even in the absence of ownership. They refer to this as a “pseudoendowment effect.” Shu
and Peck (2011; study 2) find that duration of ownership increases both feelings of psychological
ownership and seller valuations.
39
A separate strand of the literature attempts to explain why preferences might be characterized by loss aversion and reference dependence. A growing body of research (a small fraction
of which is cited here) suggests an evolutionary biological explanation for valuation gaps. For
example, Jones (2001) theorized that valuation gaps might arise from an evolutionary adaptation
that also manifests in the “widespread phenomenon in territorial systems that residents of a territory almost invariably defeat challengers” (p. 1185). Thus, those with a predisposition to hold on to
what they actually possess, in the face of an uncertain trade for something potentially better, may
have been more likely to thrive, and to pass along the same predisposition, than those all too willing
to relinquish. In turn many species, including humans, might now bear genetically influenced but
condition-dependent predispositions to place relatively high values on endowed items. See also
Friedman (2004) and Gintis (2007), who offered similar theories based on selection for territorial
behavior.
Consistent with this approach, Flemming et al. (2012) suggested that the preference features
assumed by endowment theory might be the consequence of “earlier evolutionary pressures on
human cognitive abilities.” For example, we might exhibit a tendency to keep what we have because,
for the vast majority of primate evolution, trades were difficult to enforce against defectors, by
the party to first relinquish—especially in the absence of language and third-party enforcement
mechanisms. They reported experimental findings suggesting that apes are reluctant to trade
goods that are evolutionarily salient (e.g., food). This finding supports the evolutionary biological
explanation for loss aversion. (Huck et al. (2005) formalized the idea in game-theoretic terms.) They
found relatively strong effects for evolutionarily salient items (e.g., food).
Several studies have explored reluctance to trade in nonhuman primates and in African tribes. In
an experiment using capuchin monkeys as subjects, Chen et al. (2006) and Lakshminarayanan et al.
(2008) reported data they interpret as supporting innate reference dependence and loss aversion. In

Joshua C. Teitelbaum and Kathryn Zeiler - 9781849805674
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 03/24/2018 11:07:59AM
via Boston University Pappas Law Library

What explains observed reluctance to trade? 361
predicted no aversion to losses of money (and tokens that could be exchanged for money)
and losses of goods held for sale in routine commercial transactions.40 Munro and Sugden
(2003) reformulate endowment theory to fit the existing data and to deviate as little as
possible from conventional consumer theory.41 They also extend the theory to build in
an assumption of endogenous reference points, which can accommodate experimental
findings that suggest that reference points adjust rapidly to changes in endowments. While
these theories seemed consistent with some published evidence, it is important to note
that they failed to explain the null results that also appeared in the literature at the time.
Before moving on to the literature that explores factors that either enhance or disrupt
the formation of valuation gaps, I address some apparent confusion around the normative implications of endowment theory as an explanation for observed gaps. Specifically,
some claim that the characteristics of preferences upon which endowment theory is built
are “irrational” (see e.g., Arlen et al. 2002, p. 3) or “inconsistent” (Jones 2001, p. 1148).
Apicella et al. (2014) described the endowment effect as a “well-known departure from
rational choice.” The theory’s authors, however, are explicitly agnostic about the normative

an experiment using chimpanzees as subjects, Brosnan et al. (2007) reported data they interpret as
support for evolutionary explanations for valuation gaps. They predicted and found reluctance to
trade food items but not toys. Kanngiesser et al. (2011) observed a reluctance to trade food items in
great apes but no effect for tool items. Evidence for orangutans is mixed (contrast Kanngiesser et
al. (2011) with Flemming et al. (2012)). And gorillas behave comparably to chimpanzees, Drayton
et al. (2013). Brosnan et al. (2012) reported additional data purporting to support the assumption
that gaps are context-specific. In a set of chimpanzee experiments, reluctance to trade was observed
for tools that immediately could be used to acquire food, but was not observed for the same tools
when they had no immediate value (i.e., when food was either out of reach or absent). Apicella et
al. (2014) found that an isolated tribe of bushman in Tanzania exhibited no reluctance to trade, but
a subset of the tribe living in less isolated conditions with more opportunities for regular trading
exhibited a tendency to resist giving up endowed goods. Heifetz and Segev (2004) developed an
alternative to endowment theory that is grounded in a different set of evolutionary assumptions.
Rather than assuming selection for territorial behavior, the authors assumed that toughness in
bargaining serves as an evolutionary explanation for observed valuation gaps. The authors argued
that this explanation is better at organizing existing data than endowment theory grounded in loss
aversion.
See Jones (2017) in this volume for an illuminating discussion of the study of explanations for
observed phenomenon using an evolutionary biology approach.
40
Some have challenged the claim that individuals are not averse to losses of goods held for
sale. For example, van Dijk and van Knippenberg (1996) reported evidence suggesting that gaps
might appear in exchange good markets if traders are uncertain about future exchange prices.
This uncertainty, the theory goes, might “elicit a motivation to avoid regret” (p. 522). The authors
posited that individuals focus on the net monetary result from trading goods meant for exchange,
rather than the mere loss. Other researchers have explored similar theories (see the section below on
Uncertain Preferences). In a follow-up study, van Dijk and van Knippenberg (1998) reported data
supporting a related theory that suggests gaps might arise in exchange goods markets if individuals
are unable to compare endowed goods with alternative goods offered for a trade, making it impossible to focus on the net monetary result from the trade, which shifts focus instead to the mere loss.
Others have explored the role of exchange value curiosity in reluctance to trade (van de Ven et al.
2005).
41
For example, Munro and Sugden’s revised endowment theory does not assume that preferences are additively separable, an assumption of endowment theory that they argue is implicit but
unnecessary.

Joshua C. Teitelbaum and Kathryn Zeiler - 9781849805674
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 03/24/2018 11:07:59AM
via Boston University Pappas Law Library

362

Research handbook on behavioral law and economics

status of their model’s assumptions about the features of individual preferences.42 This is
important when it comes to drawing policy implications from the economics literature.
If the best-supported theories suggest that we tend to act irrationally or err in the face of
losses, then we might find it worthwhile to structure law in a way that helps us overcome
this irrational tendency.43 On the other hand, if loss aversion is thought to be a feature of
preferences, just as risk aversion is, then we might aim to use law to structure markets in
ways that help individuals reduce the disutility that losses cause.
First, though, we need to determine whether losses trigger disutility in excess of the
disutility that arises from the lost consumption value. After describing the literature
that explores environmental features that might enhance or diminish reluctance to
trade, the chapter will describe the vast literature that explores alternatives to endowment theory.

5.

GAP ENHANCERS AND DISRUPTORS

As the literature started taking a turn towards endowment theory as the leading explanation for observed reluctance to trade, some attempted to map out conditions under which
endowment theory might apply. While the purpose of these studies was to determine a
set of conditions that trigger loss aversion, some viewed this as the beginning of the end
of endowment theory as the leading explanation for observed reluctance to trade. Rather
than interpreting mixed results as teaching us something about the context-dependent
nature of endowment theory, some argued that the results suggested that something other
than reference dependence and loss aversion might better explain observed reluctance
to trade. Before stepping through the alternative theories, this section walks through the
studies exploring gap enhancers and disruptors.
5.1

Moral Commitments

Boyce et al. (1992) set out to study gaps in valuations of public goods. While valuation
gaps for these sorts of goods might be caused by loss aversion given the lack of perfect
substitutes, Boyce et al. suggested an alternative explanation—the desire to “preserve a
natural resource for moral or other motives” (p. 1366), even if one might never receive
direct consumption benefits from it. The authors argued that intrinsic value might be
relevant only for those assigned the property right because ownership of the right triggers
moral responsibility for preserving the commodity, a responsibility not felt by those considering whether to contribute to preservation efforts. The authors elicited valuations for
Small Norfolk Island pine trees and employed two treatments to separate consumption
“Is loss aversion irrational? . . . We conclude that there is no general answer to the question
about the normative status of loss aversion or of other reference effects . . . [A] bias in favor of the
status quo can be justified if the disadvantages of any change will be experienced more keenly than
its advantages.” (Tversky and Kahneman 1991, p. 1057).
43
For example, Kermer et al. (2006) reported evidence supporting an alternative theory that
assumes that loss avoidance is the result of overestimation of the hedonic effect of losses. This
explanation posits that loss aversion is a mistake rather than a feature of human preferences.
42
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value from intrinsic or moral value.44 To estimate consumption value, subjects were asked
to report their WTP to obtain a tree to take home or WTA to give up a tree they were
given at the beginning of the experiment. To estimate intrinsic value, different subjects in
a separate treatment were told that any trees sold to the experimenter, or not purchased,
would be destroyed.45 The intrinsic value conjecture predicts that the gap in the “kill”
treatment is greater than the gap in the “no kill” treatment.
Boyce et al. structured the experiment to control for alternative explanations. They
employed the BDM mechanism to elicit non-strategic valuations. They endowed potential
buyers with $40 and potential sellers with a tree (with a retail value of $6) and $30 to
minimize income effects. Subjects participated in ten hypothetical practice rounds to gain
familiarity with the elicitation device. To avoid decisions based on perceptions of other
subjects (e.g., subjects might worry that others will harass them or think badly of them if
they sell trees that get destroyed) or the possible inconvenience of getting the tree home
after the experiment, subjects were instructed to pick up their trees at a later time from a
different location. This ensured that subjects did not learn the choices of other subjects.
Valuation gaps appeared in both the no-kill and kill treatments, with the gap in the kill
treatment exceeding the gap in the no-kill treatment due to a substantial increase in
WTA. The authors, however, noted variation in the kill-WTA reports, with some subjects
reporting valuations similar to those reported in the no-kill treatment and others reporting valuation substantially higher. The authors concluded that for goods with intrinsic
value (as opposed to consumption value), some element of moral responsibility might
explain why reported WTA is higher than reported WTP. Importantly, while these results
are often lumped in with other gap results to demonstrate support for endowment theory,
they actually support a more nuanced theory based on notions of mortality.46
Walker et al. (1999) designed an experiment to study whether human versus natural
causes of losses influence the magnitude of valuation gaps. In one experiment, the authors
elicited valuations for neighborhood trees provided by the city. Some subjects were asked
to value the saving of trees threatened by naturally occurring disease. Others were asked
to value the saving of trees from damage caused by a street-widening project. All subjects
Other researchers have explored whether the magnitude of the gap depends on the moral
aspects of the traded goods (e.g., Irwin 1994). Caution is necessary, however, when contingent
valuation methods are used to elicit hypothetical valuations for goods with highly moral aspects,
such as the right to a clean beach. The theories that provide the predictions experimenters set out
to test assume that choices have actual consequences. When this is not the case, features other than
individual values for the goods might influence reported valuations and those influences might
impact “seller” valuations differently than they impact “buyer” valuations.
45
Subjects did not witness the destruction, but a witness verified it.
46
In a study testing a similar theory, Biel et al. (2011) told one group of subjects (the donation
owners) that they would receive SEK 50 for participating and that an additional SEK 100 would be
donated to the World Wide Fund to protect the Swedish otter. They told another group (the donation non-owners) that they would receive SEK 150 for participating. During the experiment, the
donation owners were given an opportunity to get an additional SEK100 in lieu of the donation,
and the donation non-owners were given an opportunity to donate SEK 100 to the same Fund.
Subjects made anonymous choices. Forty-five percent of donation owners opted to remain donors,
and 19% of donation non-owners decided to donate. Based on subject responses to surveys meant
to measure the feelings each choice would provoke, the authors attributed the difference to affective
influences and moral reactions.
44
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were told to assume they owned a house with a tree in the yard in danger of being lost.
Some were asked to report how much they would need to be compensated to give up
the opportunity to save the tree. Others were asked how much they would be willing to
pay to save the tree. The authors report a hypothetical valuation disparity in the human
destruction treatment but not in the natural cause treatment. While the elicitation device
employed was not designed to measure actual valuations, and so should be interpreted
with caution, the results suggest that further study is necessary to determine whether
features other than the gain or loss of the consumption value of a good drive reported
valuations. The authors interpret the results as support for the hypothesis that valuations
are mediated by feelings of moral responsibility.
5.2 Frames, Attitudes, and Emotions
Loewenstein and Issacharoff (1994) suggested additional nuance by positing an increase
in the valuation of items that are added to one’s endowment as a result of successful
performance of a task and a decrease in the valuation of those added as a result of
failure (e.g., consolation prizes). This theory calls into question the standard economic
assumption of source independence—the notion that the valuation of an item does not
depend on how the item was obtained.47 The authors also framed source dependence
as a moderator of endowment theory, suggesting that “positive source effects enhance
the impact of endowment and negative source effects weaken it”48 (p. 158). Valuations
were elicited using the BDM mechanism and a multiple price list after subjects were
told that it was in their best interest to report true valuations. The results support the
conjecture that people become differentially “attached” to objects as a function of how
the objects are obtained (p. 165). Thus, the study offers evidence of another force beyond
reference-dependent loss aversion that drives WTA higher than WTP. The authors
pointed to the concept of “associationism” as the most straightforward explanation for
source dependence. The idea is that the positive affect caused by good feelings that come
from association with an object obtained through successful performance increases one’s

Plott and Zeiler (2007) include the impact of the acquisition source as a component of a
broader theory they refer to as enhancement theory. See infra for details.
48
Psychologists have tested related factors that might moderate valuation gaps. Saqib et al.
(2010) posited that levels of consumer involvement in trading decisions can impact loss aversion
levels. Specifically, they suggested that high involvement and higher stakes can increase the perceived importance of gains and losses, which can impact the magnitude of the asymmetric impact
of losses relative to gains. Subjects who provided marketing assistance to the seller of a good (e.g.,
providing information about preferred highlighter colors) in exchange for the good, a highlighter
set, reported higher valuations than owners who received a good after reading about a different
good, causing a larger valuation gap (valuations by those given a choice between the good and
money did not differ by level of involvement). The results held up when the authors used alternative
methods of inducing perceptions of involvement. Aggarwal and Zhang (2006) reported evidence
suggesting that salient relationship norms impact levels of loss aversion. Subjects who were, prior
to reporting valuations, asked to put themselves into the shoes of a person with a communal
outlook towards his friends reported higher WTA relative to those in a control group (no priming)
and those who were asked to put themselves into the shoes of a person with an exchange outlook
(i.e., quid pro quo relationship view).
47
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valuation for the object.49 Of course associationism cannot explain results from experiments in which subjects received endowments in the absence of successful performance,
but it suggests an alternative (or supplementary) explanation in the presence of such
performance. Simple versions of endowment theory do not predict varying outcomes
conditional on endowment source.
In a similar vein, Liberman et al. (1999) examined how interventions that focus an
individual on either promotion (making oneself better off) or prevention (avoiding
making oneself worse off) impact reluctance to trade. They hypothesize that if a person
is prompted to consider promotion, he is more likely to be open to change (and less
reluctant to trade). Alternatively, if a person is prompted to consider prevention, concerns
over safety and security give rise to reluctance to change (and therefore to trade). In one
experiment, subjects were asked to describe their current hopes and goals and how they
differed from their hopes and goals in the past, and then asked to decide whether they
would be willing to accept a hypothetical pen given to them as a gift from a friend in
exchange for a hypothetical mug given to their roommate as a gift from the same friend.
Subjects displayed no reluctance to trade. Another group of subjects who were asked to
describe their current sense of duty and obligation before deciding whether they would be
willing to hypothetically trade were reluctant to trade. In another experiment, participants
engaged in actual trades. In this experiment, the authors used subjects’ answers to a series
of questions to measure promotion focus and prevention focus. Those with high levels of
promotion focus were less reluctant to trade relative to those with low levels. The opposite
was true for those with high levels of prevention focus. This result suggests that framing
can influence reluctance to trade.
Lerner et al. (2004) studied whether specific emotions affect the likelihood and magnitude of valuation gaps. They designed an experiment to test appraisal-tendency theory,
which posits that emotions experienced during an irrelevant situation can carry over to
subsequent economic decisions. For example, the experience of anger during an unrelated
situation might compel risky economic choices in subsequent unrelated situations. On
the other hand, the theory posits that we might not expect carryover effects in situations
that involve actual monetary risks. During the experiment, the negative emotions of
disgust and sadness were evoked using film clips. The authors hypothesized that feelings
of disgust would cause owners to place lower values on endowed goods. Potential buyers
would react less strongly to disgust because seller “proximity” to the good is expected to
augment contamination. On the other hand, the authors predicted, in line with previous
results, that sadness would trigger a desire for change, leading potential sellers to reduce
their values and potential buyers to increase their values, both in an effort to trade. The
multiple price list method was employed to elicit valuations, and one round was randomly
chosen for payment. Non-owners received a cash payment, and owners received a set of
Others have constructed theories that stand as alternatives to endowment theory and hinge
on the psychological relationship between individuals and their possessions. Coren (2007) summarized the literature that develops and tests these sorts of theories. Evidence exists to support
these theories, which are built on assumptions such as emotional attachment to possessions as
alternatives to loss aversion. These theories assume that losses loom larger than gains not because
we’re generally averse to losses but because we perceive endowments as somehow different from
identical items that we do not own.
49
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highlighters. The findings support the theory. Owners exposed to the disgust prompt
reported lower values for their highlighters relative to owners exposed to a neutral film
clip. Exposure to a sad film clip was followed by relatively low owner valuations and
relatively high non-owner valuations, resulting in a reverse gap (i.e., WTP > WTA).50
Shu and Peck (2011) test two potential moderators of loss aversion that relate to
attitudes and emotions. The first, psychological ownership, assumes that legal ownership is unnecessary to trigger loss aversion. Mere psychological ownership, the simple
feeling that something is “mine,” might be sufficient. The authors estimated feelings of
psychological ownership by eliciting responses to three statements using a seven-point
scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree.51 The second, affective reaction, predicts
that emotional reactions towards an object can meditate loss aversion. To test this prediction, the authors elicited subject self-reports related to positive emotions and negative
emotions.52 Subjects were randomly assigned to two treatments, seller and chooser, and
the multiple list price format was used to elicit pen valuations. After reporting valuations,
the authors measured levels of psychological ownership and affective reaction to the
good. The average seller valuation exceeded the average chooser valuation, and sellers
reported greater psychological ownership and positive affective reactions (but not negative affective reactions) than did choosers.53 The authors concluded that psychological
ownership and affective reaction to the good act to mediate the effects of loss aversion.54
50
In a similar study, Lin et al. (2006) asked whether valuations gaps are mediated by happy
and sad emotional states. They hypothesized that gaps will be smaller if valuations are reported
when individuals are in a negative emotional state (e.g., sad) relative to a positive emotional state
(e.g., happy). The authors induced emotional states in two ways: by asking subjects to recount
happy or sad experiences and by exposing subjects to audiovisual clips intended to invoke particular emotional responses. Unlike Lerner et al. (2004), however, it seems that subjects did not
make binding choices nor were valuations elicited using demand-revealing mechanisms. So, while
the results suggest sadness reduces valuation gaps, the experiment design is not a valid test of the
theory; thus, we should use caution when interpreting the results. Shu and Peck (2011; study 6)
found mixed results when they measured the correlations between induced sadness and disgust and
affective reaction towards the good.
Martinez et al. (2011) induced feelings of regret and disappointment that were unrelated to the
good and found that both emotional states influence valuations of lotteries, but in different ways.
Standard procedures were used to replicate a valuation gap. Inducing feelings of regret eliminated
the gap, and inducing feelings of disappointment reversed it.
51
The statements included: “I have a very high degree of personal ownership of my item,” “I
feel like I own the item” and “I feel like this is my item.”
52
Participants were told, “Here is a list of emotional reactions you may have experienced
while evaluating the product. Please indicate how much you felt each of these emotional reactions.”
Subjects reported their emotional reactions on separate five-point scales ranging from “a lot” to
“not at all.”
53
Note that gap results were generated using parametric tests, which assume normal distributions, and regressions (presumably using ordinary least squares estimators), which assume that
error terms are normally distributed. The authors did not provide results of checks of these
assumptions, and they likely are not satisfied. The standard in the literature given the nature of the
data is to use non-parametric tests, which do not rely on distributional assumptions. This reduces
the weight we can place on the reported results.
54
In a similar set-up, the authors found that owners of an unpleasant object (a ball point
pen covered in an adhesive and rolled in fine black sand) valued the good equally to choosers, had
stronger feelings of ownership towards the good and strong negative affective reactions towards
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While the results are potentially useful, we are unable to draw any causal connections
between psychological ownership, affective reaction and valuations given potential
endogeneity. In other words, the authors did not randomly assign subjects to varying
levels of psychological ownership and affective reaction, so it might be that some third
variable is driving both attitudes or emotions and valuations. For example, sellers might
have announced relatively high valuations based on basic market instincts to sell high and
then those who bid the highest reported the strongest ownership feelings in an effort to
appear consistent with their reported valuations. This is mere conjecture, but we can’t rule
it out given the experiment design.
5.3 Market Experience
A separate line of research explores the possibility that while gaps and exchange asymmetries are regularly observed in the lab, we should not expect them to arise in markets
comprised of traders with long-run experience. List (2003) estimated the impact of
market experience by taking experimental methods to the field, where experienced traders
of goods are plentiful. He predicted that experienced traders of goods (in this case sports
cards and collector pins) are less likely to exhibit reluctance to trade an unfamiliar but
related good. All subjects were drawn from attenders of sports cards and pin shows. The
inexperienced traders were non-dealers attending the show. Experienced traders of sports
cards were drawn from the population of dealers selling and buying goods at the shows. In
one treatment, each subject was given one card (in exchange for completing a survey) and
asked whether he would like to trade the card for a different card of equal value.55 List
presented evidence that, following the experiment, the subjects planned to consume the
goods (hold them in their collections) rather than trade them. The pooled data revealed
reluctance to trade the endowed card, consistent with endowment theory. A disaggregation of the data, however, revealed that experienced sports card dealers exhibited no
reluctance to trade.56 In a second treatment, List checked the robustness of the result to
good type. He again found that more experienced traders were not reluctant to trade while
inexperienced consumers tended to hold on to their endowments. He also presented some
evidence that rejects reverse causality—experience seems to reduce reluctance to trade, as
opposed to willingness to trade causing an increase in trading experience.57 Finally, to
test robustness for other goods and different levels of experience, List ran conventional lab
experiments, bringing the same group of subjects into the lab once a week for four weeks.
During each session, subjects were given an everyday good (e.g., a mug, a pen, a can of
it relative to choosers. Seller valuations were positively correlated with feelings of ownership and
negatively correlated with negative affective reaction.
55
List estimated general preferences by giving a different group of subjects a choice between
the two goods. Roughly half the group chose one good, and half chose the other.
56
Shu and Peck (2011; study 5) replicated List’s results using a hypothetical survey instrument
and found a correlation between induced experience—subjects asked to imagine that they had
experience trading cards—and feelings of ownership.
57
List (2003) also estimated reluctance to trade using an n-th price auction to elicit valuations
for sports cards. Dealers’ WTA was statistically identical to their WTP. For non-dealers, the valuations of owners exceeded those of non-owners. In these rounds, however, cash was not given to
non-owners so wealth effects are not controlled, which opens the door to an alternative explanation.
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soda, a highlighter) and asked if they wanted to trade the endowed good for some other
everyday good of roughly equal value. Different goods were used each week. Although he
found reluctance to trade even after four sessions, the likelihood of trading increased over
the sessions. The results, taken together, support the conjecture that trading experience
reduces one’s reluctance to trade.
While List (2003) provided preliminary evidence that experience attenuates reluctance
to trade, questions remain. First, does attenuation extend to situations beyond those
previously encountered, and, second, did List (2003) effectively separate endowment
theory and neoclassical theory given that refinements of endowment theory assume that
goods acquired for trade do not trigger reluctance to trade (e.g., Kahneman et al., 1990). Is
it possible that List’s experienced traders might have planned to resell the goods acquired
during the experiment, despite their reports to the contrary? List (2004) attempted to
provide answers to these questions by estimating differences in the reluctance to trade
of sports cards dealers and non-dealers when endowed with everyday goods of roughly
equal value (mugs and chocolate bars). In exchange for completing a survey, dealers and
non-dealers were given either a mug or a candy bar or both or neither. Each mug owner
was asked whether she wanted to exchange her mug for a candy bar (and vice versa for
candy bar owners). Those receiving both were forced to exchange both for either a mug or
a candy bar. Those receiving neither chose one. Consistent with List (2003), non-dealers
exhibited a reluctance to trade while dealers did not. Those receiving both and neither
chose the mug roughly half the time, confirming the assumption of roughly equal value.
These results support the claim that experience trading one type of good can diminish
reluctance to trade other types of goods. So, while the results do not allow us to draw
inferences about what causes gaps, they do suggest that gaps might be unstable.
It is important to note that the designs of both List (2003) and List (2004) make it
impossible to draw causal inferences about the impact of experience on reluctance to
trade. The problem is that subjects were not randomly assigned to treatment and control
groups characterized by experience and no experience. Therefore, we can’t be sure if
experience or some other variable correlated with experience caused this group’s no-gap
result. To mitigate this concern, List (2011) randomly assigned a group of subjects who
reported that they made zero trades in a typical month (inexperienced traders) to two
different treatments: experience and no experience. Subjects in the experience treatment
gained market experience in the sports card market over a six-month period. A second
group gained no experience over the same period. To induce experience, subjects in the
experience treatment were given a lottery ticket for every trade they executed during the
study period. To mitigate attrition, subjects were required to sign affidavits promising
they would return. They were also given lottery tickets for showing up for subsequent
sessions. The results suggest a causal relationship between experience and reduced
reluctance to trade. Using a simple exchange design similar to Knetsch (1989), List
found a similar baseline of reluctance to trade (13% and 10% of subjects assigned to the
no-experience and experience treatments respectively opted to trade their endowed good
for the alternative good).58 After three months of experience trading, 35% of subjects

58
Some subjects were endowed with mugs and asked whether they wanted to trade for pens.
Others were endowed with pens and had an opportunity to trade for a mug.
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traded, compared to 11% of those who had not gained experience. After six months, 55%
of experienced subjects traded, compared to 21% of those without experience. Both differences were statistically significant at a 95% confidence level. List (2011) acknowledged
the possibility that the results might be due to experimenter-demand effects—subjects
who were encouraged to trade during the six-month period might have believed that the
experimenter wanted them to trade in the mug/pen rounds. In any event, the results stand
as at least some evidence of a causal connection between trading experience and a lack
of reluctance to trade.
Using a different method to investigate the impact of market experience on reluctance
to trade, Apicella et al. (2014) ran experiments on two groups of Hudza Bushmen of
Northern Tanzania, hunter-gatherers who rely on neither herding nor agriculture for
food. One group lives in an isolated region, and its members interact rarely with outsiders.
Food is consumed immediately and is shared equally among all members of the tribe.
Possessions are few, and the tribe remedies unequal distributions by taking from those
that have excess supply and giving to those with fewer resources. This group has little
to no experience with trading. The second group is located near safari parks and has
been exposed to tourists. Tour guides regularly compensate members of the group to
take tourists on hunts. The group also produces bows and arrows for sale to the tourists.
Members of this group sometimes venture to a nearby village to purchase food and other
products. Using a Knetsch (1989) style simple exchange design,59 the authors observed
reluctance to trade in the second group (those with experience trading) but not the first
(those with little experience trading). One obvious problem with the study’s design is that
the experimenters did not randomly assign Hudza members to the treatment and control
groups. Thus, some variable other than trading experience might be driving observed
differences. To address this concern, the authors pointed to some evidence that casts
doubt on the possibility that Hudza members with particular traits or preferences selected
themselves into the group with trading experience. They also claimed that varying levels
of familiarity with the goods used in the experiment likely do not drive the results. In the
end, however, the lack of random assignment leaves open the possibility that something
other than differences in trading experience might drive the differences in reluctance to
trade. Despite this limitation, the results suggest a complicated (and unclear) relationship
between market experience and reluctance to trade.
5.4 Agency
Some have explored whether agents anticipate their principals’ valuation gaps when
making decisions on their behalf. Marshall et al. (1986) used a design similar to Knetsch
and Sinden’s (1984) simple design (i.e., would you trade a lottery ticket for $2) except that
subjects were told that they could not participate in the lottery. Instead they were asked to
advise someone who owned the lottery ticket or someone contemplating buying a lottery
ticket. No valuation gaps were observed in the choices of agents in both hypothetical

59
The experimenter randomly chose which good to endow and, in one treatment, subjects
were not allowed to touch the goods prior to making a choice. See Plott and Zeiler (2007), discussed
infra, for a discussion of design choices in simple exchange experiments.
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treatments and treatments involving actual payoffs. The authors suggested that agents’
lack of appreciation for principals’ valuation disparities might give rise to agency costs
that go beyond moral hazard and other previously identified frictions.
Some have explored a different question about the relevance of agency for valuation gaps: do valuation gaps hold up when an individual-agent is transacting with his
employer-principal. Arlen et al. (2002) explored whether managers of firms are reluctant
to trade when transacting with their firms. Specifically, they tested two conjectures. The
“exchange-value” hypothesis suggests that transactions between principals and agents
involve entitlements held primarily for exchange purposes, and so loss aversion is not triggered by the loss of these sorts of goods (Kahneman et al., 1990). The alternative “sharedentitlement” hypothesis posits that an agent’s sense of loyalty to the firm reduces her sense
of entitlement in cases where the agent feels the firm is entitled to the asset. The authors
first successfully replicated the gap result using a basic design in line with Kahneman et al.
(1990). The law student subjects then pretended to play the role of agent to a hypothetical
firm. Subjects were told that they would need to choose between keeping (or obtaining) a
good, potentially a factor of production for the firm, and receiving a higher wage. Those
not endowed with the asset were given an opportunity to “take” the asset.60 Subjects were
told that the firm would enjoy higher profits if it used the asset in production. Coffee mugs
were used to represent the firm “asset.” Each subject participated in eight rounds and was
told that one round would be chosen at random for payment. Reported choices suggest
no valuation gap. The authors also reported findings that suggest that the disappearance
of the gap is driven by lower owner valuations. To test whether the no-gap result was
driven by the perception of the asset as an exchange good or by a sense of loyalty to the
firm, the authors conducted yet another experiment to separate the competing theories.
The goal of the design was to remove the possibility of shared entitlement (i.e., a sense
of loyalty). In this experiment, subjects were not playing the role of an employee of the
firm but rather an applicant for a job at the firm. The subjects were told nothing regarding how their choice would impact the firm’s profit. Given this design, an observed gap
would support the shared-entitlement hypothesis, while the exchange-value hypothesis
would be supported by the absence of an observed gap. No gap was observed. This result
adds support to the exchange-value hypothesis, in line with the qualification suggested by
Kahneman et al. (1990).
***
The studies described in this section suggest that levels of loss aversion might be impacted
by many factors such as the moral valence of the good, emotions at the time of choice,
feelings the good invokes, whether we regularly trade the good (or other goods) and who
our trading partners are. The findings were important for refining endowment theory. In
addition, however, they also inspired researchers to posit and explore alternative theories,
theories suggesting that reluctance to trade is driven not by loss aversion but by some
other force or set of forces. Each proposed theory has given rise to a sub-literature. The
60
The authors ran an additional experiment to test whether unendowed subjects were morally opposed (or at least reluctant) to take the firm’s asset. They found no evidence that morality
motivated choices.
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purpose of the next section is to describe the alternatives, review the evidence generated
to test the theories and illustrate how individual studies fit into larger literatures. While
the literature has not converged on any one of the new theories, endowment theory
clearly is no longer the leading explanation (if it ever was or should have been). The
theory has essentially been replaced by expectation theory, which retains the assumptions
of reference dependence and loss aversion but makes different assumptions about what
sets reference points. While some data support this new theory, some call into question
its predictive value. The same is true of the alternatives. Several theories stand as top-dog
contenders. More work is required to test the theories against each other, to abandon
the ones that fall short and to refine, and possibly combine, the remaining in a way that
maximizes the theory’s ability to predict choices.

6.

ALTERNATIVE THEORY DEVELOPMENT

6.1 Hanemann’s Substitution Theory
Hanemann’s (1991) theory of gaps differs radically from endowment theory. The theory
relies on two key assumptions from standard economic theory—that the availability of
substitutes impacts price elasticity and that potential buyers face budget constraints.
Specifically, one’s WTA to give up a good in the absence of substitutes might be higher
than one’s WTP if budget constraints bind so that a potential buyer whose valuation
is at least as high as the market price possesses inadequate funds to buy at the market
price. When substitutes for a good do not exist (e.g., one’s health or neighborhood tree
density or the life of a Norfolk pine tree), the theory predicts that an individual endowed
with the good requires more in compensation to give it up (in the extreme, an infinite
amount) relative to the amount she would pay to acquire it (in the extreme, her entire,
but limited, wealth). When substitutes exist, however, WTA will be lower given the ability
of a potential seller to obtain a substitute. Figure 13.2 demonstrates the basic concept.
A reduction in substitutability (a move from Panel A to Panel B) results in an increase
in valuation of the good. That is, potential sellers require more money ($13 as opposed to
$5) to remain on the indifference curve if they give up one mug. Buyers are also willing to
pay more to obtain the good, but they face budget constraints. Thus, Hanemann’s theory
attempted to explain observed gaps by positing that the lack of substitutes pushes WTA
up, and budget constraints preclude WTP from increasing to the same extent.61
Shogren et al. (1994) designed an experiment to test whether the degree of substitution
between goods (rather than endowment theory) might explain observed valuation gaps.62

Others have expanded Hanemann’s substitution theory. Amiran and Hagen (2003), for
example, worked out conditions under which WTA and WTP can infinitely diverge for public
goods even where the elasticity of substitution between market goods and the public good is strictly
positive. Hanemann (2003) agreed with Amiran and Hagen’s analysis and framed their results in
relation to his earlier work.
62
Adamowicz et al. (1993) published an experiment to test whether substitution effects explain
observed gaps prior to Shogren et al. (1994). The experiment, however, did not employ a demandrevealing mechanism to elicit valuations. Subjects simply completed questionnaires that prompted
61
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Panel A:
High Substitutability

Panel B:
Low Substitutability

$18
$10
$5

$5

1

2

mugs

1

2

mugs

Note: The dotted lines represent indifference curves, which indicate various combinations of mugs and
money that make an individual indifferent between the combinations. For example, the indifference curve in
Panel A suggests that the individual is indifferent between one mug plus $10 and two mugs plus $5. From this
we can infer that the individual would require a transfer of $5 to make him indifferent between keeping both
mugs and giving up a mug. In other words, his valuation of one mug is conditional on owning two mugs (i.e.,
his WTA) is $5.

Figure 13.2

The impact of substitutability on WTA

The authors used an auction mechanism designed to elicit true valuations for a brandname candy bar (a good with substitutes) and a reduction in the risk of food-borne illness
(a good without substitutes).63 Valuations were measured after subjects participated in
repeated auction rounds, each followed by an announcement of the market-clearing price,
which was a function of the subjects’ reported valuations. Repeated rounds were employed
to help the subjects understand the auction mechanism, which leads to confidence that
the reported valuations are the subjects’ non-strategic valuations. Subjects acted either
as sellers or buyers, and all subjects reported valuations for both the candy bar and the
reduction in risk of illness. All outcomes were potentially binding. One round was selected

them to report hypothetical maximum amounts they would be willing to pay to buy (and minimum
amounts they would be willing to accept to sell) goods with varying substitute availability. While
the experiment design is not a perfect fit in relation to the tested theory’s assumptions because
subject choices are not followed by consequences, the study provides some evidence that availability
of substitutes explains at least part of observed gaps. While the availability of substitutes reduced
the magnitude of the observed (hypothetical) gap, a statistically significant (hypothetical) gap
remained.
63
The auction mechanism employed was designed to elicit non-strategic valuations, but it is
not the familiar first-price auction that allocates the good to the highest bidder. The subjects (all
university students) were not told that they could optimize their payouts by reporting the most
they would be willing to pay as non-owners and the least amount they would be willing to accept as
owners. The authors simply described the auction mechanism and tested the subjects’ understanding of it. See infra for details on theories related to subjects’ lack of familiarity with the elicitation
device.
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randomly to be the binding round.64 Potential buyers were endowed with cash that they
could spend during the experiment and either a small piece of candy (or a food product
with normal risk of contamination) that they could exchange for a brand-name candy
bar (or a strictly screened food product with a lower risk of contamination) if their bids
exceeded the clearing price determined by the auction. Sellers received the same amount
of cash as buyers plus either a brand-name candy bar or a strictly screened food product,65
and they were given an opportunity to downgrade their endowment in exchange for cash
if their reported valuation did not exceed the market clearing price.
Given this design, Hanemann’s substitution hypothesis would be supported if no gaps
were observed in the candy bar rounds and gaps appeared in the food rounds. On the
other hand, if gaps were robust across the type of good, the data would support endowment theory. The data support Hanemann’s hypothesis. Candy bar WTA did not exceed
WTP after multiple rounds of bidding, and WTA converged to the average candy bar
market price, but food product WTA exceeded WTP even after multiple auction rounds
and subjects were provided full information about the probability and severity of health
risks.66 To test whether gaps might persist in environments with available substitutes but
uncertain value and cost, an additional treatment was conducted to elicit valuations for
mugs with the university’s emblem. Subjects were told they would be able to purchase
as many mugs as they wanted right outside the door after the experiment. No valuation
gap was observed. Shogren et al. noted that their results contradict the results obtained
by Kahneman et al. (1990) in similar experiments that elicit valuations for goods with
substitutes (e.g., pens and mugs). They pointed to numerous differences in the experiment
design including the auction used to elicit valuations, but drew no conclusions about the
impact of procedures on reported valuations. They rightly highlighted the need for further
research to better understand the impact of elicitation methods on reported valuations in
experimental markets.67
Morrison (1997a) challenged the conclusions drawn by Shogren et al. (1994). She
started by revising endowment theory to assume that one’s level of loss aversion depends
on the degree of substitutability. More specifically, she posited that, if reference dependence causes a kink in the indifferent curve, loss aversion might be detectable only when
the degree of substitutability is relatively low (i.e., no close substitutes). If the degree of

64
To leave the experiment with take-home cash, subjects were required to eat a food product
that had either the usual chance of being contaminated with a food-borne pathogen or a lower
probability of contamination due to strict screening for pathogens. The chances of contamination
of both food products were explained to the subjects prior to eliciting valuations.
65
Note that owners were endowed with more than non-owners, which might cause a wealth
effect. While the size of the differential is small, theoretically it might account for observed gaps.
Morrison (1997b), infra, ruled out this potential explanation by giving non-owners the same
amount of cash as owners plus cash equivalent to the average reported WTA. In other words,
Morrison began by placing owners and non-owners on the same indifference curve.
66
Sugden (1999) called this interpretation into question by arguing that Hanemann’s theory
predicts only small gaps in the food product market given that observed buyer valuations are low
relative to subject wealth (i.e., buyers seem not to face budget constraints). Thus, Sugden argued,
the large observed gap is inconsistent with Hanemann’s theory. This sort of critique highlights the
danger of drawing conclusions from only a subset of the data’s features.
67
This line of research has been taken up and is summarized infra.
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Panel A:
High Substituability

Panel B:
Low Substituability

$25

$18
$12
$10

kink at reference point

$5

1

Figure 13.3

kink at reference point

$5

2

mugs

1

2

mugs

The impact of loss aversion on WTA as a function of substitutability

substitutability is high (i.e., close substitutes are available), then the valuation disparity,
while present, might simply be more difficult to detect in the lab.
Figure 13.3 illustrates the basic idea. When substitutes exist (see Panel A) and an
individual is endowed with two mugs and asked to report the minimum amount she is
willing to accept to give up one mug, in the absence of loss aversion, she asks $5 (i.e., she
is indifferent between $5 + two mugs and $10 + one mug, so her valuation for the mug is
$5). When substitutes do not exist (Panel B), she requires $13 to give up her endowment
($18 minus $5). If potential buyers are equally income-constrained under both market
conditions, a valuation gap is likely to appear only under low substitutability. As noted
earlier, Hanemann argued that observed gaps have been misinterpreted as resulting from
loss aversion when they are actually caused by low substitutability. Morrison’s critique
noted that loss aversion, if it exists, has a different impact on a seller’s reported valuation
depending on the degree of substitutability. If loss aversion causes a kink in the indifference curve at the reference point ($5 and two mugs), in markets with high substitutability loss aversion would push WTA up much more modestly than in markets with low
substitutability (up to $7 in Panel A versus $20 in Panel B). Morrison’s main point is
that the lack of a valuation gap in markets with high substitutability does not necessarily
demonstrate the lack of loss aversion. It could be that loss aversion is simply more difficult
to detect because of its relatively small impact on seller valuations in markets with high
substitutability.
Morrison (1997b) performed the tests suggested in her previous work. Specifically, she
designed an experiment based on Shogren et al.’s (1994) design to test endowment theory
against the substitutability hypothesis and to determine whether both theories might be
at work when valuation gaps are observed. One basic design difference between Morrison
and Shogren et al. is that subjects in some of Morrison’s treatments were placed on the
same indifference curves before valuations are elicited. In her first treatment, to replicate
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Shogren et al., Morrison endowed both owners and non-owners with the same amount
of cash. Potential buyers were told that they could spend their own money during the
experiment, and they were encouraged to bring money to the experiment when they
signed up to participate. In a second treatment, non-owners were endowed with cash
equal to the cash given to owners plus cash equal to the average owner WTA response.
In both treatments, subjects were told the price of the good and that it was offered for
sale at a nearby shop; therefore, substitutability is assumed to be relatively high in both
treatments. Under this design, Hanemann’s theory predicts a gap in the first treatment
due to the higher potential for budget constraints, but not the second. Endowment theory
predicts gaps in both. Morrison found neither; rather, she observed no gap in the first
treatment and a statistically significant gap in the second. The results from Treatment 2,
which ruled out substitutability as a possible explanation, compelled her to conclude that
endowment theory plays a significant role in gap creation, despite the fact that the theory
cannot explain the result in the first treatment.
Shogren and Hayes (1997, p. 241), in a short comment on Morrison (1997a), raised
concerns with her theory. They claimed that the theory’s assumptions are arbitrary and
argue that she failed to propose “a more sensitive way to detect [the] elusive effect.” They
noted, however, that the literature does contain evidence in support of endowment theory.
They hypothesize that the mixed results might be attributable to the differing auction
mechanisms used to elicit valuations (e.g., BDM as employed by Kahneman et al. (1990)
and Vickery auctions used in Shogren et al. (1994)). They worried that repeated signals in
the form of between-round announcements of market clearing prices in Vickery auctions
might move reported valuations away from subjects’ true valuations.
Bateman et al. (1997) used a different experimental design to test endowment theory
against Hanemann’s substitution effect conjecture. They noted that while Shogren et al.
(1994) provided some evidence for substitution effects as an explanation for observed
gaps, they did not directly measure the elasticities of substitution (i.e., the steepness of
indifference curves), thus the interpretation of their data was merely speculative. Bateman
et al. designed an experiment that purported to eliminate substitution and income effects
as a possible explanation for observed gaps. They did this by asking subjects to rank order
the same two bundles of goods from various endowment points. They then compared the
preference orderings across different reference points.
The authors established endowments by giving subjects differing bundles of two goods:
{a little of x, a little of y}, {a little of x, a lot of y}, {a lot of x, a little of y} or {a lot
of x, a lot of y}.68 Subjects were then asked indirectly to rank order two of the bundles
(i.e., {a little x, a lot of y} and {a lot of x, a little y}) conditional on being endowed with
one of the four bundles (the reference point).69 The demand-revealing BDM mechanism

E.g., bundle a = {2 cans of Coke, £3.00}, bundle b = {6 cans of Coke, £3.00}, bundle c = {2
cans of Coke, £2.20}, and bundle d = {6 cans of Coke, £2.20}.
69
Rank ordering was elicited by asking subjects to state an amount of a good that would
make one option just better than the other. To illustrate, assume a subject is endowed with {2
cans of Coke, £3.00}. The subject is presented with two options, one of which he must chose. For
example, two options might be (1) we give you 4 cans of Coke and you give us $X, and (2) nothing
(no change from initial endowment). The subject is asked to state the highest value of X such that
he would still prefer option (2) to option (1). In this case, X is equivalent to the subject’s WTP for
68
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was used to determine preference orderings after subjects were trained and tested on the
device. Under these conditions, the standard theory of consumer value predicts that a
subject’s rank ordering of the two bundles will not depend on the subject’s endowment
(Hicks and Allen 1934). Endowment theory, on the other hand, predicts that rank orderings will depend on one’s starting point because subjects will account for potential losses
differently than assumed under the standard theory. Bateman et al. found that the data
supported endowment theory, both in the Coke and the luxury chocolate treatments.
They also found that the effect was stronger for luxury chocolates than it was for Coke,
suggesting that familiarity might diminish the effect but not completely eliminate it.70
They concluded that their “results [were] consistent with those of a large number of other
experiments and field surveys,” and that “[i]n light of this evidence, it seem[ed] that the
influence of loss aversion [was] a robust effect”71 (p. 503). Interestingly, Bateman et al.
(1997) reported evidence suggesting loss aversion in money. This result, along with others,
such as no-gap results for induced-value tokens and the equivalence between chooser and
potential buyer valuations, leads to the question: what sets reference points?
6.2

Expectation Theory: Endowment Theory Generalized

The theory Bateman et al. (1997) tested and the theory Kahneman et al. (1990) posited
are different in important ways. Bateman et al. (1997) assumed that reference points are
set by one’s current endowment, no matter what that endowment is, including money. The
results Kahneman et al. (1990) reported, however, suggest that valuations of choosers and
potential buyers are the same, implying that buyers do not experience the giving up of
money as a loss that triggers a disutility, at least under certain conditions.72 To resolve
4 cans of Coke conditional on having 2 cans of Coke and £3.00. The authors used pilot studies
to determine the combinations of goods so that one bundle would not always be preferred to the
other bundle.
70
Bateman et al. (1997) used luxury chocolates to test conjectures related to the impact of
good familiarity on gaps. Specifically, they noted that the potential loss of a familiar good might
not trigger loss aversion because (1) one’s preference for familiar goods is more certain, reducing
the likelihood of stochastic variation and error in valuation determinations, (2) one might use
known market prices as an anchor when thinking about one’s valuation, and (3) if the product is
regularly consumed, one might view gains of the good in the experiment as saved money rather than
increased consumption. Again, it is important to note that hypotheses such as these substantially
refine endowment theory, but appliers of the theory often overlook them (Klass and Zeiler 2013).
Landesberg (2007) also reported a gap in valuations for an unfamiliar good (albeit smaller than the
usual 2 to 1 ratio of WTA to WTP—between 1.27 and 1.40) and a smaller gap for a familiar good
(estimated WTA/WTP ratio of 1.12–1.23). For subjects who confirmed that the familiar good was
in fact familiar, no gap was observed. We might question the power of the test to identify an effect,
however, given the small sample size—12 owners and 8 non-owners.
71
Bateman et al. (2000) measured hypothetical valuations in the field for pubic goods such
as traffic calming methods to test Hanemann’s substitution effect conjecture against endowment
theory. Their data supported neither theory, but the hypothetical nature of the questions posed to
subjects calls into question whether the study’s design is a good test of either theory, both of which
assume that actual consequences follow choices.
72
For example, if a potential buyer has extra money to spend on an unexpected purchase
opportunity, then no feeling of loss might arise from the giving up of the money. On the other
hand, if the potential buyer must give up some planned purchase to spend the money on an unex-
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this issue, Bateman and Kahneman joined forces with a number of other authors to
conduct an adversarial collaboration (Bateman et al. 2005).73 Using a demand-revealing
mechanism, the authors elicited WTP, WTA, and equivalent gain (EG), a measure of
the smallest amount of money that the individual would be willing to accept in place of
a gain of some amount of a good (in this case, high quality chocolates).74 A number of
hypotheses were formulated by developing predictions from the competing theories given
the experiment design. For example, if individuals experience the giving up of money as
a loss, then the smallest amount of a good an individual is willing to accept in return for
a loss of some amount of endowed money will exceed the smallest amount of a good an
individual is willing to accept in place of a gain of some amount of money. Both measures
ask subjects to report the amount of money that would make them indifferent between
the money and the good, but in the former condition, the subject loses the money and
gains the good while in the latter condition, the subject gains the money or the good and
nothing is lost. If money given up is experienced as a loss, individuals averse to losses
will demand extra compensation in the form of a larger amount of the good received in
exchange for the money. On the other hand, if individuals do not experience giving up
money as a loss, then the two reported valuations would be equal. The data turned out
not to support either theory particularly well. The authors noted that they “. . . cannot
reject [Kahneman’s no-loss-aversion-in-buying hypothesis] with 95 percent confidence;
but there is no positive support for that hypothesis” (p. 32). Other results reported in the
study support the claim that individuals are averse to money losses. According to the
authors, the most striking feature of the results was the relative weakness of loss aversion
in all comparisons in which both theories predict such effects.75 Although the results
were mixed, both parties agreed that the results favor loss aversion in money, although
only weakly. This implies that endowment theory might be quite general—the nature
of the endowment is potentially irrelevant despite earlier caveats. Overall, however, this
study might be viewed more generally as a reason to question the explanatory power of
endowment theory.
A few years later, Kahneman teamed up with Novemsky to continue the exploration
of the same question: are individuals averse to money losses? (Novemsky and Kahneman
2005). The authors elicited valuations in three treatments: (1) buyers reported the highest

pected purchase opportunity, the loss of the money might be experienced as a loss of the planned
purchase. By designing an experiment such that the potential transactions offered are sufficiently
small to avoid the latter scenario, we can rule out the latter alternative explanation.
Others have examined experiment design features that might strengthen or weaken reference
states. See, e.g., Knetsch and Wong (2009), discussed infra.
73
Co-authors positing competing theories conduct such studies to test one theory against the
other using an experiment designed to separate them. Typically, all participants agree to co-author
the study regardless of which theory the data support.
74
In initial treatments, the authors used vouchers that could be exchanged by the subjects for
high quality chocolates at a local shop. Surprisingly, given previously published results (e.g., Sen
and Johnson 1997), the data suggested no loss aversion for the vouchers. For this reason, actual
chocolates were used in subsequent treatments.
75
The authors did find the typical 2-to-1 ratio between WTA and WTP in the classic WTA/
WTP comparison, however, which lends some support to endowment theory. But, the theory is not
able to unify the results reported in the study.
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amount they would pay for a good (WTP); (2) choosers reported the lowest amount of
money that would trigger a choice to take the money over taking the good (CE); and
(3) sellers reported the lowest amount of money that would compel them to give up an
endowed good (WTA). If individuals are not loss averse in money but are loss averse in
goods, then the ratio of WTA to CE should be greater than 1 and the ratio of CE to WTP
should equal 1. The list method was used to elicit all valuations. One choice on the list was
chosen randomly to determine the outcome. Data were collected during eight different
experiments conducted over a number of years.76 Some experiments were hypothetical
and some resulted in binding outcomes. Different items were used in the eight experiments. Despite mixed results across the experiments (two of the eight experiments cannot
rule out the possibility of no gap), the authors concluded that, at least in the aggregate,
the data supported loss aversion in goods (WTA/CE > 1) but no loss aversion in money
(CE/WTP = 1).
Novemsky and Kahneman (2005) combined their results with results from other experiments to formulate two propositions:77
(1) individuals are averse to losses of benefits rather than attributes of a good so we
should expect no loss aversion for exchanges of goods that are close substitutes, and
(2) goods that are exchanged as intended are not evaluated as losses78 (e.g., shoe sellers
intend to exchange shoes for money, so they will not exhibit loss aversion when they
give up the shoes).
These sorts of results highlighted a potential need to refine endowment theory in a
more general way. Much of the reported evidence failed to support endowment theory’s
assumption that reference points are set by endowments. Köszegi and Rabin (2006)
proposed a theory that moves away from this assumption. Their model instead assumed
that one’s overall utility for a riskless outcome depends on consumption utility and on
gain-loss utility, the sensation of gain or loss due to a departure of the endowment from
some reference point. Their model assumed that reference points are set not by one’s
endowment but by one’s “rational expectations held in the recent past about outcomes.”79
So, for example, a merchant who regularly sells goods expects not to end the day as

Aggregated results were produced using averages weighted by sample sizes. Weighting by
sample size ensures that results from sessions with a large number of subjects don’t get weighted
more heavily than results from smaller sessions.
77
The authors developed a third proposition related to the relationship between risk aversion
and loss aversion. Ariely et al. (2005) responded to these results and their potential interpretation,
which are beyond the scope of this review.
78
No loss aversion for money is a special case of this proposition. Svirsky (2014) reported
additional evidence that supports the general claim. He observed a valuation gap for chocolate
coins described to subjects as chocolate but not for money or for chocolate coins described as
tokens. He did not take a position, however, on what drives the observed gap given the wide array
of possibilities in the literature, some of which relate to basic design choices.
79
“Specifically, a person’s reference point is her probabilistic beliefs about the relevant consumption outcome held between the time she first focused on the decision determining the outcome
and shortly before consumption occurs” (p. 1141).
76
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owner of the merchandise. Thus, the merchant does not experience negative gain-loss
utility when he sells goods. In addition, reference point updating might lag behind belief
updating. Thus, one might have expectations over ending up with a good that get resolved,
but preferences continue to depend on the expectations. For example, I might expect to
receive a new bike for my birthday, but I do not receive the bike. The model predicts that,
even after the uncertainty is resolved, my willingness to pay for the bike is higher than
it was before I expected to receive it. This model, which I will refer to as “expectation
theory,” seems a good replacement for Tversky and Kahneman’s (1991) endowment
theory because its predictions are consistent with a larger swath of the data published by
the mid-2000s.80
In a similar vein, Brenner et al. (2007) distinguished between “possession loss aversion” (disutility that arises from the loss of any endowment, which is more severe than
the utility that arises from a gain of the same good if not endowed) and “valence loss
aversion” (disutility that arises from changes perceived as negative developments, which is
more severe than the utility that arises from changes perceived as positive developments),
and posited that both play a role in valuation gaps. In questionnaire-type, hypothetical
choice experiments, the authors produced data suggesting that valence loss aversion tends
to dominate possession loss aversion.81 The authors claimed that valence loss aversion
also tends to better organize the array of data published through the mid-2000s. How
much weight can be placed on these results, however, is unclear given that the experiment
design is not completely in line with the assumptions of the theories (i.e., that choices are
followed by actual consequences).
Ericson and Fuster (2011) directly tested expectation theory by manipulating subject
expectations and correlating the induced expectations with reluctance to trade. In experiment 1, subjects were endowed with a randomly selected good (either a mug or a pen, both
university memorabilia) and individually randomly assigned to having either a 10% or
90% chance to decide whether to trade for the other good. Thus, subjects in one treatment
expected that they likely would be in a position to decide whether to trade, and subjects
in the other did not. Subjects then completed a questionnaire after which they were
reminded about instructions for the (possible) exchange. This reminder was intended as a
check on understanding of the task and to get them to think about the possible decision.
Another questionnaire was administered, after which the subjects were asked to report
choices that would be administered if they end up in a position to trade. After another
questionnaire a die was rolled and decisions for those allowed to choose were effectuated.
The results supported expectation theory: subjects expecting not to be able to trade their
endowed good were less likely to report being willing to trade than those expecting to be
able to trade.
The authors ran a second experiment designed to induce expectations over ownership.
Subjects were individually randomly assigned either a 10% or 80% chance of receiving the
For example, Köszegi and Rabin’s (2006) model was able to explain the lack of aversion
to losses of money (e.g., Novemsky and Kahneman 2005) and goods obtained for the purpose of
reselling them (e.g., List 2003).
81
Shu and Peck (2011; study 7) collected data using similar hypotheticals and found a correlation between the valence of the endowed good, affective reaction towards the good and feelings of
ownership.
80
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mug in their possession and leaving with it at the end of the experiment, each with equal
likelihood. Each subject also had a 10% chance of being in a position to choose between
the mug and some randomly determined amount of money. Finally, each subject had a
10% chance of getting no mug and no money. After the questionnaire and a reminder
about the task, subjects were asked to make choices between the mug and different monetary amounts (from $0 to $9.57 in 33 cent increments) and told that these choices would
be effectuated in the case they were in a position to choose between the mug and money. In
this case, the experimenter would randomly choose an amount from the list to determine
which choice would be implemented. They were then told that if they ended up getting no
mug and no money they would get to choose between a pen and some random amount
of money. They then made choices between the pen and different monetary amounts (the
same list used to elicit mug valuations). The pen valuations were used to difference out
preferences for university memorabilia. In line with the predictions of expectation theory,
subjects with a high chance of receiving and leaving with the mug valued it (weakly)
significantly higher in the absolute sense than those who had a low chance.82 This finding
supports expectation theory, but the magnitude of the gap was substantially lower than
the oft-cited 2-to-1 ratio of WTA to WTP.83
Smith (2012) designed an experiment similar to Ericson and Fuster’s (2011) second
experiment, but his focus was on expectation theory’s predictions related to lagged beliefs.
Recall that expectation theory assumes that preferences might lag behind beliefs (my valuation for a good I expected to receive but didn’t receive is higher relative to the valuation
I had for it prior to developing the expectation even though I now expect not to get it).
To test whether preferences are influenced by lagged beliefs, Smith determined whether
subjects were endowed with the good before eliciting valuations. Subjects had either a
10% or 70% chance of getting a water bottle. Once the subjects individually determined
the outcome by drawing a marble out of a bag, valuations were elicited using the multiple
price list format. Those who won a mug valued it as a seller, and those who did not valued
it as a buyer. The demand-revealing BDM mechanism was used to determine which
subjects transact, and sales and purchases were made privately in an adjacent room. To
reduce the impact of reference point formation related to expectations over the buying/
selling task, subjects were not told about the task until endowments were determined.
The elicitation mechanism, however, was explained before subjects reported valuations,
which might have contaminated their expectations. Smith tested two predictions from
The authors estimated the difference a second time assuming that the effect of a high probability of getting the mug is approximately proportional to the consumption utility of the mug to
determine whether mug lovers will boost their valuations more than those not so passionate about
mugs. The authors used regression analysis to correlate log-transformed mug valuations with the
likelihood of getting the mug, controlling for log-transformed pen valuations (a proxy for preferences over university memorabilia to reduce idiosyncratic noise) and subject demographics. They
found that valuations for the mug were between 20 and 30% higher on average for those with a high
probability of getting one.
83
Ericson and Fuster (2011) ran a third experiment to separate expectation theory from
motivated taste change theory (Strahilevitz and Loewenstein 1998), which assumes that preferences
are impacted by self-image partly driven by the self-perceived desirability of one’s own possessions.
Their results provided no support for motivated taste change. See details behind the literature
related to mere-ownership theory infra.
82
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expectation theory: (1) WTP for those with high expectations of winning is greater than
WTP of those with low expectations of winning (due to lagged beliefs); and (2) WTA
for those with high expectations exceeds WTP for those with high expectations (due to
loss aversion). The results support the assumption of loss aversion but not the predicted
influence of lagged beliefs. Smith pointed out that subjects possibly did not hold the
lotteries for a sufficient length of time to incorporate expectations into their reference
points. Alternatively, it might be that in this context subjects were able to quickly update
their reference points upon resolution of the lotteries. Of course it is also possible that
preferences simply are not a function of lagged beliefs. In any event, the data stand as
evidence against a basic tenant of expectation theory.
Heffetz and List (2014) designed another set of experiments to directly test expectation
theory. Unlike in Ericson and Fuster’s (2011) design, their subjects did not own either of
the goods before deciding which they would choose if given the opportunity to make a
choice. Like in Ericson and Fuster (2011), the experiment was designed to induce varying
expectations over which item will be received to test the impact of expectations over
outcomes on choices. They first asked subjects to flip a coin and choose a number between
1 and 100. Subjects were then allowed to inspect two items (a mug and a pen) and were
told that they would get one of the items as a gift. Whether they got to choose the gift
or were assigned one of the items according to the coin flip was determined randomly
according to known probabilities (e.g., a 99% chance that the chosen good is received and
a 1% chance that the coin flip determines which good is received). The randomization
procedure was explained, a test of understanding was administered, and default goods
were revealed (e.g., if you are not allowed to choose, you will receive the pen if your coin
flip came up heads and the mug otherwise). After completing an unrelated questionnaire
(to pass time), all subjects chose a good that would be given to them in the event they
were allowed to choose. The uncertainty was resolved, and subjects either received the
chosen good or were assigned one of the goods based on the outcome of the coin flip.
The treatments varied subject expectations over whether they will end up with the default
good (either a 1% chance or a 99% chance).84 Thus, expectation theory predicts different
choices. The theory predicts that those with a strong expectation that they will receive
the default good will choose the default good and that those with a strong expectation
of getting a choice will make choices that are independent of the default good (half are
predicted to choose the mug and half the pen). The standard model predicts that choices
are independent of reference points, so the standard model predicts that subjects with
a strong expectation of getting the default will choose the mug or the pen independent
of the default good. The data revealed that subjects’ choices were independent of their
expectations across the board. Unlike in Ericson and Fuster (2011), the data did not
support expectation theory.
Although choices seemed not to be influenced by expectations, Heffetz and List (2014)
found that they are correlated with the coin flip, even when it’s virtually irrelevant.85 This
The authors used a survey to verify expectations. The vast majority of subjects correctly
answered questions related to expectations. Almost all of the others correctly answered after being
prompted to re-read the instructions and try again.
85
For subjects who correctly answered on the first attempt questions meant to check
understanding, choices were correlated with the coin flip (p = 0.03). The result was not statistically
84
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result is predicted by neither standard theory nor expectation theory (when combined
with the results related to expectations). In a second experiment, designed to explore both
the disparity in results relative to Ericson and Fuster (2011) and the observed coin-flip
dependence in the first experiment, the authors brought the design more in line with
Ericson and Fuster’s design.86 In addition, they varied the strength of the language used
to convey the endowment and to remind subjects of the endowment at the time of choice.
When endowments were emphasized and subjects were reminded of them, the results
observed in the previous experiment held up. Specifically, expectations over outcomes did
not impact choices, but choices were correlated with the coin-flip. When the language used
to convey endowment was de-emphasized, however, no statistically significant correlation
between the coin flip and choices was observed, and choices did not depend on expectations over outcomes. This evidence suggests that the language used to convey ownership
impacts choices. The divergent results call into question the ability of expectation theory,
in its simple form, to predict behavior.87
6.3

Uncertain Preferences

At the same time that researchers were testing and refining both endowment theory
and substitution theory, additional alternative theories were being generated. Several
theorists have focused on uncertainty over preferences as an explanation for observed
gaps. For example, Hoehn and Randall (1987) posited that individuals must consult
their preferences to determine their true valuations for goods and that this consultation
is time-consuming and might be stopped short when they face time pressure to report
WTP, biasing it downward. Dubourg et al. (1994) explored whether gaps are driven by
imprecise preferences through eliciting valuations for hypothetical changes in the risk of
non-fatal road injuries. They concluded that gaps seem to be correlated with imprecise
preferences but that imprecision explains only a portion of observed gaps. They pointed
to endowment theory as a potential explanation for the remaining portion.88 Kolstad
significant for all subjects (p = 0.13) but likely would be if the authors ran a one-sided test, which
is arguably the better test given the nature of expectation theory’s predictions.
86
For example, subjects had either a 90% or a 10% chance of being able to choose rather than
99% or 1%, subjects answered additional survey questions used to measure expectations, and the
time they spent thinking about one good versus the other was adjusted to be more in line with the
amount of time Ericson and Fuster allowed.
87
In another (working) investigation of expectation theory, Goette et al. (2014) argued that
varying the probability of the ability to choose is not a sharp test of the theory. Instead, the authors
varied the probability of a forced exchange. Owners were endowed with a good and non-owners
were endowed with money. Valuations were elicited after subjects were told that they would be
forced to trade with some probability. When that probability was set to zero, the results replicated
Kahneman et al. (1990)—WTA exceeds WTP. Expectation theory predicts that the gap should disappear when the probability of a forced trade is 0.5 and should reverse itself when the probability
exceeds 0.5. When Goette et al. varied this probability, however, they observed the usual valuation
gap. The authors suggested that expectation theory needs to account for individuals’ lack of ability
to fully forecast future reactions to gains and losses when developing plans of action.
88
Dubourg et al. (1994) dismissed substitution effects as a plausible explanation for their
experimental results. They claimed that this sort of risk had substitutes because “drivers of less
safe cars can switch some journeys to public transport, or trade speed and convenience for safety
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and Guzman (1999) attempted to explain valuation gaps in contexts where experimenters
employ first-price auction mechanisms to elicit valuations.89 They assumed that subjects
are able to expend costly effort to reduce uncertainty about their valuations. Their theory
predicted that when the payoff from trade is small relative to the cost of information,
subjects will tend to understate WTP and overstate WTA. The theory, however, relates
only to valuations elicited using first-price auctions, so it cannot explain divergence in
second-price auctions, which are commonly used to elicit valuations in experiments.90
Plott (1996) suggested a similar process of preference discovery. Specifically, Plott laid
out what he terms the “discovered preference hypothesis,” which models decision making
in three stages. Stage one is characterized by a lack of experience with the environment
that maps choices into outcomes. In this stage, choices are driven by self-interest but are
impulsive, and thus might appear irrational. Decision makers transition into stage two
as they gain experience with the environment, practicing and learning from feedback
following biding choices. During this stage, choices begin to stabilize and more closely
align with preference-based models. By stage three individuals anticipate that others will
act rationally, and choices become best responses to the predicted rational behavior of
others. This hypothesis suggests that seemingly irrational behavior might instead be a
symptom of a lack of experience or understanding of the environment, and that practice
and experience might be a necessary component of preference discovery.
Zhao and Kling (2001) took a related approach in an attempt to organize the thenexisting data better than both endowment theory and substitution theory. Their commitment cost theory built upon an assumption of imprecise preferences and predicted
that subjects would inflate WTA when they were uncertain about their valuations.91 The
theory predicts that a potential seller will report a WTA that is higher than her true WTA
by driving more slowly and carefully” (pp. 127–128). Of course, as the authors mentioned, whether
subjects actually contemplated these sorts of substitutes before reporting hypothetical valuations
for risk reductions was unclear. Despite this lack of clarity, the authors deemed endowment theory
to be a “better explanation.”
Morrison (1998, p. 190) pointed out, however, that knowing whether gaps are caused by endowment theory or alternative theories, such as lack of market discipline and preference imprecision,
is impossible given the context in which Dubourg et al. elicited valuations. That is, she argued
that Dubourg et al. (1994) did not provide strong evidence given the hypothetical nature of the
valuation elicitation procedure. As evidence against alternative theories she pointed to elicited
valuations reported in her earlier paper (Morrison 1997b), which imposed market discipline by
using an incentive-compatible elicitation device and employing repeated trials to allow subjects to
gain experience using the device. She measured preference precision by asking owners, who were
endowed with mugs over which subjects were assumed to have imprecise preferences, to state (1) the
minimum value that they were sure they would be willing to accept to give up their endowment and
(2) the maximum value that they were sure they would not accept. Analogous responses were elicited from non-owners. She found that minimum WTA exceeded maximum WTP (Figure 2, p. 193)
and argued that this evidence cuts against preference imprecision as a driver of observed gaps.
89
In these auctions, the highest bidder buys and pays his bid, and the lowest asker sells and
receives her ask.
90
In second-price auctions, the highest bidder buys but pays an amount equal to the secondhighest bid. Selling works similarly. Second-price auctions were designed to encourage the reporting of true valuations.
91
Li et al. (2002) empirically estimated the impact of uncertainty over the welfare effects of a
proposed change on distributions of valuations. They found that “individuals who [were] uncertain
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if she is forced to state a valuation that will potentially result in her having to give up the
good for money sooner than she would choose to give it up. By announcing a higher WTA,
she buys time to discover her valuation because she is more likely to leave the experiment
with the good and have opportunities to determine her true valuation and then to sell the
good after the experiment. Similarly, potential buyers will offer less to avoid buying until
they can obtain more information about their true valuation for the good. The theory
posits that we can think of the difference between reported WTA (WTP) and actual WTA
(WTP) as the amount the subject is willing to forego to postpone the decision until she is
able to obtain more information about her true valuation.92 Zhao and Kling argued that
data reported in other experiments supported their theory. For example, when values are
certain (e.g., values for induced-value tokens in Kahneman et al. 1990), we do not observe
gaps. Kahneman et al. (1990) did observe gaps, however, for mugs even after opportunities
to learn during repeated bidding rounds. The author noted, though, that subjects need
opportunities to learn not only about how the valuation elicitation mechanism works but
also about their true valuations.
Kling et al. (2013) designed an experiment to test commitment cost theory. They began
by refining the theory. They noted that commitment cost theory is incomplete without
some source of asymmetry in beliefs over the ease in buying and selling outside the
experiment. If subjects anticipate the possibility that they might wish to reverse trades
made during the experiment after learning more about their values and the market value
of the good, then the valuations reported during the experiment will depend on subjects’
beliefs about the ease of buying and selling after the experiment. If beliefs about ease
are symmetric, then we would expect WTA = WTP. Under Kling et al.’s (2013) version
of commitment cost theory, valuation gaps are caused by asymmetries in beliefs about
ease of buying versus ease of selling, which they assume stem from cognitive dissonance
and/or limited memory. Under the assumption of cognitive dissonance, subjects’ beliefs
about the ease of buying or selling are correlated with their role in the experiment because
individuals tend to believe that their trading position in the experiment, say as a seller, is a
“good” position, which triggers the belief that selling in the future will be easier relative to
buying. The same is true for potential buyers. Buyers believe that the buyer role is a “good”
position, which triggers the belief that buying in the future will be easier relative to selling.

about the welfare effects of a proposed change tend[ed] to have higher expected WTA values than
under certainty.”
92
Zhao and Kling (2004) presented a formal dynamic model of an individual’s decision to
purchase or sell under conditions of uncertainty, irreversibility, and learning. The theory assumes
that “commitment costs arise when the following conditions are met: the individual (1) is uncertain
about the value of the good, (2) expects that she can learn more about the value in the future, (3)
has some willingness to wait, (4) expects a cost associated with reversing the action of buying or
selling, and (5) is forced to make a trading decision now even though she might prefer to delay the
decision” (Zhao and Kling 2004, p. 510).
Simonson and Drolet (2004) also studied the impact of uncertainty on reported valuations
and consider how their findings might inform theories intended to explain gaps. They focused on
individuals’ uncertainty regarding whether they wish to sell an endowed good. They examined the
impacts of anchors on reported WTA. They found that uncertainly is correlated with an irrelevant
anchor’s influence on reported WTA. They did not, however, go as far as suggesting that uncertainty causes WTA to exceed WTP.
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These divergent beliefs cause potential sellers to report high WTA because they believe
that they will be able to sell outside relatively easily if they resolve their uncertainty after
the experiment and wish to reverse the experiment outcome of no sale. Potential buyers,
on the other hand, report low WTP because they believe that they will be able to buy easily
outside if they resolve uncertainty after the experiment and wish to reverse the choice not
to purchase in the experiment. Alternatively, Kling et al. suggested that the asymmetry
could be caused by limited memory of past buying and selling experiences coupled with
the assumption that we perceive selling as easier than buying if we more readily recall
selling experiences, and buying as relatively easier if we readily recall buying experiences.
Most gap experiments provide subjects with experience trading before measuring the gap;
therefore, sellers get experience selling and buyers get experience buying. Thus, beliefs
over ease of buying and selling diverge along role lines. This leads to the same predictions
as under the assumption of cognitive dissonance. Buyers will report low WTP because
they believe they will easily be able to buy after the experiment if they so wish after their
uncertainties about their valuation and the market price are resolved (or reduced).
To test this theory, the researchers conducted what they describe as a “field” experiment.93 The experiment was conducted using subjects drawn from a pool of people who
were attending a sports card show. In one set of experiments, half the subjects were given
a baseball card with a market value of roughly $12, and the other half were given $12 in
cash to rule out income effects. After eliciting valuations using an incentive compatible
mechanism,94 the subjects were asked to report whether they intended to keep, trade, or
sell the card if they ended up with one at the end of the experiment. Subjects also were
asked to report how easy they thought it might be to sell or purchase the card outside
the experiment. Subjects were told that their responses would be kept confidential and
that they would be contacted within three days if they were among the traders based on
reported valuations,95 and cash (cards) were mailed to subjects who mailed in cards (cash).
The authors observed a valuation gap.96 More analysis was performed to determine the
cause of the gap. The authors found that potential sellers who planned to keep the card
stated statistically significantly higher values on average than those who planned to sell
See Harrison and List (2004) for a description of field experiments, in which data are collected using experimental methods that are applied in actual markets rather than in the laboratory.
Despite the use of the term, Kling et al.’s (2013) experiment might better be described as a quasifield experiment in the sense that the data were collected using subjects that were attending a sports
card show. Subjects reported valuations in a (mobile) laboratory setting and not as participants in
actual transactions at the sports card show.
94
Valuations were elicited using the Shogren et al. (2001) nth-price auction, which is designed
to encourage reports of non-strategic valuations.
95
Subjects endowed with cards traded if their reported valuations were less than a randomly
chosen number. In exchange for their cards, they received a number of dollars equal to the
randomly chosen number. Those not endowed traded if their reported valuations were more than
a different randomly chosen number. In exchange for cash equal to the randomly chosen number,
they received a card.
96
The gap was statistically significant at the 5% level according to both parametric and nonparametric tests. Non-parametric tests are employed when the populations from which the samples
are drawn are not normally distributed. The null hypothesis is that the samples were drawn from the
same population (i.e., a group of individuals that behave similarly regardless of which treatment
is applied).
93
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outside the experiment. They also found asymmetric beliefs about the ease of transacting
outside the experiment. For example, those intending to keep the card reported beliefs
of higher levels of difficulty selling outside the experiment relative to those who did not
intend to keep the card. Generally, the results support the predictions of Zhao and Kling’s
commitment cost theory.97 WTA decreased and WTP increased as the perceived difficulty
of reversing the transaction decreased.98
Others have proposed similar theories that assume uncertain preferences. For example,
Inder and O’Brien (2003) suggested that individuals might report low WTP and high
WTA if they are uncertain about how a transaction will impact their utility in an effort
to avoid negative emotional states that might arise from disappointment or regret.99 Such
reactions might be triggered, for example, if an individual does not know the market
value of the good and purchases the good during the experiment for an amount above an
amount she could gain from selling the good after the experiment (or for an amount that
exceeds the utility she eventually derives from the good).
Carmichael and MacLeod (2006) also developed a rational choice theory model based
on principals similar to those employed by Zhao and Kling (2004). The authors crafted
a trading model that assumes that individuals have the capacity to walk away from a
seemingly unfair deal even if it requires giving up a potential gain. They assumed that
individuals are endowed with goods and have the ability to “act decisively before they have
fully analyzed a situation” (p. 213). Their model predicted that individuals might refuse
to trade if the perceived gains from trade are small relative to the expected gains from
waiting to fully analyze things. The model seems to be the first to suggest that valuation
gaps are the result of bargaining strategies developed through evolution. The basic idea
is that “survival” depends on strategic reluctance to give up one’s endowments, and that
we naturally default to these “adaptive structures known to exist in our brains” (p. 213).
Tsur (2008) modeled valuation uncertainty from a different angle. He assumed that
gaps were caused by uncertain preferences, but he diverged from previously posited theories regarding how that uncertainty impacts behavior. Rather than assuming positive costs
of committing to a transaction prior to discovering one’s valuation, Tsur assumed that
individuals, faced with opportunities to transact, predicted their uncertain utility from
a trade by using selective past experiences. Selectivity results from the assumption that
individuals place greater weight on past utility from transactions that were carried out

Ratan (2012) reported evidence from simple exchange settings that support a similar theory.
Corrigan et al. (2008, p. 285) conducted additional tests of the impact of commitment costs
on WTP and found that “respondents offered the opportunity to delay their purchasing decisions
until more information became available were willing to pay significantly less for improved water
quality than those facing a now-or-never decision.” Lusk (2003) put predictions related to WTP to
the test in the lab and found that most of his results were not in line with the theory’s predictions.
He noted several problems with the experiment design (pp. 1321–1322), so it is unclear how much
weight we can confidently place on the results.
99
See also Zhang and Fishbach (2005) who reported evidence which suggests that the
magnitude of gaps is affected by regret-type feelings that are associated with losing possession of
a potentially valuable object (for sellers) or losing money on a potentially worthless purchase (for
buyers). Ratan (2014) found evidence of regret avoidance in simple exchange experiments that
allow subjects to reverse trading decisions if they wish. See infra for details on experiments designed
to test regret theory.
97
98
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relative to those that were not. Valuations gaps result because buyers recall past purchases,
which were more likely to occur after an overestimation of value relative to previously
avoided buying opportunities, and sellers recall past sales, which were more likely to occur
after an underestimation of value relative to previously avoided selling opportunities.
Buyers reduce their predicted utility (and therefore their reported valuations), and sellers
increase theirs, based on experienced utility. Tsur’s model built in variation in levels of
sophistication to predict larger gaps for those who failed to account for selectivity (naïve
agents) compared to those who did (rational agents). Tsur did not run experiments to test
his model, but he did attempt to square the model’s predictions with previously reported
data. He argued that his theory explained variation in gap size. Specifically, valuation gaps
tend to be larger for non-market goods (such as air quality and nuclear water repositories)
than for ordinary market goods, such as pens and mugs, and induced-value tokens, which
have certain values. In addition, he argued that his theory also accommodated results
suggesting that experienced traders’ valuations do not depend on their reference states.
Kingsley and Brown (2013) revisited the basic theories of preference uncertainty—for
example Plott’s (1996) discovered preference hypothesis and List’s (2003) market
experience conjecture—and put these theories to the test by providing subjects with
opportunities to discover their preferences for goods by engaging in a “value learning
exercise.” In the baseline treatment, student subjects were paid a $10 show-up fee and
handed a coffee mug with the school’s insignia. Valuations were elicited using the multiple
price list format. Subjects received instruction on the mechanism and participated in
hypothetical induced-value practice rounds as hypothetical owners and non-owners.
Subjects were randomly assigned to either the owner or non-owner group, and valuations
were collected. Transactions were completed anonymously. A second treatment included
a value-learning exercise before valuations were elicited. The subjects were asked to make
155 hypothetical choices between pairs of items including the mug, five other locally
available private goods, four public goods, and 11 different dollar amounts. The purpose
of the exercise was to provide subjects with an opportunity to learn their valuation for
the mug. If uncertain preferences explain observed valuation gaps, and the exercise helps
subjects learn their preferences, then the valuation gap should disappear after subjects
complete the value-learning exercise. Kingsley and Brown observed a valuation gap in
the baseline treatment but not in the treatment that provided the mechanism for learning
one’s valuation. This result supports Plott’s (1996) discovered preference hypothesis and
suggests that explanations that assume loss aversion are not robust.
In an effort to develop a general theory that can accommodate outcomes that vary
based on preference uncertainty, Loomes et al. (2009) proposed a model that assumed
that individuals are loss averse and that reluctance to trade varies with the characteristics
of relevant goods and an individual’s knowledge about and experience with the good.100
The model predicted that “exchange resistance” increases as utility loss aversion and
uncertainty about future preferences over relevant goods increase. The assumed dependence of reluctance to trade on preference uncertainty allows the theory to explain a wider

100
In support of this assumption, Landesberg (2007) observed valuation gaps for an unfamiliar
good but not for a familiar good. Familiarity was measured in part by how often the subjects
purchased the good outside the lab.
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range of experimental findings than Tversky and Kahneman’s (1991) endowment theory.
For example, the theory predicted that gaps are reduced or eliminated in contexts in
which experience or experimental procedures reduce uncertainty about future preferences.
Loomes et al. did not, however, put this theory up against other theories that have found
support in the literature. Thus, more work is required to determine which theory best
unifies the reported findings.
6.4

Mere-Ownership Theory

Moving away from the assumption that individuals experience disutility from losses,
some have developed theories that suggest that mere ownership of a good can change
the nature and value of the good. This camp of theories posits that reluctance to trade is
caused by the placement of a higher valuation on an owned good relative to the same good
when it lies outside one’s endowment. This explanation is an alternative to endowment
theory, which assumes valuation gaps are driven by sellers’ demand for compensation in
return for suffering the loss of a good valued the same regardless of whether she owns
it. In other words, higher WTA under endowment theory is assumed to be driven not by
divergent valuations of goods based on endowment status but by amounts of cash (or
other goods) required by owners to compensate them for the disutility they experience
when they give up an endowment. This distinction is important and is sometimes missed
by legal scholars.101
Loewenstein and Adler (1995) characterized the impact of ownership on valuation as a
“type of endogenous taste-change.” They suggested that WTA exceeds WTP because individuals experience extra utility from the owning of a good as opposed to the assumption
that individuals demand compensation for losses.102 They explored whether individuals
are able to predict the impact of ownership on valuation. The authors provided subjects

For example, see Korobkin (2014) who suggested that attachment to substantive endowments is one possible psychological explanation for loss aversion—“the endowment effect could
result from an attachment to substantive entitlements that forms solely as a consequence of
ownership or possession. Once a widget becomes my widget, perhaps I like the widget more” (p.
17). He incorrectly described attachment as a driver of loss aversion rather than an alternative to it.
He made the same mistake with his descriptions of transactional disutility, regret theory, and query
theory, all of which are offered by their authors as alternatives to loss aversion. These theories are
described infra.
102
Others posit that ownership might create a psychological association between the object
and the owner. Beggan (1992) found that subjects evaluate a good more favorably when they own
the good even when they do not chose it. He suggested that this finding reflects a general tendency
of people to make self-enhancing judgments—i.e., implicit evaluations of oneself are transferred
to objects one owns. Similarly, Nesselroade et al. (1999) found that subjects tend to enhance their
possessions when they compare them to possessions of the same type that others own. Kogut and
Kogut (2011) found a correlation between subjects’ self-reports of levels of attachment to those
with whom they have close relationships, self-reported levels of attachment anxiety, and valuations
of both sellers and buyers. They found a positive correlation between attachment anxiety and
valuations, both as buyers and sellers, but more strongly for sellers. They concluded that some of
the variation in valuations can be attributed to variation in attachment anxiety in close relationships that individuals transfer to goods. See Morewedge et al. (2009) for a summary of the broader
literature in psychology.
101
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with a monetary incentive to accurately predict their own WTA in terms of giving up a
mug in the event they obtain one by correctly guessing the result of a coin flip. Once mug
ownership was randomly determined, mug owners announced that they wished they had
reported higher WTA. Why can’t individuals predict the impact of ownership on valuation? The authors posited that “a person must be threatened with the loss of an object to
appreciate his or her heightened attachment to it” (p. 935). They concluded that valuations
reported for hypothetically owned goods or rights are likely biased downward.103
Carmon and Ariely (2000) reported data that supports the claim that potential buyers
and potential sellers assess the value of the same item differently, which leads to divergent
valuations. Their experimental data suggests that “buyers and sellers focus on aspects
of the exchange associated with what they will forgo and differ in the attention they pay
to attributes of the evaluated item and in how they evaluate what they notice” (p. 368),
sometimes referred to as “focus on the foregone theory.”104 Nayakankuppam and Mishra
(2005) designed an experiment to test whether the behavior reported by Carmon and
Ariely (2000) was due instead to buyers and sellers focusing on different features of the
good. For example, a potential seller might be more likely to notice the benefits he derives
from a good and fail to notice its negative features. Buyers on the other hand might notice
both positive and negative features when deciding whether and for how much to purchase
a good. Their evidence suggests that potential buyers and potential sellers do, in fact,
tend to focus on different aspects of goods, and this differential focus causes valuation
gaps.105 Okada (2010) found a similar result for goods with uncertain values that become

Other researchers have explored whether individuals are able to predict and anticipate
valuation gaps in themselves and in others. For example, Van Boven et al. (2000) predicted an
underestimation of the magnitude of the gap due to “egocentric empathy gaps,” an overestimation
of the similarity between their own valuation and the valuation of the person on the other side of
the transaction. In addition, they predicted that individuals make biased predictions about what
their valuations would be if they found themselves on the opposite side of the transaction. They
found evidence of both predictions. They also found that mis-estimation led to reduced earnings for subjects when placed in a market setting, suggesting that markets might not reduce the
observed biases. Subjects who gained experience in the roles of both potential buyer and potential
seller exhibited a smaller egocentric empathy gap. Later Van Boven et al. (2003) further explored
whether ownership creates attachment utility. They reported experimental results suggesting that
individuals do not anticipate endowment effects in their trading partners. Bischoff and Meckl
(2008) offered a model to illuminate the normative implications of assuming that gaps are caused
by attachment utility (which they label the “ownership-utility effect”) as opposed to loss aversion.
Specifically, they argued that if an ownership-utility effect as opposed to loss aversion causes gaps,
then public goods will be overproduced under certain conditions.
The attachment utility hypothesis, however, has not enjoyed unanimous support. Loewenstein
and Kahneman (1991), for example, pointed out findings from Kahneman et al. (1991) that
suggested that pen owners were no more likely than non-pen-owners to rate pens highly on an
attractiveness scale. In addition, the “instantaneous” nature of gaps seems to work against attachment theory, at least if it assumes that attachment requires some time to develop (Kahneman et al.
1990, p. 1342; but see Coren 2007, who suggested that attachment might occur instantly).
104
Shu and Peck (2011; study 4) employed a hypothetical survey on valuation of basketball
tickets to study whether a focus on the attributes of the object or money owned is correlated with
feelings of ownership. Subject responses suggest a positive correlation.
105
In the same vein, Casey (1995) proposed a “transaction encoding framework,” predicting
that individuals encode the transaction problem differently along a number of dimensions, only
103
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certain after transactions occur (e.g., forward contracts).106 She attributed valuation gaps
to potentially different foci of owners and non-owners on the good’s features—owners
on positive features and non-owners on negative ones—that are driven by risk aversion.
Johnson et al. (2007) explored a similar theory, which they describe as a “query theory
of value construction.” They designed an experiment to test whether individuals determine valuations by answering a series of questions whose order differs depending on one’s
reference point. The idea is that the order of questions an individual asks herself when
attempting to determine her value of an item differs depending on whether she owns the
item, and the order systematically generates values that are higher for owned items relative
to non-owned items. More specifically, the theory posits that potential sellers consider the
advantages of keeping the item first and then the advantages of selling it, while potential
buyers (or choosers) consider the advantages of not obtaining the item (the non-owner’s
status quo) and then the advantages of obtaining it. Judgments related to advantages and
disadvantages are based on information retrieved from memory.107 The asymmetry is purported to arise from the greater weight placed on answers to the question first considered.
To test their theory, Johnson et al. used the multiple price list format108 to elicit the
valuations of the subjects endowed with a mug and the subjects who were presented

one of which is endowment. While Casey (1995) acknowledged that some researchers observe no
gap between WTP and WTA, his theory is not able to explain those findings.
106
Parametric tests were used although the distribution of the data likely does not satisfy the
necessary assumption of normality, thus confidence in the results is limited.
107
Ashby et al. (2012) expanded query theory to include situations where information is,
instead, provided during the valuation and preference construction phase rather than retrieved from
memory. They derived a set of hypotheses that set out the assumptions of their Biased Evidence
Accumulation theory. The theory assumes that potential buyers focus more on value-decreasing
attributes relative to potential sellers, and this bias impacts valuation. Using eye-tracking devices,
the authors found that potential buyers of lotteries attended more to the low outcome on average.
They also found a negative correlation between time spent focusing on the low outcome and
reported valuations, and a negative correlation between the gap and deliberation time, suggesting
that as time passes, attention shifts—potential buyers begin to consider positive attributes of the
good, and potential sellers shift their attention to negative attributes of the good.
In a similar study, Pachur and Scheibehenne (2012) designed an experiment to study information
search behavior of owners and non-owners. To the extent that information is available to help
determine valuations, they predicted that owners would stop searching after encountering signals
of high value and non-owners after low-value signals. Subjects were allowed to play the lottery until
they felt ready to value it. Each time they played a lottery, the computer would randomize over
the possible outcomes according to the assigned probabilities and produce a result. Subjects then
valued hypothetical lotteries as owners and non-owners. Observed within-subject valuation differences support the authors’ search theory. Valuations as hypothetical owners exceeded valuations
as hypothetical non-owners. Search termination was correlated with owner/non-owner roles and
received signals—disparities in termination choices result in hypothetical owners and non-owner
exposure to different samples from lottery plays. Sellers stopped searching after observing high
value signals, and buyers after low value signals. Distributions of signals correlated with valuations.
108
The authors referred to the multiple price list method as the BDM mechanism, but,
technically, the BDM mechanism requires subjects to report valuations rather than make a series
of choices presented in the list. Use of the BDM mechanism avoids any influence experimenters
might have on reported valuations when they choose prices that appear in the list (Anderson et al.
2006, 2007).
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choices between the mug and various amounts of cash.109 Subjects performed a “practice
task,” during which they reported non-binding valuations for induced-value items. Those
who did not report the induced value were eliminated from the experiment. Subjects were
also given tests of understanding, and those who failed were eliminated. All subjects
were given a chance to inspect a mug placed in front of them.110 They then proceeded
to computers where they learned their endowment state (seller or chooser). Before using
the list to make choices between the good and different amounts of cash, the subjects
listed the aspects they considered in making the decision. The reported aspects were used
to draw inferences about the questions subjects asked themselves and whether the order
of the questions depends on the subject role. Subjects then used the multiple price list
to report their preferences. A previously determined random number was announced,
and transactions were completed. A valuation gap was observed—sellers and choosers
reported average valuations of $5.71 and $3.42 respectively (statistically significant at the
1% level under both parametric and non-parametric tests of differences). The authors also
noted differences between sellers’ and choosers’ descriptions of aspects. Sellers were more
positive about the mug relative to the cash, and they listed positive mug aspects earlier
than positive cash aspects. They concluded that this evidence supports query theory.
Interestingly, they found that listed aspects explain much more variation in valuations
than the endowment state, suggesting that endowment alone is insufficient to explain
gaps and that individuals might be heterogeneous in how endowments impact query
order.111 One potential concern is priming. The impact of eliciting subject views on aspects
immediately following endowment (or assignment to the chooser role) and before eliciting
valuations is unknown. By eliciting views of aspects of items, the experimenters might
have focused subjects’ attention in a way that deviates from environments outside the lab.
Additional research is required to explore this issue.
The studies summarized in this section all reported evidence in support of mereownership theory. These results are important, but they do not allow us to draw inferences
about the impact of reference dependence and loss aversion, if any. It is quite possible
that both explanations—mere-ownership theory and endowment theory—play a role in
observed reluctance to trade. Morewedge et al. (2009) pointed out the difficulty in testing
one theory against the other—both theories predict gaps in the presence of ownership.

109
Johnson et al. claimed that, by comparing valuations of potential sellers to choosers rather
than potential buyers, they eliminated wealth effects. This is not true, however. Theoretically, at
least, owners might feel wealthier on average relative to choosers because they received more from
the experimenters than did the choosers. The endowment puts the sellers on different indifference
curves relative to the choosers. The amount of the difference, however, likely is too small to trigger
concerns that wealth effects drive the reported results. The eliminated concern is not income effects
but budget constraints. Under this design, we don’t have to worry about buyers announcing low
valuations because they don’t have cash available to pay an amount equal to their true valuation.
110
The practice task and test for understanding were motivated by results produced by Plott
and Zeiler (2005) discussed infra. Plott and Zeiler showed that the gap disappears when controls for
subject misconceptions about the valuation elicitation device are employed. Johnson et al. (2007)
did not, however, employ all of Plott and Zeiler’s controls, making it difficult to completely rule out
subject misconceptions as a driver of the results.
111
Similarly, Shu and Peck (2011; study 3) replicated some of the study’s findings and reported
a correlation between query order and self-reported feelings of psychological ownership.
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What is needed is a way to separate the theories by generating a design that leads to
divergent predictions. To this end, Morewedge et al. designed an experiment to hold
ownership constant and vary whether subjects experience a loss or a gain. Using the
multiple price list method with a randomly generated price, they estimated the valuation
of mugs by both sellers and by choosers who already owned one mug.112 The ownerchoosers were asked to choose between various amounts of money and a second mug.
Endowment theory predicts that such owner-choosers would report lower values relative
to sellers, while mere-ownership theory predicts they would report values equal to sellers.
They assumed that owner-chooses will value a second mug the same as the owned mug. In
support of mere ownership theory, they find equivalent average values of owner-choosers
and sellers. One obvious alternative explanation is that some other difference between the
two groups is driving the result—namely, that owner-choosers will end up owning a pair
of mugs, which might increase their individual value over the value of an endowed single
mug. To rule out complementarity, Morewedge et al. estimated the value of two mugs to
those who own none and were asked to choose between two mugs and various amounts
of cash. The per-mug value for non-owners was the same regardless of how many mugs
the experimenters offered. This suggests that complementarity does not explain the main
result.113
The authors were also interested in comparing valuations of seller-owners and
seller-non-owners and the valuations of chooser-owners and chooser-non-owners. They
estimated values by asking subjects to make choices as agents for others, some who have
an opportunity to sell a good they own and others who do not own but are presented a
choice between the good and some amount of money.114 The authors claimed that endowment theory predicts that those acting as agents for sellers will report relatively high values
regardless of whether they own the good. Alternatively, they argued, mere-ownership

112
Morewedge et al. referred to choosers as buyers for ease of exposition, but I use choosers
here to maintain consistency with the descriptions of other studies.
113
Others have explored the impact of the number of goods owned or considered for purchase.
For example, Burson et al. (2012) found variation in observed gaps for single units (gap in valuations for one chocolate) versus multiple units (no gap in valuations of 25 chocolates) versus multiple units described as one unit (gap in valuations for 20 chocolates described to subjects as a box
of chocolates). They offered four possible explanations for this variation including modifications
to endowment theory and alternatives to endowment theory. Schurr and Ritov (2014) studied the
impact of the number of units but from a different angle. They found valuation gaps when subjects
were forced to sell (buy) all or nothing, but not when they could sell (or buy) just some owned
(or considered) units. They referred to this finding as the “giving-it-all-up effect.” The authors
interpreted this finding as evidence against endowment theory, which would predict gaps regardless
of whether endowments or expectations set reference points. They did, however, suggest that loss
aversion might depend on the magnitude of the change since individuals are not asymmetrically
impacted by small losses. Of course this interpretation is rejected by many experiments that find
valuation gaps for single low-value goods identical to those used by Schurr and Ritov. Their
findings, though, might be important for identifying conditions under which we would predict
valuation gaps. They suggested that gaps should not be expected when sellers decide to sell a few of
many and buyers decide to buy a few more than they already own.
114
The experimenters did not deceive subjects. They later brought another group into the lab,
randomly assigned them to the agents and gave them cash or mugs depending on the randomly
determined price and the agents’ choices.
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theory predicts that those who own the good will report relatively high values regardless
of whether they are acting as agents for sellers or choosers. Their findings support mereownership theory.115 Valuations are higher for owners relative to non-owners, both for
those representing choosers and for those representing sellers. Conditional on ownership,
valuations do not differ depending on who is represented. These results seem to be in line
with those Loewenstein and Adler (1995) reported. The findings are also consistent with
previous results for non-owners Marshall et al. (1986) reported, although they suggested
that individuals are loss averse but do not anticipate loss aversion in others. The results
Morewedge et al. reported suggest this is not the case. If it were, we would have observed
owners reporting valuations similar to those of non-owners, but we do not. We might
wonder whether loss aversion is anticipated only if the agent is an owner, but Morewedge
et al. found that owners report the same average valuation regardless of whether they
are deciding for sellers or choosers, and those average values are higher than the values
reported by both groups of non-owners. Thus, while the results cannot rule out loss
aversion as a sufficient condition for valuation gaps, they do suggest it is not a necessary
condition. In the end, however, the amount of weight we can place on any of the results
is limited by the test Morewedge et al. used to measure gaps. They generated all results
using parametric tests. Generally, non-parametric tests are employed in this literature
given the likelihood that the data are non-normally distributed. Morewedge et al. did not
report whether the data satisfy the normality assumption, so caution is warranted when
drawing inferences from the results.116
6.5 Enhancement Theory
On a parallel track, others have investigated the influence of methods used in the laboratory to endow owners and to elicit choices. Plott and Zeiler (2007) revisited the line of
research that explores the drivers of exchange asymmetries in experiments where subjects
are endowed with one good and asked whether they’d like to trade their good for another
good. The authors posited several potential influences acquisition and choice methods
Maddux et al. (2010) used the standard design based on Kahneman et al.’s (1990) BDM
mechanism elicitation approach and found differences in the magnitudes of gaps for East Asians
(smaller gaps) and Westerners (larger gaps). They attributed these differences to self-enhancement
tendencies in Western cultures versus those in East Asia. Assuming that mere ownership causes
gaps, Maddux et al. attributed the observed differences in gap magnitudes to the tendency of
Westerners to engage in more self-aggrandizement than East Asians, which leads to higher valuations of owned goods that are infused with value from mere association with the highly valued self.
It should be noted here, though, that the authors used parametric tests, the results of which might
be invalid given that valuation data tends to be non-normally distributed.
Dommer and Swaminathan (2013) investigated why mere ownership leads an owner to increase
his valuation for an endowed good. They reported evidence suggesting that owners increase valuation to enhance the self and that this effect is stronger when one’s self-esteem is threatened. They
also reported differences between males and females that they attributed to gender disparities in
reactions to valuations as owners of out-group goods (i.e., goods associated with others). They suggested that such “motivational factors can often override the impact of loss aversion in influencing
valuations for goods” (p. 1047).
116
See Schmidt and Traub (2009) for a useful discussion of the impacts of employing different
statistical tests to measure gaps.
115
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might have on reluctance to trade: (1) experimenters, through involvement over the
choice of which good to endow, might signal something about relative value to subjects or
suggest that the item is a “gift” from the experimenter;117 (2) the language used to endow
subjects and to elicit subject choices might suggest the relative value of the items;118 (3)
the location of the good at the time of choice might signal the relative value or generate
positive transaction costs; and (4) choices might depend on what other subjects choose.
To test these conjectures, the authors altered procedures used to endow subjects and to
collect choices. Plott and Zeiler started by replicating the exchange asymmetry reported
by Knetsch (1989)—this “standard procedures” treatment resulted in an asymmetry that
was statistically significant at the 6% level. In a separate treatment, they implemented a
set of procedures designed to control for the impact of acquisition and choice methods.
The good to be endowed was randomly chosen rather than appearing to be chosen by
the experimenter; the subjects were told, “These coffee mugs are yours” rather than “I’m
giving you the coffee mug. It is a gift. You own it. It is yours”; subjects were asked to
circle the item they wanted to take home with them (mug, pen, I don’t care) rather than
choosing between the options “I want to keep my mug” and “I want to trade my mug
for a pen”; and subjects made choices privately and with neither the endowed good nor
the alternative good in their possession. No exchange asymmetry was observed. They
also ran a treatment that included the full set of controls but left both the endowed and
alternative goods in the subjects’ possession. Possession did not change the null result—no
statistically significant exchange asymmetry was observed. These results provide support
for the claim that exchange asymmetries are explained not by endowment theory but
by classical preference theories such as signaling, information aggregation, and otherregarding preferences.119 Some refer to this collection of conjectures as “enhancement
theory” (Klass and Zeiler 2013).120
117
Others have posited similar conjectures. For example, see Nesselroade et al. (1999), who suggested that the giving of objects by the experimenter to the subjects “may have caused participants
to enhance the value of the gift to thank the gift giver” (p. 23). Ericson and Fuster (2011) found
support in their data for this conjecture, which they refer to as the “value inference effect.”
118
Mandel (2002) also considered the impact of language used to elicit valuations. He designed
an experiment to investigate potential confounds created by the language Thaler (1980) used
to elicit valuations. Mandel hypothesized that by mentioning to each subject endowed with a
hypothetical bottle of wine that “a wine merchant offers to purchase it from you,” the experimenter
might have signaled that the buyer might be willing to buy at a high price, triggering strategic
considerations that move the reported valuation away from the subject’s non-strategic valuation.
While an available supplier was mentioned to buyers, the prompt did not mention any intention
to sell. This insight was one of the earliest warnings about the subtle impact language can have on
reported valuations.
119
Ericson and Fuster (2010, working paper version of Ericson and Fuster 2011, on file with
author) argued that the language used by Plott and Zeiler (2007, p. 1459) (“We began these sessions
by informing the subjects that mugs and pens would be used during the experiment. Subjects were
then told that a coin was flipped before the start of the experiment to determine which good, the
mug or the pen, would be distributed first. We then distributed mugs to the subjects and announced,
‘These mugs are yours’) triggered an expectation in subjects that they would also be given a pen or
that they would have an opportunity to trade the mug for a pen. This is an open question.
120
This theory should not be confused with self-enhancement theory, which assumes that
ownership triggers an increase in the value of a good because the owner associates the good with
himself (Beggan 1992).
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In a direct response to Plott and Zeiler (2007), Knetsch and Wong (2009) suggested
that the disappearance of exchange asymmetries is due not to influences suggested by
enhancement theory but rather by experimental procedures that diminish the subjects’
reference state. For example, Knetsch and Wong posited that reference states are muddled
when subjects possess both goods instead of just the endowed good, when the endowed
good is randomly chosen as opposed to determined by the experimenter, and when the
choice is neutrally framed (i.e., “Which good would you like to take home?” as opposed
to “Would you like to trade your X for a Y?”). This muddling, the theory goes, diminishes
the perception of the giving up of the endowed good as a loss to be avoided. Knetsch
and Wong purported to test their theory by adopting all necessary controls to eliminate
enhancements triggered by the experiment procedures and by generating reference
states of varying strengths across treatments to test how this variable impacts exchange
behavior. The theory predicts that exchange asymmetries will appear when the reference
state, which might not hinge on ownership, is strong and thus more likely to trigger a
perceived loss.
The authors designed three treatments to estimate the effects of reference state strength.
However, despite their claim to the contrary, they could not rule out Plott and Zeiler’s
(2007) conjectures as drivers of the divergent outcomes across treatments. In Treatment
1 (“owned and weak reference”), all subjects were endowed with the same randomly
chosen item. Subjects were told that they had “earned” the good and now owned it, and
they could take it home with them if they wished to. After subjects had time to inspect
the good, which was then removed from their possession, they were offered a trade and
privately chose a good. Choices were presented neutrally—i.e., “which item would you
like to take home?” In line with both theories’ predictions, no exchange asymmetry was
observed.
Treatment 2 (“owned and semi-strong reference”) was identical to Treatment 1
except that the “earned” item was determined randomly using student identification
card numbers. Half the subjects in the room were told that they owned one good,
and the other half were told they owned the other. This design change was meant to
enhance the reference state by creating a feeling of “deservedness” that comes from
“winning” the good during the random assignment. As in treatment 1, subjects were
given time to inspect the goods, but they did not possess them at the time of choice.
Choices were made privately, but the language was changed to emphasize ownership
(“keep X” or “trade X for a Y”), which was meant to enhance the reference state. Their
theory predicts that these two design changes will result in a higher reluctance to trade
relative to Treatment 1. The result was in line with this prediction, and the authors
concluded that diminished reference states, rather than Plott and Zeiler’s enhancement
theory, explained Plott and Zeiler’s (2007) results. The obvious problem here, though,
is that enhancement theory also predicts a stronger reluctance to trade given the design
changes. Specifically, it predicts that experimenter emphasis of ownership will signal
the goods’ relative values. In addition, while Plott and Zeiler did not discuss feelings
of deservedness, increased reluctance to trade in response to the altered method of
endowment is in line with their intuitions about how endowment methods might impact
the perceived value of an endowed good. The same logic applies to telling subjects they
earned the endowed good. While this feature can’t account for any of the variation
in choices across treatments because it is held constant across each of them, it is yet
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another way in which Knetsch and Wong did not control enhancements. So, despite
Knetsch and Wong’s claim that they ruled out enhancements, they in fact did not. For
this reason, their design did not effectively separate their theory from enhancement
theory.
Treatment 3 (“not-owned and strong reference”) was plagued by the same problem.
The authors’ goal here was to test for the effects of design features predicted to produce
strong reference points in the absence of ownership. In this treatment, the experimenter
chose which good to (eventually) endow, which the authors predicted would strengthen
the reference state. Subjects were told they don’t own the good, but they would eventually
if they earned it by completing a questionnaire. Subjects were allowed to inspect but
not to use the good, which stayed in their possession. This design change is noted as
a second feature meant to strengthen the reference state. After subjects completed the
questionnaire, they were allowed to inspect the alternative good, which was then placed
in front of the room, out of their possession. Subjects then made a private choice between
“earn and keep the X” and “give up earning X and earn Y instead,” language designed
to strengthen the reference state in a third way. As their theory predicted, this treatment
resulted in the largest exchange asymmetry. The problem, however, is that Plott and
Zeiler’s enhancement theory also predicted that this treatment would produce the largest
exchange asymmetry. According to their enhancement theory, experimenter involvement
in the choice over which good to endow, the placement of the goods, and the language
used to elicit choices can all signal the relative value of the goods. Thus, Treatment 3,
like the other treatments, was ill equipped to separate Knetsch and Wong’s hypotheses
from Plott and Zeiler’s. While the experiment did provide evidence that ownership is not
required to trigger reluctance to trade, it did not help us determine what exactly causes it
in these types of settings.
Engelmann and Hollard (2010) set out to disentangle the number of potential drivers
of exchange asymmetries posited by Plott and Zeiler (2007). They focused on two types of
uncertainty that might impact choices: “choice uncertainty,” defined as uncertainty about
the relative values of the endowed and alternate goods that might arise from the public
choices of others, and “trade uncertainty,” defined as uncertainty about whether trading
is optimal given potential transaction costs (e.g., experimenter involvement in the choice
over which good to endow and decision costs in the presence of indifference). They also
explored the role of trading experience on choices, following on work by List (2004). They
hypothesized that List’s (2004) results suggesting that trading experience seems to reduce
exchange asymmetries are, in fact, driven by the possibility that those voluntarily choosing to gain trading experience are more likely to have less trade uncertainty. The basic
idea is that exchange asymmetries are caused not by loss aversion of the inexperienced
but by lower trade uncertainty of experienced traders, which makes it more likely for
them to trade. The authors remedied this selection problem by strongly encouraging one
set of subjects to trade to induce experience and reduce trade uncertainty. The authors
conducted two treatments, both with two stages. In the first stage of the free-trade
treatment, subjects were randomly endowed with a good and allowed to trade with other
subjects if they wished to do so. In stage one of the forced-trade treatment, subjects lost
their randomly endowed good if they did not trade it for an alternative good. In both
treatments, an identical second stage was conducted where subjects faced the standard
choice between an earned endowed good (chosen by the experimenter) and an alternative
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good.121 The results suggest that forced trading in stage 1 drives higher rates of trading in
stage 2. If we assume that even very limited trading experience reduces trade uncertainty
for those who would otherwise not trade due to such uncertainty, this result supports the
conjecture that trade uncertainty plays a role in exchange asymmetries. Engelmann and
Hollard argued that experience is unlikely to change expectations that set one’s reference
point. Thus, endowment theory seems not to explain observed exchange asymmetries.
Ratan (2014) employed a different experiment design to test whether trade uncertainty
affects reluctance to trade in simple exchange experiments. Ratan wondered whether
anticipated regret theory might explain observed exchange asymmetries. If subjects were
uncertain about whether to trade, then they might lean towards not trading to avoid the
regret that might arise from a bad decision. He designed an experiment that reduced the
likelihood that subjects would consider future regret when deciding whether to trade
the endowed goods for the alternate goods. Specifically, subjects in the treatment group
were allowed to reverse their decisions within 24 hours. Ratan observed an exchange
asymmetry in the control group, which did not have an opportunity to reverse choices,
but not in the treatment group. He concluded that removing any anticipation of regret is
sufficient to eliminate reluctance to trade in simple exchange settings. He also noted that
his result bolsters the more general claim that asymmetries are sensitive to small changes
in the experiment design and calls into question the necessity of trading experience for
elimination of exchange asymmetries.
Brown et al. (2015) were also interested in exploring which design features do the most
work to trigger a reluctance to exchange one good for another. They began by reviewing
the existing literature to generate a list of potential explanations that find support in the
data.122 They then reported the results from 11 experiments designed to test a series of
hypotheses related to the potential drivers of exchange asymmetries. The experiments
differed in the goods used, the number of endowed goods (all the subjects endowed with
the same good or half of the subjects endowed with one and the other half with other), the
location of the goods at the time of choice, the passage of time after endowment, and
the method of choice (raised hands or private forms). The extreme trading observed by
Knetsch (1989) was not observed in any of the 11 experiments. The lowest percentage of
trading over all experiments was 21%. Exchange asymmetries were observed in all but two
experiments. In one of the two, half the subjects received one good and half the other
(to control for the signaling of relative value through endowment), subjects possessed
While stage 2 would have been cleaner if the experiments had endowed subjects with
randomly chosen goods, the experimenters chose which good to endow and subjects earned them in
both treatments, so any differences cannot be attributed to this design feature. It is impossible, however, to determine exactly what drives exchange asymmetries in stage 2 of the free-trade treatment.
122
The contenders are many: experimenter emphasis of the endowment (characterization
as a gift, personal selection of the good by the experimenter, and language used to emphasize
ownership), characterization of the decision as trading or choosing, the amount of possession time,
whether the decision could later be reversed, location of the goods at the time of choice, utility
or disutility from the act of trading (e.g., disutility experienced from the giving up of the good),
and utility gained from impressions created by trading (e.g., trading out of solidarity because
others are trading or to be part of the in-group (“herding”) or not trading to avoid offending the
experimenter). The authors added to the list the possible inability of subjects to rank the goods due
to indifference or preference imprecision.
121
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the endowed good but not the alternative at the time of choice, subjects completed an
unrelated questionnaire after endowment and before choosing (to increase the “sense of
attachment”), and they made public choices by raising hands. This result, however, was
not robust to a change in the goods used. In the other no-asymmetry treatment, half
the subjects received one good and the other half received the other, subjects possessed
both goods at the time of choice, no time passed between endowment and the choice,
and subjects chose privately. Given the large number of experiments and the variation
in exchange asymmetries, it is difficult to pinpoint what’s driving them, as the authors
conceded. They tossed out some conjectures (e.g., possession of both goods might dull
the sense of endowment,123 asking the subjects to choose between the goods rather than
to decide whether to trade or keep might focus subjects away from the fact that they own
one of the goods, telling subjects that there are enough goods for everyone to get what
they want might give them the impression that they are just choosing rather than keeping or trading). The data cannot resolve these questions, but, as the authors conceded,
“[w]hat seemed at first like the simplest of experiments turns out to be surprisingly
complex” (p. 115).
6.6

Valuation Elicitation Methods, Subject Misconceptions, and Market Instincts

As noted in the description of the literature’s seminal studies, several early researchers
pointed to valuation elicitation methods as potential drivers of observed reluctance to
trade. While evidence that supported alternatives to endowment theory was often given
short shrift in the early days, some attempted to reconcile the mixed results, a crucial
step in theory development. In contrast to Knetsch (1989), Kahneman et al. (1990)
and Tversky and Kahneman (1991), Singh (1991), for example, attempted to reconcile
the entire body of existing literature. Singh’s purpose was to check the robustness of
reluctance to trade in a different subject pool—Malaysian civil servants as opposed to
American university students—and, perhaps most importantly, to reconcile the results
of previous studies. Singh begins by noting three insights from the existing literature: (1)
demand-revealing mechanisms reduce the magnitude of valuation gaps but do not always
eliminate them; (2) within-subject designs might provide a better measure of gaps and the
method of measuring gaps matters (e.g., the ratio of median WTA to median WTP is less
influenced by outliers than the ratio of mean WTA to mean WTP); and (3) the method of
endowment might matter (e.g., reluctance to trade might disappear when an endowment
is the result of a windfall).
Singh endowed all the subjects with $3 and no lottery tickets, two lottery tickets with
an expected value of $1.50 each, or $1.50 plus one lottery ticket. He elicited (non-binding)
valuations at the beginning of the experiment by asking each subject to report his WTA
and WTP for a lottery ticket. He then allowed the subjects to trade lottery tickets in a
double-bid auction in an hour-long market, which enabled subjects to learn their values
Kogler et al. (2013) found a disparity between choices made by owners and inspectors when
asked to choose between two goods sitting next to each other on a table. Owners owned one of the
two goods and inspectors were given time to inspect one of them. Ratan (2012) reported a similar
result. This is some evidence that possession of both goods is insufficient to eliminate reluctance
to trade.
123
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for the lottery ticket.124 At the end of the market, subjects again reported (non-binding)
WTA and WTP for the lottery. The lottery outcome was determined, and subjects were
paid according to their endowments at the end of the market. Before subjects participated
in the market, a valuation gap was observed for the civil servants, but it disappeared after
they gained experience valuing the lottery during market trading.125 Singh also measured
the gap using a sample of undergraduate and graduate students and observed no gap both
before and after the market. He also asked another group to advise hypothetical clients
on the highest WTP and lowest WTA, and no gap was observed, although he cautions
against putting much weight on this result due to the hypothetical nature of the task.
Thus, he finds that the gap disappears after subjects are given opportunities to discover
their true valuations for the lottery ticket.
This evidence is in line with Harless’s (1989) results, but what about the studies that
report significant gaps and exchange asymmetries? Singh attributed the variation in
results to the type of asset endowed—when risky but not uncertain assets are used, no gap
is observed, but when assets with uncertain values (e.g., mugs) are employed, gaps appear.
With respect to endowment theory, this sort of observation suggests yet another theory
refinement. When we combine this refinement with those from Kahneman et al. (1990),
endowment theory predicts reluctance to trade only if the asset has an uncertain value,
if it will be consumed rather than sold or exchanged, and if it has no available perfect
substitutes. This nuance seemed to be lost in the applications of endowment theory in
law at the time.
Shogren et al. (2001) continued to explore how auction mechanisms impacted valuation
gaps. They constructed an experiment that holds constant all features across treatments
except for the auction mechanism.126 In rounds using the BDM mechanism, the multiple
price list format was used to elicit choices at various prices, and, between rounds, subjects
were told the randomly drawn clearing price and how many buyers and sellers were willing
to buy and sell at that price. In Vickery auction rounds, subjects were asked to write down
a numerical value on a sheet (either the most they were willing to pay or the least amount
they were willing to accept), and between rounds subjects were told the market-clearing
price, which was determined by the subjects’ bids. Endowment theory predicts gaps will
persist regardless of the mechanism used to elicit valuations, assuming the mechanism is
effective at encouraging reports of true valuations. The results revealed different outcomes
across auction mechanisms, both of which are designed to elicit true valuations. In the
BDM treatment, for both candy bars and mugs, gaps were observed in the first round
and persisted throughout. In the Vickery auction treatment, however, while gaps appeared

124
In a double auction, owners and non-owners bid simultaneously, and owners willing to sell
at prices lower than some non-owners’ bids are matched with those non-owners, and trades are
effectuated (Fudenberg and Tirole 1991).
125
Because the data were not distributed normally, Singh employed a non-parametric sign test
to determine whether the median individual WTA-to-WTP ratio was greater than 1.1, which allows
for a small income effect.
126
All subjects received $15 up front, ten rounds were conducted for each auction, candy
bars and coffee mugs were auctioned, subjects were not informed of the retail price of the goods,
participation was voluntary (as opposed to being a course requirement), and subjects were told that
one round would be selected as the binding round at the end of the experiment.
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initially, they disappeared by round 2 with candy bars and by round 4 with mugs (reappearing only in the eighth mug round). WTP increased and WTA decreased over the
Vickery auction rounds. To test the conjecture that Vickery auctions do not induce the
reporting of true valuations of bidders whose values are such that they will never trade,127
the authors devised a clever auction mechanism—the random nth-price auction. In this
auction, subjects do not know which value in the list of reported values will set the price
from round to round. Under this auction mechanism, the valuation gap disappeared by
the fourth candy bar round and by the fifth mug round, and it did not return. Shogren
et al. (2001) did not directly test the conjecture that announced market-clearing prices
between rounds might move reported valuations away from true valuations, but they
pointed to contrary evidence published elsewhere (List and Shogren 1999). The authors
concluded that their data do not support endowment theory and that the elicitation device
at least partly explains observed gaps.
Sugden (1999) suggested that eliciting valuations might require more than the use of an
incentive compatible mechanism. He argues:
[T]he Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism and the second-price sealed-bid auction are quite
complicated, and their incentive-compatibility is not immediately obvious. . . . For example, a
respondent who is presented with a purportedly take-it-or-leave-it offer may wonder whether the
offer really is non-negotiable. . . . Thus, respondents might misrepresent their preferences in the
mistaken belief that it was to their advantage to do so. . . . [I]n most bargaining situations, it is
good tactics to try to give the impression that you are less eager to trade than you really are. . . .
The point . . . is to try to influence the other party’s belief about your reservation price; you
want the other party to underestimate your maximum WTP, or to overestimate your minimum
WTA. . . . [R]espondents’ understanding of . . . incentive-compatibility may depend on the
clarity of the instructions they are given and on the opportunities they are allowed for gaining
experience of how the elicitation mechanism works. (pp. 162–163)

Plott and Zeiler (2005) designed an experiment to test a conjecture similar to Sugden’s
(1999). Specifically, they tested endowment theory against an alternative explanation
related to subject misconceptions. Misconceptions, they posited, can arise both from
lack of familiarity with the elicitation mechanism (Sugden 1999) and during the process
of discovering one’s value for a good (Plott 1996). The basic idea is that misconceptions
might trigger subjects to revert to their basic market instincts to buy low and sell high.128
The authors conjectured that these subjects have no incentive to report true valuations as
long as their reported valuations exceed the clearing price, information about which subjects gather
from round to round.
128
Coren (2007, Chapter 3) attempted to flesh out this basic concept by developing a theory
around the notion of bargaining scripts, which assumes that individuals’ self-interested motivations
when placed in bargaining environments are to maximize the amount obtained in exchange for
the endowed good or to minimize the amount paid in exchange for the good. Her experimental
data (gathered using hypothetical surveys) support the bargaining scripts hypothesis. Binmore
(1994), in a much earlier critique of the field’s response to anomalous behavior observed in the lab,
argued that unless behavior is robust to environments that include strong incentives and ensure
subject understanding of the nature of the tasks, “the experimenter has probably done no more
than inadvertently to trigger a response in the subjects that is adapted to some real-life situation,
but which bears only a superficial resemblance to the problem the subjects are really facing in the
laboratory” (pp. 184–185).
127
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After replicating valuation gaps using the Kahneman et al. (1990) design,129 they altered
the design in a number of ways: (1) subjects were provided training on the BDM using
numerical examples that illustrated why it was in subjects’ best interest to report their
true values; (2) subjects were walked through examples on how to determine their true
values;130 (3) subjects participated in unpaid practice rounds, which provided time for
questions and an opportunity for the experimenter to check for understanding;131 (4) subjects participated in a number of paid practice rounds using lotteries, switching between
buyer and seller roles throughout, to gain experience with the BDM mechanism;132 and (5)
subjects received payouts anonymously to eliminate the potential for signaling of personal
characteristics through revealed valuations (Fremling and Posner 2001). These design
changes were driven by a “revealed theory methodology,” the adoption of the union of
controls found in the literature to control for subject misconceptions about the elicitation
device. The authors observed no gap in mug valuations in two experiments using different
subject pools (USC Law students and Pasadena City College students).133
To test whether experience using the mechanism drove the results, a second group of
USC Law students reported mug valuations using the same experiment design, except
valuations were recorded before the paid practice rounds. No gap was observed, suggesting that experience with the mechanism is not required to control misconceptions.134
Half the subjects, university students, were randomly assigned to be sellers and the other
half buyers. Sellers were given mugs with the school logo. Buyers were allowed to inspect a mug.
Subjects participated in two unpaid practice rounds using induced-value tokens and one binding
round using mugs. Valuations were elicited using the multiple price list method. Payouts were made
publically. Buyers used their own money and were told that credit and change were available at the
beginning of the experiment.
130
Potential buyers were instructed to start low and increase until they reach an amount that
makes them indifferent between the money and the good. Potential sellers were instructed to start
high and decrease to find their indifference point. The experimenter directly elicited individual
valuations; the multiple price list format was not used. Non-owners who ended up purchasing a
mug used money earned during the lottery rounds to pay for it. This is in contrast to the Kahneman
et al. (1990) replication, in which buyers exchanged their own money for the mug.
131
Corrigan et al. (2014) subsequently studied the impact of hypothetical practice rounds (in
the absence of training on the mechanism) and found evidence that practice rounds seem to impact
behavior in non-practice rounds and that multiple non-practice rounds seem to mitigate anchoring
and subject misconceptions.
132
Vondolia et al. (2014) reported evidence suggesting that subjects who had experience using
trading mechanisms outside the lab reported different valuations for hypothetical goods in the
lab. They found that “being familiar with monetary and labour payment vehicles attenuates time/
money response asymmetry” (p. 13).
133
In a separate study, Kovalchik et al. (2005) used similar procedures and observed no gap in
valuations of healthy elderly individuals (average age 82). Roth (2005) also used similar procedures
and observed no gap for consumer goods but gaps remained for risky assets. As discussed supra,
Plott and Zeiler (2010, 2011) also observed gaps in lotteries. Kniesner et al. (2014) found no valuation gap in wage data from the field and suggested that the no-gap result might be due to the fact
that labor providers likely have no misconceptions about the trading environment.
134
Note that once subjects had written down their valuations, they were prompted to consider
whether the offer was in fact their actual non-strategic value, and they were allowed to change the
offer before committing to it. This procedure was intended to increase subjects’ understanding
of and attention to their non-strategic valuations, a measure that is required to test endowment
theory. Kingsley and Brown (2012) noted that this revision prompt had not been previously used,
129
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The results support the claim that gaps observed in the laboratory are caused not by loss
aversion and reference dependence, but by the methods experimenters use to elicit valuations.135 Candidates include the unfamiliar elicitation procedures and lack of anonymity.
Recent evidence reported by Brown and Cohen (2015) supports unfamiliar elicitation
procedures over anonymity.136 These results in combination with Plott and Zeiler’s suggest

and they wondered whether it might be driving the no-gap result. Using procedures similar to, but
not the same as, Plott and Zeiler (2005), Kingsley and Brown (2012, p. 2582) replicated the no-gap
result, but they also had subjects submit pre-prompt valuations. Rather than simply giving subjects
an opportunity to change their offers, as Plott and Zeiler did, they told the subjects “before you
commit to your . . . offer and we reveal the fixed offer, consider whether your offer reflects your
actual, non-strategic, value of the mug. [Your offer] will be discarded.” They required all subjects to
submit another offer, although they informed the subjects that they were not required to alter their
initial offer. The authors observed a gap in pre-prompt offers but not in post-prompt offers. They
concluded that the prompt might have suggested to subjects that they did not go far enough in their
iterations to find their non-strategic valuations (see supra footnote 130). The authors did note that
it is impossible to determine whether pre- or post-prompt valuations more accurately reflect nonstrategic valuations. It is possible, however, that the prompt might have led to overcorrections of
strategic valuations. In a separate replication of Plott and Zeiler’s no-gap result, Isoni et al. (2011),
discussed infra, did not indicate that they allowed subjects an opportunity to revise their reported
mug valuations. More research is required to fully understand the impact of this procedure and its
role in the no-gap results reported in the literature. Note that Korobkin (2014) incorrectly pointed
to Kingsley and Brown’s (2012) findings as evidence of experimenter demand effects (post-prompt
reconsideration “caus[e] buyers to believe they should move higher and sellers to believe they
should move lower” (p. 12)); the data do not allow us to determine whether subjects are moving
towards their true valuations or in the directions the experimenters “demand.”
135
Köszegi and Rabin (2006, p. 1142) argued that Plott and Zeiler’s (2005) results can be
explained by reference-dependent preferences. They claimed that “Plott and Zeiler . . . successfully
decoupled subjects’ expectations from their initial ownership status.” They did not explain what
they mean by this or how Plott and Zeiler’s design might have caused a “decoupling.” It is possible
that they are implying that the Plott and Zeiler procedures (e.g., putting each subject in the position
of potential buyer and potential seller throughout the binding practice rounds) created an expectation that endowments would be sold. This is only a guess, but it seems at least a plausible interpretation. This interpretation might explain the results from treatments that elicit mug valuations after
subjects participate in a number of practice rounds. It does not, however, explain the no-gap result
in the treatment where mug valuations are elicited prior to the binding practice rounds.
Ericson and Fuster (2010, p. 26) argued that “the procedures and training used by [Plott and
Zeiler] may not have induced a difference between buyers and sellers in their expectations of
keeping the mug, as subjects may anticipate the possibility of trade.” They did not provide detailed
conjectures about which procedures might be setting expectations. We can rule out the binding
practice rounds given the results of the second experiment that finds no gaps in the absence of
practice rounds. It is possible, however, that training on the BDM mechanism might impact
expectations over and above more basic messages used by others about optimal behavior—for
example, Kahneman et al. (1990) explained the BDM mechanism and told subjects it was in their
best interest to report their true values. It is an open question.
136
Brown and Cohen (2015) designed a 2 x 2 experiment to test the impact of anonymity on
valuation gaps. Valuations were elicited from half the subjects using the procedures employed
by Kahneman et al. (1990), half under conditions of anonymity and half whose valuations and
payouts could be tied back to them. The other half reported valuations under the Plott and
Zeiler (2005) procedures, half assigned to an anonymous condition and the other half to a nonanonymous condition. They observed valuation gaps in the Kahneman et al. treatments regardless
of anonymity, and no gap in the Plott and Zeiler treatments regardless of anonymity. The results
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that lack of familiarity with the elicitation device causes subjects to misconceive how
their reported valuations will impact outcomes and encourages them to rely on their basic
market instincts to sell high and buy low. If this conjecture is correct, it implies that the
valuations subjects report in experiments that do not control misconceptions are strategic
and not useful for testing theoretical assumptions about the deep structure of preferences
including reference dependence and loss aversion.
A third potential explanation for Plott and Zeiler’s null result is the house money effect.
Potential mug buyers had cash to spend from lottery rounds in the controlled experiment
but not in the Kahneman et al. replication, and they might have been more willing to
spend cash “won” during the experiment relative to cash from their own pockets. Plott
and Zeiler (2005) reported findings demonstrating that lottery round income and WTP
are not positively correlated in experiments where subjects reported valuations after the
lottery rounds, which stands as evidence against the house money effect. Despite this,
WTP in the Kahneman et al. replication, in which subjects did not receive a show-up
fee but were offered credit, is lower than WTP under the Plott and Zeiler procedures in
treatments where potential buyers reported mug valuations after the lottery rounds.137 In
the Plott and Zeiler treatment where potential buyers reported mug valuations before the
lottery rounds, subjects did not have the lottery winnings in hand when reporting mug
valuations but they did receive a $5 show-up fee at the beginning of the experiment. If the
house money effect were driving willingness to pay, we might expect mug valuations to fall
somewhere between WTP from the replication and WTP from the controlled experiments
since average lottery winnings fell well above $5. They are roughly in the same ballpark,
however, as WTP valuations following the lottery rounds.138 This is additional evidence
that WTP is not correlated with the amount of cash received during the experiment prior
to reporting WTP. In addition, gaps have been observed in the absence of show-up fees,
and gaps remain when show-up fees are added.139 More work is required to determine the
impact of cash gained during the experiment and how it influences our ability to measure
true WTP.
Landesberg (2007), in a study primarily designed to investigate the impact of familiarity
with the good on valuation gaps, employed versions of the controls similar to those that
Plott and Zeiler (2005) adopted to control subject misconceptions. Subjects participated
in two practice rounds using induced-value tokens, one as owner and one as non-owner,

suggest that anonymity is not the driving factor in Plott and Zeiler’s experiment and that subject
misconceptions likely drove their no-gap result.
137
Mean and median WTP in the Kahneman et al. replication were $1.74 and $1.50, respectively. In Plott and Zeiler’s treatments with mug valuations following the lottery rounds, mean WTP
was $5.20 and 7.29 and median WTP was $5.00 and $8.00.
138
Mean WTP is $7.88 and median is $6.50. When one outlier is dropped, mean WTP is $6.50
and median is $5.00.
139
For example, Kovalchik et al. (2005) employed the Plott and Zeiler (2005) procedures but
did not provide a show-up fee. They did not observe a valuation gap. Smith (2012) used Kahneman
et al.’s (1990) procedures but added a show-up fee. He observed a valuation gap. Perhaps the strongest evidence against the house money effect conjecture is from Bartling et al. (2015), described infra.
They not only gave subjects a large show-up fee, but they reminded subjects about the show-up fee
when presenting all choices. The house money effect conjecture surely predicts no valuation gap,
but they observe one.
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and four binding rounds, during which half the subjects were owners and the other half
were non-owners. They were allowed to ask questions during the practice sessions and the
binding rounds, and many questions were fielded. Subjects were told that their choices
and outcomes would be anonymous. During the binding rounds, the multiple price list
method was used to elicit valuations for a voucher that could be exchanged for a sandwich.
Subjects were told that one of the four rounds would be chosen at random and that the
chosen round would determine payoffs.140 The elicitation mechanism was explained using
numerical examples, and subjects were told that it was in their best interests to report
their true valuations as they made choices between the good (a voucher for a sandwich at
a nearby shop)141 and the various monetary amounts in the list. Subjects were told that
credit would be available. The random market price was announced between each round.
At the end of the experiment, subjects received $5 for participating in the experiment and
transactions were anonymously executed. As a test of misconceptions, the author tallied
the number of subjects who reported correct valuations for the practice round inducedvalue tokens. Ninety-eight out of 127 (77%) reported a $3 valuation for both practice
round tokens, which could be exchanged at the end of the experiment for $3. Those who
did not pass were dropped from the dataset.142 The author observed valuation gaps in
all four rounds using the voucher for the unfamiliar sandwich shop (WTA/WTP ratios
between 1.27 and 1.40, all significant at the 99% confidence level) and smaller gaps in all
four rounds using the voucher for the familiar sandwich shop (ratios between 1.12 and
1.23, two significant at the 90% level and two at the 95% level). What might explain the
difference in results between this study and Plott and Zeiler (2005)? While the procedures
used were similar, they were not the same.143 For example, Landesberg did not walk
subjects through the procedure Plott and Zeiler employed to help subjects understand the
meaning of “true valuation” (buyers start low and increase until they reach an amount
of money that makes them indifferent between the good and the money and sellers start
high). In addition, Landesberg used the multiple price list method while Plott and Zeiler
asked subjects to write down a valuation. The two studies also employed different goods.
Given that the design is different from Plott and Zeiler’s in more than one way, it is
impossible to tie down what might be driving the divergent results. It is important to note,
It is important to note here that the binding trial was not randomly determined. The experimenter chose a trial with a random price below $5 because subjects were given $5 for participating
in the experiment and transactions would be easier (no credit was required for buyers). This sort
of deception is strongly frowned upon in experimental economics. It is not clear whether subjects
detected the fraud during the experiment, but the paper clearly states that the author deceived the
subjects.
141
In one treatment, the voucher was for a familiar sandwich from a shop with an average
sandwich price of $4.50. In another treatment, the voucher was for a less familiar sandwich from
a shop with an average sandwich price of $6.50. Subjects were not told the average prices of
sandwiches from the two shops.
142
Seventy-nine percent of the dropped subjects were “endowment prone.” They reported
WTA higher than WTP, WTA above $3 or WTP below $3. Their valuations for the vouchers,
however, did not differ much from those of subjects who passed the test, perhaps suggesting that
both groups’ understanding was roughly the same by the time they started the non-hypothetical
sandwich voucher rounds.
143
Landesberg, in fact, claimed to have implemented a “more complete set of controls than did
Plott and Zeiler (2005)” (p. 39), but this does not seem to be the case.
140

Joshua C. Teitelbaum and Kathryn Zeiler - 9781849805674
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 03/24/2018 11:07:59AM
via Boston University Pappas Law Library

What explains observed reluctance to trade? 405
however, that Landesberg’s instruction on the elicitation device might be responsible for
reducing the gap from the usual ratio of 2 to 1 down to 1.4 to 1 at the highest.
Georgantzís and Navarro-Martínez (2010, p. 1) designed an experiment to shed
light on the psychological basis for valuation gaps. They argued that their results cast
“serious doubts on the claim that the gap might be just a consequence of inappropriate
experimental practice.” They correlated subject attitudes and feelings about the good,
measured using survey instruments, with reported valuations to test theories based on
mere-ownership and loss aversion triggered by preference uncertainty. They designed
the experiment to “replicate” the valuation gap “using a standard design, while avoiding
misconceptions as much as possible” (p. 897). Subjects were divided into two groups,
choosers and owners (as opposed to buyers and sellers), and they reported their valuations
for a bottle of wine in those roles using the multiple price list format.144 Two surveys were
administered before owners were endowed with the wine bottle. The first was designed to
measure attitudes related to “general liking, attitude towards having the good, attractiveness, [and] design and quality” (p. 897), and the second attempted to measure the level of
familiarity with the good using the prompt: “under normal conditions, would you buy a
bottle of wine like this one?” (p. 898). Owners were then endowed with a bottle of wine,
and choosers were allowed to inspect one. Next, subjects completed a second attitude
instrument to measure attitudes related to “appearance, attractiveness, quality, taste,
refinement, and general liking” (p. 897), and another instrument designed to measure
levels of positive and negative feelings (e.g., happy, pleased, good, excited, upset, uncomfortable, awkward, bad).145 Attitudes towards risk were collected for a portion of the
subjects one week prior to the experiment during sessions conducted to run an unrelated
experiment.
The authors reported several findings: (1) owner valuations are higher than chooser
valuations; (2) choosers and owners report similar attitudes about the good after
owners are endowed, even when divided into groups with non-positive and positive
attitudes prior to endowment; (3) sellers reported having higher levels of positive feelings
post-endowment relative to choosers, positive feelings were correlated with reported
valuations, and reports of negative feelings were the same across treatments; (4) neither
familiarity nor attitudes towards risk were correlated with chooser valuations, but owners
who reported that they would buy a bottle of wine like the endowed one under normal
conditions reported lower valuations relative to owners who reported that they wouldn’t
buy such a bottle; and (5) owners reporting higher levels of risk aversion valued the
good more highly than those with lower levels of risk aversion. From these findings,
Georgantzís and Navarro-Martínez concluded that: (1) subject misconceptions cannot
explain the observed gap because they were controlled; (2) changes in attitudes related to
the good do not cause gaps; (3) enhanced positive feelings caused by receiving and owning
The working paper version of the study indicates that choosers chose between “I prefer the
bottle” and “I prefer the money” for each possible price, and owners chose between “I keep the
bottle” and “I exchange the bottle.”
145
The authors did not estimate within-subject differences in attitudes before and after
endowment, arguing that such comparisons are not meaningful because they are different instruments measuring different attitudes, and might be plagued by contamination problems. They also
measured personality traits, but they are not discussed here.
144
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the endowed good (mere ownership) contribute to observed gaps; and (4) loss aversion
contributes to observed gaps in the presence of unfamiliarity and uncertainty (i.e., those
who would not normally purchase the good are less familiar with it, and thus feel more
uncertain about their preferences related to it, increasing the level of loss aversion one
would experience if the good were exchanged for money). They argued that Plott and
Zeiler’s (2005) procedures, such as repeated practice rounds, undermine the “necessary
psychological underpinnings” (p. 906) of the valuation gaps that they uncover.
Whether these findings help us separate experiment design issues from mere ownership
theory and uncertainty-driven loss aversion is unclear. First, although Georgantzís and
Navarro-Martínez argued that the design “avoids misconceptions as much as possible”
(2010, p. 897), it is possible that the observed gaps resulted from features of the design
that Plott and Zeiler (2005) identified as potential drivers of gaps. For example, subjects
were not told that their choices would be anonymous,146 and, perhaps more importantly,
subjects were not trained on the elicitation device. As Plott and Zeiler (2005) emphasized,
although the multiple price list format seems quite simple, subjects might not fully grasp
the idea that they are best off when they report their true preferences. In addition, even
though subjects are not labeled as buyers and sellers, for owners who misconceive how
their price-by-price choices will map into outcomes as a function of some randomly
generated price, the choices of “keep” or “exchange” might be sufficient to trigger basic
seller-type instincts to choose to exchange only at the higher prices in the list. Thus, we
cannot rule out misconceptions, at least as Plott and Zeiler (2005) conceptualize them, as
drivers of the observed gap.
While Georgantzís and Navarro-Martínez argued that their results cast serious doubt
on Plott and Zeiler’s misconceptions conjecture, it might be consistent with them.
Features Plott and Zeiler included in the design to eliminate misconceptions and other
influences are not present here; thus, misconceptions about how choices map onto
outcomes might have triggered the basic instincts of the owners, now in a position to
exchange their good for money, to exchange at a high price. What do we make, then,
about differences in emotions between owners and choosers and the correlations between
risk aversion and owner valuations, and between familiarity and owner valuations? It is
entirely possible that owners report more positive feelings than choosers simply because
they just received a good. Those positive feelings, however, might be unrelated to valuation gaps if subjects turn their attention to uncertainty about the elicitation device once
the experimenter asks them to choose between the good and various amounts of money.
Also, lack of familiarity with the good and higher levels of risk aversion might feed into
subject reactions to the unfamiliar elicitation device. Both might impel owners towards
basic instincts when they face the unfamiliar device. Choosers don’t have basic instincts to
fall back on. Alternatively, owners might worry that when the experimenters observe their
non-anonymous choices, they might perceive low-value owners in some negative way—as
soft bargainers or as individuals who lack gratitude for “gifts,” etc. The lack of anonymity
makes it impossible to rule out these sorts of owner reactions.

146
Subject instructions are not included in the published version of the paper, but they do
appear in a working paper version (on file with author). Note, however, that Brown and Cohen
(2015) reported evidence suggesting that anonymity does not impact the results.
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Second, Georgantzís and Navarro-Martínez’s explanation of Plott and Zeiler’s results
is problematic. They argued that “[t]he fact that the gap can be eliminated shows just
that the necessary psychological underpinnings for it to appear can be undermined
through experimental procedures (like, for example, repeated practice rounds that may
lead subjects to perceive the good as something they trade)” (2010, p. 17). Although
an interesting research question, the claim is mere conjecture given their results do not
provide evidence to support it. Something they did not note is that Plott and Zeiler’s
subjects did not trade mugs until the final round used to measure gaps. Lotteries were
used in the repeated practice rounds. It is less likely that trading lotteries in the practice
rounds led subjects to perceive mugs as something they trade. If this were true, however,
then we might predict no gaps in the field where people transact regularly, although
perhaps they don’t sell sufficiently regularly to consider goods as objects of trade. It’s an
open question. In any event, Plott and Zeiler observed no gap even when subjects did not
participate in the repeated binding practice rounds, so practice rounds can be ruled out
as a potential underminer. What’s left then? It is possible that other procedures might do
the undermining. Referring to subjects as buyers and sellers or training on the elicitation
device might somehow do the work. We can’t be sure without evidence. To test this, the
authors might have incorporated these features into their design in a second experiment to
examine whether reported emotions and other psychological underpinnings are different
in the presence and absence of the relevant features.
Koh and Wong (2013) suggested an alternative interpretation of Plott and Zeiler’s
(2005) results. They proposed that certain procedures might have caused the gap to disappear due to the reduced salience of gains and losses. They listed specific procedures that
led to this concern: buyers and sellers both possessed the good at the time of valuation,
the experiment did not frame transacting in terms of gains and losses, and owners and
non-owners received both buying and selling instructions. More specifically, the authors
wondered whether these procedures might have weakened the reference state so that
subjects treated their endowment status as irrelevant. In addition, they hypothesized that
training procedures presenting yes/no questions related to plausible mug values employed
to train subjects on how to find their true valuations might have caused subjects to anchor
on those values. Plott and Zeiler’s verbal training procedure ended with an example of
$6.50 as a valuation for an owner and $5.25 as a valuation for a non-owner. Koh and
Wong wondered whether subjects might have anchored on one of these values depending
on their roles as potential seller or potential buyer. In a treatment intended to replicate
Plott and Zeiler’s (2005) Treatment 2 (anonymity, training, two hypothetical practice
rounds but no binding experience), the authors found mixed results.147 In a second

147
The result from a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank sum test on a sample pooled across four
different sessions supports the claim that a valuation gaps exists (at the 95% confidence level),
but the result from a median test cannot reject the null hypothesis of no difference between WTA
and WTP. One unemphasized difference between Plott and Zeiler and Koh and Wong’s attempted
replication is the payment of the show-up fee. Plott and Zeiler paid $5 to subjects upon arrival.
Koh and Wong “eventually paid [a] $5” show-up fee. It’s possible they paid the fee at the end of the
experiment rather than the beginning. If so, this might be evidence of a house money effect in Plott
and Zeiler’s Treatment 2 no-gap result. See the text accompanying footnote 137 for a more detailed
discussion of this conjecture.
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treatment, only sellers possessed the mugs. Buyers were allowed to inspect but did not
possess at the time of valuation. Sellers were told “the mug you are inspecting is yours
to take home with you at the end of the experiment, if you decide to keep it later.” The
instructions were edited to change “the item” and “the mug” to “my mug” and “your
mug” for owners. Owners received only the owner instructions and non-owners only the
non-owner instructions. Finally, the training procedure was altered so that the example
ended with $650 as a valuation for an owner and $525 as a valuation for a non-owner, and
subjects were told that these were hypothetical examples. The authors observed a valuation gap in this treatment. They ran a third treatment to determine whether the results
from their second treatment would change if the Plott and Zeiler examples were used
rather than the examples using implausible mug valuations. The result did not change—a
valuation gap was observed. The authors interpreted these findings as evidence that
Plott and Zeiler’s procedures weaken the subjects’ reference states and that the weakened
reference states caused the gap to disappear. An alternative interpretation based on
Plott and Zeiler’s 2007 study is that the change in procedures generated enhancement
effects. For example, subjects in the owner-only sessions who were repeatedly told that
the mug was theirs might have perceived the mug as a gift from the experimenter and
perceived the repeated emphasis on “yours” and “mine” as signals of value. Koh and
Wong’s results, however, stand as some evidence against Plott and Zeiler’s misconceptions
conjecture.
Evident from the descriptions included in this chapter, experimenters commonly
employ the theoretically demand-revealing BDM mechanism to elicit valuations.148
Although Plott and Zeiler’s (2005) results suggest that training on the mechanism might
be required to control subject misconceptions over how their reported valuations map
into outcomes, training has not caught on. Some have argued that training somehow
changes subjects’ reference points (e.g., Köszegi and Rabin 2006) or that elaborate
training procedures train subjects to do what the experimenters want them to do (assess
true values) when they would not do so in the field (e.g., Kahneman 2011). To further
investigate potential misconceptions related to the BDM mechanism, Cason and Plott
(2014) designed an experiment to elicit valuations for cards worth $2 if owned at the
end of the experiment. Given that all theories predict that subjects will value the cards
at $2, the authors used reported valuations that deviated from $2 to test theories related
to subject misconceptions about how their choices map onto outcomes. They found
that with basic instructions and no training or feedback, only 17% of subjects reported
values of $2. After outcomes were determined using the BDM mechanism, subjects
participated in an identical second round. Following one round of feedback, 31% of
subjects reported values of $2. Those who initially chose $2 tended to stay with $2 in
the second round, but those who made a sub-optional choice in the first round tended
to choose a different value in the second round. Subjects who made costly mistakes
in the first round were more likely to value the card at $2 relative to those who made
But see Loomes et al. (2010) (“A guiding principle for the design, widely accepted among
stated preference researchers, is that individuals cope more easily with conditional questions requiring yes/no responses (‘If the price was x, would you buy?’) than with unconditional open-ended
questions using maximum or minimum concepts (‘What is the highest price you would pay?’))” (p.
380). They did not provide support for the claim of wide acceptance.
148
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inconsequential mistakes.149 They demonstrated that simple interpretations might lead
to conclusions that the data support theories grounded in framing (such as endowment
theory with reference points set by either endowments or expectations), but more
sophisticated analyses suggest that theories that assume “game form misconceptions”
fit the data better. Specifically, the data suggested that a substantial portion of subjects
“believe that the payment mechanism is similar to a first-price procurement auction in
which the lowest offer wins and is paid the offer price” (Cason and Plott 2014, p. 1257).
The basic conclusion is that unless misconceptions are controlled, it is difficult to
determine whether game form misconceptions or framing theories (or other sorts of
theories) explain observed phenomena. In addition, if testing a theory or set of theories
requires the elicitation of non-strategic (or true) valuations, the presence of game form
misconceptions will make testing those theories impossible.
In line with the insights of Cason and Plott (2014), Loomes et al. (2010) tested whether
market discipline shrinks observed valuation gaps. They designed an experiment to
investigate how feedback generated by the market impacts reported valuations. If market
discipline works to encourage the reporting of true valuations and individuals are not loss
averse, gaps should decrease in magnitude and eventually disappear as the market institution administers discipline. Specifically, the market discipline hypothesis predicts that
negative experiences triggered by non-optimal choices that are punished by the market
will encourage optimal choices—in this context the reporting of true valuations—in subsequent rounds. The authors employed a median-price auction, which is demand revealing
but does not systematically bias bids and asks.150 After explaining the auction procedures,
subjects participated in two hypothetical practice rounds for induced-value vouchers (i.e.,
tickets with a certain value that can be exchanged for cash at the end of the experiment).
Next subjects took part in two binding practice rounds, one as owner and one as nonowner. Subjects were then trained on the special features of the auctions for lottery tickets,
and two hypothetical practice rounds were conducted using lottery tickets (e.g., a 19%
chance of winning X and an 81% chance of winning Y). Following the practice rounds,
eight lottery rounds were conducted, two of which collected measures of WTP and WTA
used to estimate the valuation gap. Subjects reported their valuations by answering a series
of yes/no questions (e.g., would you pay X to get a lottery ticket?) ordered to narrow down
to true valuations. After each round the market price was announced for that round, and
subjects were informed about their outcomes. Each auction was repeated six times. One
round of one auction was chosen at random at the end of the experiment, and payments
were made based on the outcome of the chosen auction round. Valuation gap magnitudes

149
For example, if a subject reported a valuation of $3 and the random offer was $4, the subject
would receive $4, the same amount he would have received had he reported $2 as his valuation. He
loses only if the random offer falls between $2 and his higher reported valuation. In that case, he
would keep the card and receive $2 rather than the higher random offer.
150
Second-price auctions, the authors pointed out, might encourage owners to increase
(and non-owners to decrease) reported valuations across rounds. This is due to the fact that the
announced market clearing price in owner (non-owner) auctions likely will be higher (lower) than
the average valuation, and the announced prices might give rise to “shaping effects”—a tendency
for subjects with uncertain valuations to shift their reported valuations towards the announced
market clearing price.
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decreased over the rounds but did not completely disappear. The authors interpreted this
result as support for the market discipline hypothesis.
Lunn and Lunn (2014) proposed a “computational theory of exchange” in line with,
but more precise than, Plott and Zeiler’s (2005) notion of reliance on basic instincts: sell
high and buy low. Specifically, Lunn and Lunn assumed that individuals, when responding
to elicitations of valuations in unfamiliar settings, “behave as if they are at the start of a
potential sequence of trading opportunities, when in fact they are in a one-shot market
that will clear at a single price” (p. 5). The basic idea is that “agents will simply extend
a logic that they use successfully outside the laboratory to a one-shot experiment where,
effectively, it backfires” (p. 5). The model predicts that WTA will exceed WTP because
owners, aiming to maximize their surplus, will ask for an amount that exceeds the true
value and that depends on their beliefs about what others are willing to pay, and nonowners, also aiming to maximize their surplus, will offer an amount that is lower than
the true value and depends on their beliefs about what the current owners are willing to
accept. Owners and non-owners both assume that they will get a chance to make another
offer if the first is rejected and another if the second is rejected, and so on, even if the rules
of the auction do not allow for this. The model also predicts that, if an individual is choosing between the good and cash, he will report his true valuation or certainty equivalent
(CE). The prediction that separates this theory from others is the relationship between the
CE and the reported valuations of owners and non-owners. The model predicts that as
one’s CE increases, the ratio between WTA and CE should approach 1 from above, and
the ratio between WTP and CE should approach 1 from below. Lunn and Lunn derived
predictions about the relationships between CE, WTA, and WTP for five alternative
theories, all of which differ from the predictions from their theory. They used data from
previously published studies to test their theory against the others. Data gathered by
multiple experimenters supported the model and did not support predictions of the alternative theories. The authors argued that the theory is consistent with self-reports of how
subjects set WTA and WTP, the observed correlation between willingness to exchange
and perceptions of what others will pay or accept, subject perceptions of market prices,
subject responses to feedback on what others pay or accept, and associations between the
likelihood of future exchange and reluctance to trade. They claimed that the model might
also provide insights into the findings of both Plott and Zeiler (2005) and List (2003), but
they did not elaborate.
Finally, Bartling et al. (2015), building on Cason and Plott (2014), studied whether misconceptions about the elicitation device are necessary to produce valuation gaps. Bartling
et al.’s aim was to implement procedures to control misconceptions in experiments that
asked subjects to value induced-value cards and to determine whether such controls
eliminate valuation gaps. In each session, subjects were randomly assigned to be either all
buyers or all sellers and were told they would get a show-up fee of 25 CHF. The multiple
price list method was used to elicit valuations for an induced-value card that could be
exchanged at the end of the experiment for 8.50 CHF. Both buyers and sellers received
a card. Buyers were told that they could purchase it; sellers were told that the card was
theirs and that they owned it but that they could sell it to the experimenter. The multiple
price list was different from the usual list. In each row, the list informed subjects of the
outcome of each choice. For example, the buyers’ list contained two rows not included in
the usual list: one labeled “Final payoff (25 CHF – price + value of card)” and the other
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labeled “Final Payoff (25 CHF).” The cells in these two columns revealed the total payout
that would result for each option in that row. For example, in the row asking whether the
subject would be willing to purchase the card for 1 CHF, the subject was informed that he
would gain 32.50 CHF if he bought at that price and 25 CHF if he did not. Subjects were
constrained to a single switching point. After subjects made choices in each row, they were
required to report the final payoff for each choice. The list, including columns with final
payoffs for each choice, was in front of them during this exercise. Each subject was allowed
to alter choices in this phase. If the subject entered all payoffs correctly, he earned 2 CHF.
If mistakes were made, the subject was asked to try again. The subject could continue
only when all answers were correct. Subjects then conducted the same exercise with one
alteration—the induced-value card was replaced with a box of chocolates.151 As in the first
part, the outcome of each choice was presented to the subjects. For example, in the row
asking whether the subject would be willing to purchase the box for 1 CHF, the subject
was informed that he would gain “24 CHF + chocolate” if he bought at that price and 25
CHF if he did not. As in the first part, subjects were required to report how much money
they would receive for each option and whether they would get the chocolate. Changes
were possible during this phase, subjects were paid for correct answers on the first attempt,
and they could move on only if all answers were correct.152 Given that the outcomes from
each choice were presented to the subjects, Bartling et al. unsurprisingly observed a higher
rate of optimal choices in the induced-value card exercise than did Cason and Plott (71%
v. 17%). Eighty-one percent of subjects correctly reported the outcome for each choice
at the first attempt. Bartling et al. then split the subjects into two groups based on their
performance in the first part. A subject was categorized as “sophisticated” if she both
valued the card correctly and correctly identified outcomes across all potential prices at
the first attempt in both parts. The main result was that a statistically significant valuation
gap for the box of chocolates was observed when including only subjects classified as
sophisticated. The authors interpreted the results as evidence that gaps can persist even in
the presence of evidence of a lack of misconceptions. Unfortunately, they did not go one
step further to give the reader a sense of which theories might best explain the observed
gap.
6.7 Gaps in Lottery Valuations: Loss Aversion, Question-Influenced Beliefs, Focus Bias,
or Gambling Wealth?
Several researchers have studied reluctance to trade lottery tickets. While endowment
theory, which assumes a riskless environment and a market for a certain good (e.g.,
mugs, pens, and chocolates), makes no predictions about disparities in lottery valuations,
Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory does. The nature of lotteries gives rise
to a number of alternative theories as well. This section begins with a debate involving
valuations of lotteries by subjects in Plott and Zeiler’s (2005) practice rounds. Following
The boxes were purchased from a local, well-known shop at a retail price of 17 CHF.
Subjects were not informed of the price.
152
The authors used audio recordings to instruct the subjects and posted the recordings on-line
for easy access. This potentially allows for better replicability relative to having the conductor of the
experiment read the instructions aloud.
151

Joshua C. Teitelbaum and Kathryn Zeiler - 9781849805674
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 03/24/2018 11:07:59AM
via Boston University Pappas Law Library

412

Research handbook on behavioral law and economics

that, a quick overview of more general studies of lotteries and the theories developed to
explain reluctance to trade lotteries is provided.
Isoni et al. (2011) questioned the generalizability of Plott and Zeiler’s (2005) misconceptions conjecture by pointing to the fact that valuation gaps remain in Plott and Zeiler’s 14
practice rounds using lottery tickets. The authors posed the question: if procedures are
in place to mitigate misconceptions, what explains observed gaps in the lottery rounds?
Plott and Zeiler’s design was replicated in some aspects, but not all, although the differences arguably are irrelevant given that the results were similar in all relevant aspects to
Plott and Zeiler’s results. Isoni et al. observed gaps for four out of five lotteries. Using
Plott and Zeiler’s data, they also reported gaps in all their lottery rounds. They concluded
that it is “not credible to propose that misconceptions about a common set of elicitation
procedures persist . . . and then suddenly disappear when the mug task is faced” (2011,
p. 1005). The authors offered some conjectures to explain the mug results—that design
features might have “reduced the salience of the distinction between buying and selling
tasks,” that placement of mugs in front of both buyers and sellers might have affected
subjects’ reference points (presumably the implication is that buyers’ reference points were
impacted by possession in the absence of ownership), that training and practice somehow
weaken an individual’s perception of “not trading” as a reference point (although this is
less likely in Plott and Zeiler’s Treatment 2, where subjects report mug valuations before
the 14 paid lottery rounds), that the no-gap mug result was driven by house money effects
triggered by the payment of a show-up fee,153 and that the differing nature of the goods
(mugs v. lotteries) explains the disparity in results.
Plott and Zeiler (2011) provided a more nuanced analysis of the lottery data both
from Plott and Zeiler (2005) and Isoni et al. (2011), which demonstrates that the data
do not support endowment theory, despite the presence of a gap and Isoni et al.’s claim
that they controlled for “all sources of contamination.” The problems seem to stem from
issues listed in Plott and Zeiler (2005; footnote 15), including subjects’ perceptions of the
nature of randomization and the concept of probability. First, in the four lottery rounds
using degenerate lotteries with certain outcomes (e.g., 50% chance of 20 cents and 50%
chance of 20 cents), an average of 23% of Isoni et al.’s subjects reported strictly dominated
valuations. Interestingly only 3% of Plott and Zeiler’s subjects on average did the same.
The difference in procedures used during the training rounds might explain the disparate
results. In addition, 13% of Isoni et al.’s subjects and 8% of Plott and Zeiler’s subjects
reported valuations at or outside the range of possible outcomes in the large stakes lottery
rounds with non-negative outcomes.
Perhaps more telling, subjects were more likely to ask at or above the upper bound as
sellers, and bid at or below the lower bound as buyers. When these subjects are removed
from the dataset, gaps disappear for two of the ten examined lotteries (using 90%
confidence as the cut-off), and the magnitude of the gap diminishes substantially for
the others. These results suggest potential asymmetric beliefs about the outcomes of the
lotteries that are tied to buyer/seller roles. Plott and Zeiler (2011) also reported evidence
rejecting prospect theory’s assumption of stable risk preferences in the domains of gains
and losses. Specifically, prospect theory assumes risk aversion when uncertain gains are
153

See text accompanying footnote 137.
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valued and risk seeking behavior when uncertain losses are valued. The lottery valuation
data reported by both Plott and Zeiler (2005) and Isoni et al. (2011) fail to support this
basic assumption of prospect theory.
Plott and Zeiler (2011) referred to the potential impact of ownership on beliefs as a
“question-influenced beliefs conjecture,” and it stands as an alternative explanation for
lottery gaps.154 In fact, given the evidence that subjects might perceive the same lottery
as two different items (with two different likely outcomes), lotteries might be ill-suited
for testing endowment theory, which assumes that buyers and sellers value the same good
differently given loss aversion. Even if we start with the assumption that the goods are the
same in the eyes of buyers and sellers, the question-influenced beliefs conjecture stands
as an alternative to endowment theory, and the employed designs cannot separate them.
Plott and Zeiler (2010) laid out a potential roadmap for applying revealed theory methodology to control for lottery misconceptions using controls adopted in the literature
involving lottery valuation elicitation.
Finally, Plott and Zeiler (2011) called into question Isoni et al.’s alternative explanations
for the no-gap results in Plott and Zeiler’s (2005) and Isoni et al.’s (2011) mug rounds. In
the end this conversation raises more questions than it resolves: What exactly causes gaps
in lottery rounds? How can we control for misconceptions related to the nature of randomness? How might show-up fees impact on buyer valuations? How might possession
impact buyer valuations? How might training and practice related to the elicitation device
impact on one’s reference point? While some research exists on many of these questions
(and is discussed throughout this chapter), more work is required to better understand
these various influences.
Rather than implementing Plott and Zeiler’s revealed theory methodology to control
for lottery misconceptions, Fehr et al. (2015) took a different approach to test Plott and
Zeiler’s misconceptions conjecture. They used procedures similar to Plott and Zeiler’s
(2005) treatments with binding experience (i.e., the lottery rounds) to elicit valuations
for lotteries and commodities (mugs and USB sticks). Subjects were trained in both the
BDM procedure and how to locate their true valuations, and they participated in two
practice rounds, during which they were allowed to ask questions in private (as opposed
to publicly in Plott and Zeiler). Also, unlike in Plott and Zeiler, choices and payouts were
not anonymous.155 Akin to Bartling et al. (2015), Fehr et al. then used reported lottery
valuations to categorize subjects as either “rational” or “irrational.” For example, they
categorized a subject as “rational” if he reported valuations that were either on or inside
the lottery bounds for all lotteries. Of the 95 subjects who reported valuations for a mug
in the final round, 42 (44%) fit the bill. Using only the mug valuations of these subjects,
a valuation gap was observed. The authors interpreted this as evidence against the
misconceptions theory. Using other definitions of “rational,” they found similar results.
The second major finding was that, unlike Plott and Zeiler (2005) and Isoni et al. (2011),
Given the experiment design, it is impossible, of course, to separate the impact of questioninfluenced beliefs on valuations within the bounds from the impact of loss aversion or other forces.
It is reasonable, though, to believe that question-influenced beliefs play at least some role in gaps
for subjects who did not bid at or outside the lottery bounds.
155
Recall, however, that Brown and Cohen (2015) reported findings suggesting that results are
similar under anonymous and non-anonymous conditions.
154
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they observed gaps in valuations of both mugs and USB sticks. Thus, the main result of
the two previous studies was not replicated. These results potentially called into question
the stability of the no-gap result under the Plott and Zeiler (2005) procedures, but were
inconsistent with numerous replications of the no-gap result (see, e.g., Kovalchik et al.
2005; Roth 2005; Isoni et al. 2011; Kingsley and Brown 2012; Brown and Cohen 2015).
Others have studied gaps in lottery valuations, and the results support a number of
theories. Some have gone back to basics to study the impacts of income effects. Schmidt
and Traub (2009) designed an experiment to study within-subject gaps in lotteries and
whether income effects cause observed gaps in lottery valuations. They controlled income
effects by endowing buyers with an amount of money equal to the highest possible outcome of the lottery endowed to sellers. In addition, in most rounds all buyers and sellers
started from and ended in a risky position, which controlled any influences of movements
from risky to non-risky positions and vice versa. They concluded that income effects
cannot account for gaps in lottery valuations, but that the experiment design might. In
particular, their data suggest that lottery valuation gaps might be driven by disparities in
starting and ending risk positions across buyers and sellers and by between-subject gap
measurement. Interestingly, just as reported by Plott and Zeiler (2011), some of Schmidt
and Traub’s subjects reported valuations above the largest possible outcome and below the
smallest possible outcome. These data suggest a possible misunderstanding of the nature
of lotteries, an issue in need of further study.
Others have explored whether gaps are robust in terms of the size of the stakes.
Blavatskyy and Pogrebna (2010) cleverly employed data compiled from the television
show Deal or No Deal, where contestants are given sealed boxes containing some unknown
amount of money picked from a known distribution of possible monetary prizes ranging
from one cent to half a million euros and asked whether they wish to exchange it for
another sealed box containing a different unknown amount of money picked from the
same known distribution. Their results suggest that when individuals choose in high
stakes environments, exchange asymmetries are substantially reduced.
Others have tested psychological theories related to risk perception. Peters et al. (2003)
tested a theory related to affect, which assumes that, when valuing lottery tickets, owners
focus on the best possible outcome and have negative affect towards giving up the chance
to win that amount. Non-owners, on the other hand, focus on the amount of money
they must give up to obtain the ticket and on the likelihood of ending up with the worst
possible outcome.156 Peters et al. elicited valuations for lotteries with two possible nonnegative monetary outcomes (e.g., a 5% chance of winning $100 and a 95% of winning
nothing). Subjects reported their feelings towards the lottery—sellers were asked to report

156
This research builds on an earlier study by Einhorn and Hogarth (1985). They posited that
owners and non-owners of insurance would pay different amounts of attention to possible losses
when considering whether to sell or buy insurance, which drives owner valuations higher than
non-owner valuations. The authors found a predicted gap between valuations of buyers and sellers
of (hypothetical) insurance. Others have posited different models of lottery value construction. For
example, Johnson and Busemeyer (2005) developed the Sequential Value Matching model, which
assumes that sellers start with a high price and then insufficiently adjust downwards to reach their
indifference point, whereas buyers start with a low price and insufficiently adjust upwards on the
way towards their indifference point.
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how they would feel about not having the ticket, and buyers were asked how they would
feel about having the ticket—and then each subject reported valuations as both buyer
and seller, half as seller first and half as buyer first. The BDM mechanism was used to
encourage subjects to report non-strategic valuations, and subjects were trained on how
the mechanism works. The theory predicts higher valuations for potential sellers. The
authors observed a valuation gap and reported other evidence supporting their posited
role of affect. The authors acknowledged the possibility that the form of the questions
about affect might have caused the gap, but they downplayed it given the gap’s robustness
in the literature to date. What we have learned about procedures since then, however,
suggests that getting subjects to focus on affect before reporting valuations likely impacts
on their valuations. Whether gaps exist outside the lab when individuals are not prompted
to focus on affect is unclear.
Finally, in a new addition to the ever-growing stack of theoretical explanations,
Lewandowski (2014) challenged the predictive value of the basic tenet of consequentialism that assumes that individuals make choices conditional on their total wealth. In most
experiments, subjects are asked to report valuations for lotteries with small values relative
to total wealth. Under expected utility theory and certain assumptions about relative
risk aversion, individuals are assumed to be risk neutral when it comes to small-value
lotteries. Thus, standard expected utility predicts no gap in small-value lottery valuations.
Lewandowski strayed from the standard model only by assuming that individuals do not
consider their total wealth but rather the amount of wealth with which they are willing
to gamble (aka “gambling wealth”). Similarly, Fudenberg and Levine (2006) developed a
dynamic model in which the long-term self controls various short-term selves. The longterm self allows the current short-term self to take only a small amount of money (aka
“pocket cash”) to places that entice with discretionary spending opportunities (e.g., the
casino or the nightclub). This sort of model assumes that short-term selves make choices
that are optimal given a small amount of wealth. Lewandowski’s expected utility theory
with gambling wealth predicted gaps in lotteries, but he did not attempt to determine
whether his theory explains the variation in reported results. This would seem to require
a set of hypotheses about how experimental procedures impact perceptions about wealth
or a method for estimating beliefs over wealth.
6.8 Transaction Disutility, Bad Deal Aversion, and Regret Avoidance
As another alternative to endowment theory, some have posited that owners ask for
amounts in excess of their consumption values not to compensate for disutility from
experienced losses but to avoid regret. Bar-Hillel and Neter (1996) found that subjects
were reluctant to trade an endowed lottery ticket for an alternative identical ticket plus
a small monetary incentive. Conversely, over 90% of subjects were willing to trade an
endowed pen for an identical pen plus a small cash bonus. They interpreted the evidence
as support for the claim that
two lottery tickets, even if they are identical as gambles, have the potential to have different
worth once the gambles are played and the uncertainty resolved. . . . [T]he mere fact that two
lottery tickets have the potential to result in different outcomes, and in particular, one can result
in a desired outcome while the other results in a less desired outcome, suffices to induce an
anticipation of regret (which is assumed to be larger for an exchange than for its refusal). (p. 26)
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Van de Ven and Zeelenberg (2011) also found that subjects were reluctant to exchange a
lottery ticket for an identical lottery ticket even when they could receive a free pen if they
exchanged. When they removed anticipation of regret by making it impossible for subjects
to know whether they would have won the lottery had they kept the initial endowment,
reluctance to trade was reduced, suggesting that anticipated regret accounts for observed
reluctance to trade lotteries, at least in part. In another treatment, subjects were given
information that would allow them to know whether they would have won the lottery had
they traded. In addition, those who traded would know whether they would have won had
they not traded. In this symmetric information treatment, 77% of subjects traded, and
that percentage exceeded the percentage who traded in a baseline treatment where only
traders would know whether they would have won had they not traded.
Note that these sorts of designs make it difficult to rule out loss aversion as an explanation for gaps given that subjects were paid to trade. It could be that the payment to trade
is sufficient to compensate for the disutility from the loss. Kogler et al. (2013) addressed
this by designing an experiment to keep the costs of trading and not trading the same.
In one experiment, half the subjects were given a lottery ticket and the other half were
allowed to inspect one. They were then given the choice of keeping the owned or inspected
ticket or getting another identical ticket with the same chance of winning. Both tickets
were in possession at the time of choice. Subjects did not receive a bonus for trading, and
transactions costs, possession and information were identical across treatments. Half of
the non-owners kept the inspected ticket, but the vast majority of owners held on to the
endowed ticket. After choices were made, valuations for the chosen ticket relative to the
other ticket were elicited. Subjects were asked to state the least amount they would accept
to give up the ticket they now owned in exchange for the other ticket. Endowment theory
predicts similar valuations for the two groups, but the average valuation of initial owners
was higher than the average valuation of initial inspectors. This result is not predicted
by endowment theory, but it might be in line with regret theory. Bar-Hillel and Neter
(1996) found evidence of higher levels of regret for previously owned tickets that were
given away and turned out to be winners relative to a ticket that was not chosen from a
choice set. Thus, feelings of regret depend on both the outcome and on the action taken.
When subjects were asked to report anticipated feelings of regret based on hypothetical
situations, the highest levels of regret were recorded for switching possessors relative
to non-switching possessors and inspectors who either switched or did not. When the
experimenters ran the same design with mugs instead of lottery tickets, subjects who were
endowed with a mug were reluctant to switch for an identical mug, whereas statistically
half of inspectors chose the inspected mug. Reported valuations of owned mugs did not
differ between initial owners and initial inspectors. The authors concluded that both
endowment theory and regret theory have roles to play depending on whether subjects
are evaluating riskless or risky goods.
Isoni (2011) proposed a model that assumes reference-independent valuations for
consumption goods. Her model generated valuation gaps instead by assuming price
sensitivity and bad-deal aversion. Individuals were characterized by price sensitivity if
they got utility from making good deals and suffered disutility from being “ripped off.”
Bad-deal aversion is the notion that the pain associated with bad deals outweighs the
pleasure derived from same-sized good deals. Isoni defined good and bad deals relative
to the expected price, potentially justified by the fact that individuals normally consider
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a posted price when deciding whether to trade. In environments in which the price is
unknown, individuals form expectations about the price, and they experience utility or
disutility depending on how the expected price compares with the actual price. Thus,
owners will report valuations in excess of their true valuations to avoid selling at a price
below the expected price, and non-owners will report valuations below their true valuations to avoid buying at a price above the expected price. The model predicts not only gaps
in WTA and WTP but also decaying gaps in repeated markets, shaping effects (i.e., the
tendency for reported valuations to move in the direction of announced market clearing
prices in repeated markets), and variations in reported valuations elicited using different
versions of demand-revealing elicitation devices. Isoni’s analysis of the data and the leading theories concludes that bad-deal aversion might be best at organizing the data existing
at the time. As she noted, however, it cannot account for exchange asymmetries in simple
exchange experiments such as those undertaken by Knetsch (1989). In those experiments,
the price (i.e., the alternative good) was known at the time of the choice.
Weaver and Frederick (2012) reported evidence of bad-deal aversion, which they
referred to as “transaction disutility.” Half of the endowed owners of boxes of candy
were told that the market price of the candy at a local movie theatre was $4, and the other
half were told that a retail store sold the candy for $1.49 per box (both true statements).
Non-owners were split into two groups, and they reported valuations under the same two
conditions as owners. The BDM mechanism was used to elicit valuations (price lists were
not provided to avoid introduction of alternative reference prices). Under endowment
theory, revealed market prices should not impact reported valuations. Bad deal avoidance,
on the other hand, predicts that moderate market reference prices will decrease reported
owner valuations, reducing or eliminating valuation gaps. The results supported bad deal
avoidance. A gap was observed in the high reference price treatment, but not in the moderate reference price treatment. Owner valuations were significantly lower in the moderate
revealed market price treatment relative to the high revealed market price treatment, but
non-owner valuations were not significantly different across treatments. The authors
ran a second experiment using mechanical pencils with different prices on affixed tags
with similar results (i.e., WTA exceeded WTP in the high market price condition but not
in the moderate market price condition, and the increased market price pushed owner
valuations higher but not non-owner valuations). A separate experiment confirmed that
non-owner valuations respond to a change in the market price from moderate to low but
not moderate to high. Weaver and Frederick acknowledged that their theory could not
account for all results reported in the literature, and thus they argued that their theory
should supplement rather than supplant other theories that have found support in the
literature.
Evidence for regret theory has been found in simple exchange experiments as well.
Ratan (2014) conducted simple exchange experiments and gave subjects 24 hours to
reverse the decision made in the lab. Subjects performed a simple task to earn a good (a
drink bottle or bookmark—randomly assigned across subjects). Endowment through
earning was meant to ensure feelings of endowment without using language to emphasize
ownership to avoid signaling relative value (see Plott and Zeiler 2007). Subjects completed
a questionnaire and then were supplied with the alternative good for inspection. They
were informed of the store prices, the same for both goods, to remove any question about
relative values. Choices were made privately and while subjects were in possession of both
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goods. Two treatments were conducted. In the first, decisions made in the lab were final.
In the second, subjects were told that they could reverse their decision during the next 24
hours. Subjects who could not reverse their decision exhibited reluctance to trade while
those who could did not. Neither endowment theory nor expectation theory can explain
this result. Anticipated regret theory, however, is consistent with the result. The ability to
reverse the decision protects subjects against choosers’ remorse.
Arlen and Tontrup (2015) designed a set of experiments to test the assumption that
anticipated regret impacts choices only when the individual feels solely responsible for the
choice.157 If responsibility is shared, for example with an agent or a set of fellow voters,
then anticipated regret should influence choices less strongly, and we should observe less
reluctance to trade. In a base treatment, subjects were endowed with a lottery ticket and
asked whether they wanted to trade the ticket for an identical ticket plus a small monetary
bonus. In line with previous results, a statistically significant positive percentage of
subjects rejected the trade. The result did not change when subjects were told that another
subject’s agent recommended trading. A statistically significantly higher percentage of
subjects (relative to the base treatment) traded when told that an actual agent was paid
to recommend trading, and, in fact, recommended trading (69% v. 30% in the lab; 78%
v. 56% in treatments conducted online). This supports anticipated regret theory’s prediction related to sole versus shared decision responsibility. In addition, relative to the base
treatment, a statistically significantly higher percentage of subjects (79%) voted to trade
when told that the outcome of a majority vote of at least 80 subjects would determine
each subject’s outcome. A similar result was observed when subjects were told the same,
but also that they could veto the vote outcome and decide on their outcomes individually.
In the veto-vote treatment, 85% of subjects voted to trade and only 11% of subjects vetoed
the group decision and kept their endowed ticket. In other treatments, the authors found
evidence suggesting that individuals are willing to pay to shed sole responsibility for the
decision. The authors argued that their results posed a serious challenge to the common
assumption that legal intervention is required to alleviate inefficiencies that arise from
reluctance to trade. They argued that individuals often use responsibility-shifting institutions to avoid anticipated regret and that efficient outcomes are more likely to result from
allowing private orderings relative to interventions that are ill-equipped to sort people by
preferences that we cannot observe.

Arlen and Tontrup seemed to assume throughout most of the article that anticipated
regret explains gaps generally, although, as is obvious from this review, the theory is inconsistent
with a number of reported results. For example, the theory cannot explain no-gap results in
experiments that use commodities such as mugs and pens and that do not take steps to eliminate
subject uncertainty over value. They did acknowledge near the end of the paper that in some
cases reluctance to trade might be caused by “loss aversion caused by attachment to entitlements” (p. 176). This seems problematic for a couple of reasons. First, attachment is posited in
the literature generally as an alternative to endowment theory (reference dependent preferences
plus loss aversion) and not as a cause of loss aversion (one of the assumptions of endowment
theory). In fact, Tversky and Kahneman (1991), who the authors cite, did not mention the notion
of attachment in their development of endowment theory. Second, the authors’ results did not
support endowment theory, and the literature has moved away from it in the face of mounting
evidence against it.
157
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***
In summary, this section highlights the substantial number of theoretical explanations
for gaps that have been developed and tested, including endowment theory, substitution theory, expectation theory, preference uncertainty, mere-ownership theory, query
theory, enhancement theory, choice uncertainty, trade uncertainty, subject (game form)
misconceptions and reversion to basic market instincts, the computational theory of
exchange, the question-influenced beliefs conjecture, the gambling wealth conjecture,
transaction disutility, bad deal aversion and regret avoidance. The literature is also filled
with evidence related to experiment design features that might impact reluctance to
trade such as endowing sellers with the good but not buyers with cash (income effects),
endowing buyers with cash (house money effects), announcements of market clearing
prices, non-anonymous choices that offer signaling opportunities, length of ownership,
possession, and many more.
6.9 Synthesis and the Frontier
What general conclusions can we draw from the body of published evidence? Most importantly for legal scholarship, it is safe to conclude that, even though endowment theory
continues to be cited as the leading explanation of observed reluctance to trade (Klass and
Zeiler 2013), the theory has not held up well to the growing body of published data. The
social sciences literature essentially moved beyond it. This is not to say that loss aversion
and reference dependence have no possible role to play. While much evidence rejects the
claim that endowments set reference points, theorists have shifted the theory’s assumptions to suggest, for example, that expectations set reference points (Köszegi and Rabin
2006). While some evidence supports expectation theory (depending on its assumptions
about how we form expectations), it is inconsistent with a number of observations in the
lab, including some from experiments designed specifically to test it. The same is true for
a number of other theories. Preference uncertainty, mere-ownership theory, enhancement
theory, subject misconceptions, expectation theory and regret avoidance, among others,
have all garnered some support, but no one theory clearly rises to the top as the leading
explanation. More work is required to determine which best organizes the body of existing evidence and stands up to tests of robustness.
Although several theories remain in contention, some fare worse than others.
Explanations centered on wealth effects seem not to organize the data well. Gaps appear
in experiments with goods of relatively low value where we would not expect wealth
effects to impact valuations much, and at least some experiments that control for them
produce gaps when the theory predicts no gaps. Isoni (2011) convincingly argued that
Hanemann’s (1991) substitution theory was not a good candidate given the implausibly
large WTP response to income changes the theory would need to assume to fit the data.
In addition, substitution theory’s predictions are out of sync with reported valuations
of private goods with plentiful substitutes (e.g., mugs with a university logo available at
the campus bookstore) in environments where potential buyers are given cash to remedy
budget constraints.
That more than one explanation is at work is also possible. For example, Brown
(2005) reported evidence from subject self-reported explanations for gaps that might be
interpreted as support for commitment cost theory (e.g., “My thoughts are, what do I
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think I can get for the notebook” (p. 374)). Other self-reports suggested a reversion to
basic sell high/buy low instincts (“I grew up with ‘buy low, sell high’” (p. 374)). A handful of subjects complained about being broke, although none seemed worried that they
would be unable to obtain the good outside the lab if sold during the experiment, which
might constitute mixed evidence of an explanation grounded in substitution effects. Some
researchers directly tested multifaceted theories, which suggest that more than one driver
might be at work more generally. For example, Chatterjee et al. (2013) reported evidence
suggesting that both mere ownership, which they argued triggers an association of the self
with the object, and loss aversion played necessary roles in gap formation.158
Some have been working on developing new ways to test theories that attempt to
explain observed reluctance to trade.159 By running experiments on subjects while taking
images of their brains using functional MRI technology, researchers are able to identify
which parts of the brain are active during decision-making tasks involving valuation in
different roles.160 Research in brain science has taught us much about which parts of the
brains are active when we’re thinking strategically or motivated by fear or reacting to
potential rewards and losses. Even though we have roughly five decades of research on
this question under our belts, in many ways we are in the very early stages. Much more
work is required before we can confidently employ data from brain scans to home in on
the causes of reluctance to trade.

7.

CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR APPLICATIONS IN
LAW

Despite the numerous potential explanations for observed reluctance to trade, law and
policy scholars generally point to one, endowment theory, and proceed to work out both
descriptive theories and normative arguments in a wide variety of legal contexts based
on this single theory (Klass and Zeiler 2013). Indeed, even some economists emphasize
endowment theory despite numerous alternatives supported by equally strong evidence.161
While we might well have justified this approach during the 1990s, when endowment
theory was new and seemed to be gaining ground, following the turn of the century the
continued application of endowment theory in legal scholarship fell out of sync with the
economics literature; the latter has long since moved beyond endowment theory, while
legal scholarship has lagged behind.162
After reporting results that support their theory, the authors offer explanations for results
in the literature that seem to work against the theory. They also point out results their theory does
not predict, which opens the door for further exploration.
159
Morewedge and Giblin (2015) review some of the literature.
160
See Votinov et al. (2010) for a recent example. They provide a summary of the neuroeconomics literature on reluctance to trade, and highlight variation in results from these studies.
161
See, e.g., Johnson et al. (2006).
162
See Klass and Zeiler (2013). See also a recent review by law professor Korobkin (2014),
which mistakenly points to theories that were proposed as alternatives to endowment theory (e.g.,
attachment, transaction disutility, regret avoidance, and query theory) as drivers of loss aversion.
A recent review of some of the relevant literature by economists Ericson and Fuster (2014) more
accurately characterizes the alternative theories as alternatives to endowment theory and argues,
158
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Keeping up on developments in the economics literature is not the only issue with which
legal scholars have struggled in their attempts to import findings related to reluctance to
trade from economics into law. First, at least some legal scholars mistakenly assume that
observed deviations from predictions of standard economic models trigger a need for
intervention. To determine whether and how to intervene, we need to understand what
drives the observed reluctance. As this review has attempted to highlight, economics
experiments are performed not only to identify whether gaps exist but also to identify
what explains them. And observed gaps do not necessarily support theories that assume
a lack of rationality.163 Different causes can lead to different policy responses and some
causes suggest no policy response is required. For example, if we believe that gaps are an
artifact of experiment designs that do not have analogs in settings outside the lab, then
we would not expect gaps outside the lab, and we would need no policy intervention. The
first step is to understand what causes observed reluctance to trade, and more work is
required. This, of course, does not mean we should not act until we fully understand the
cause(s). Intervention might be warranted before we achieve a full understanding, but we
must account for the risks of intervening in the face of incomplete information before
deciding whether and how to move forward. We must also accurately represent the state
of scientific knowledge when offering proposals.
Second, law and policy scholars tend to focus on the trees (or, more likely, a single tree)
and often fail to appreciate the large and continually changing forest (Klass and Zeiler
2013). The vastness of the reluctance to trade literature makes it impossible to draw
conclusions from any one study or even a handful of studies.164 As this review makes clear,
those who wish to draw lessons from the literature must evaluate the body of evidence as a
whole to understand which inferences are valid. The reluctance to trade literature reveals
that no one theory finds universal (or close to universal) support. Many open questions
remain. We are still in search of a theory that is able to organize a substantial portion of
the reported results. As is also clear, relying on second-hand descriptions of studies and
claims about what we can learn from any one study or the literature more generally is
dangerous. Both lawyers and economists sometimes get it wrong, even when describing
single studies.165 Best practice requires careful reading of primary sources.
Third, law and policy scholars often fail to appreciate how little weight we can
confidently place on any one experimental finding when we aim to import theory into
descriptive and normative claims related to law and policy. Findings reported in one study
that support some tested theory are but a first step on the road towards a theory with
support sufficient to warrant substantial weight. In well-developed literatures, such as the

as mentioned, that loss aversion remains a potential explanation, but as part of a substantially
modified version of endowment theory and only with the caveat that still more research is required.
163
See Zeiler (forthcoming). As mentioned, Tversky and Kahneman (1991) were agnostic as to
whether loss aversion is irrational. More generally, depending on the context in which they appear,
observed gaps sometimes constitute support for a wide array of rational choice theories.
164
See, e.g., Open Science Collaboration (2015) (“As much as we might wish it to be otherwise, a single study almost never provides definitive resolution for or against an effect and its
explanation”).
165
Some have gone as far as drawing inferences from “handfuls” of studies that do not exist.
See, e.g., Klass and Zeiler (2013) who point out Arlen and Talley’s (2008) unsupported claims.
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one on reluctance to trade, researchers have reported a substantial number of findings and
have posited and tested a wide array of theories. Law and policy scholars should strive to
identify the theory that best organizes the entire body of evidence in the literature. In high
quality studies, authors summarize the findings from the existing literature and attempt to
assess how well the tested theory organizes the entire body of evidence. If the study does
not provide such an analysis, the reader should either assess the theory along these lines or,
at a minimum, warn the reader of the literature’s existence.166 In addition, extreme caution
should be exercised until results are replicated (Open Science Collaboration 2015). The
first step in testing alternative theories is often to replicate reported results. Often, even
when the same or very similar procedures are used to elicit responses from subjects, results
vary, suggesting that the finding is fragile to changes in the subject pool or small variations in procedures. In law and policy scholarship, we should take care not to place much
weight, if any, on new results and those that have yet to be replicated. While waiting to
import a newly posited theory until it is supported by convincing evidence is unnecessary,
the importer should accurately report on the contours of the economics literature to give
readers an accurate sense of how much weight should be placed on the theory.
One approach a legal scholar might (mistakenly) take in the face of so many theory
contenders is that it doesn’t matter much what explains reluctance to trade. We know
individuals are reluctant—we observe it all the time in the lab. So, no matter what’s driving
it, the argument might go, we can expect reluctance. For example, if a legal rule places a
right or good into the hands of some party, that party will be reluctant to trade the right
or good away. Thus, counter to Coase’s (1960) famous prediction, law matters. The reluctance to trade might prevent the right or good from getting into the hands of the person
who values it the most. A closer analysis of the literature, however, demonstrates the flaw
in this reasoning. Certainty the law matters if we experience a disutility from the giving
up of something we own or expect to end up with. If endowment theory or expectation
theory explains observed reluctance to trade in the lab, we might expect individuals to be
tight-fisted when it comes to legal entitlements, at least under certain conditions. If, on the
other hand, uncertain preferences explain reluctance to trade in the lab, our take changes.
First, we might expect less uncertainty outside the lab. Second, we might be able to find
ways to assist individuals with preference discovery. The same sort of analysis applies if
subject misconceptions are responsible for reluctance to trade in the lab. We would start
by asking whether we expect such misconceptions outside the lab. In contexts in which
individuals face unfamiliar elicitation devices, we might require information disclosures
that help ensure accurate reporting. Of course, this sort of requirement would be unnecessary if observed gaps are caused by loss aversion as opposed to misconceptions. If loss
aversion explains observed gaps, then we would not perceive valuation gaps as errors, and
we would be best served by allowing free expression of preferences. Although we might
worry that goods might not make it into the hands of the individual with the highest
The most unhelpful approach is to point readers to a subset of studies that support the
author’s pet theory while failing to include others that do not, even when they are published in the
same journal issue as the cited studies. (See, e.g., Korobkin (2014), which cites Isoni et al. (2011)
but not Plott and Zeiler (2011), which is printed immediately following the former and provides
evidence against many of its claims.) Law review editing procedures are not set up to catch this sort
of cherry picking. Misleading reviews serve to exacerbate the confusion in legal scholarship.
166
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value conditional on ownership. As these examples illustrate, it matters greatly for legal
applications which theory rises to the top as the leading theory.
The experimental literature on reluctance to trade is not unlike other literatures on a
variety of issues studied by economists and psychologists that potentially impact law and
policy. Most experimental literatures have features similar to the literature described here.
They report findings that support a substantial number of different theories. They are
comprised of studies that take incremental steps towards understanding some particular
observed phenomenon. They include studies that vary widely in the theories they test,
the methods they use to elicit subject responses, and the controls employed to rule out
alternative explanations. In our efforts to import interesting findings into law and policy,
we often lose sight of this variation and the limitations it places on our ability to draw
useful insights from a single study or a small number of studies. The detailed literature
review provided here will hopefully foster an appreciation for the nature of experimental
findings and a deeper understanding of how best to import them into legal scholarship.
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